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ABSTRACT  
   
This project develops the "socio-technical contract" concept, a notion that 
signifies the kinds of socio-technological assumptions and arrangements that 
characterize a particular domain of policy or practice. Socio-technical contracts, unlike 
their social contract counterparts in political theory, represent active negotiation and 
renegotiation of social contracts around emerging technologies, as opposed to the tacit 
social contracts of thinkers such as Locke. I use the socio-technical contract concept to 
analyze the governance of assisted reproductive technologies in the United Kingdom. 
For increasing numbers of people, reproduction is happening in a fundamentally different 
way. Conception outside of the womb became a reality with the 1978 birth of Louise 
Brown, the first baby born via in-vitro fertilization. Alongside Louise Brown's birth 
emerged new social and governance configurations around reproductive technologies, 
including, in the United Kingdom, the establishment of a national regulatory agency, the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. The project applies the socio-technical 
contract concept in order to examine how distributed governance and socio-cultural 
processes in the British context worked over time to renegotiate fundamental ideas 
about families and kinship, the boundaries of "ethical" science, rules governing release 
of information, the "right to an identity," the role of the state in the reproductive choices 
of individuals, and general approaches to how to think about the roles and relationships 
of the child, parents, and the state in and around the introduction of these technologies. 
As these changes have occurred, policies, social understandings, and legal rights have 
been renegotiated and new governance capacities, what I call "anticipatory capacities," 
have come into existence to manage and coordinate change across complex social 
systems. In illuminating anticipatory capacities in each context, I explore the tools 
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deployed by government actors, scientists, stakeholders, and citizens in negotiating 
evolving socio-technical contracts around reproductive technologies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ANTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE AND SOCIO-TECHNICAL CONTRACTS 
“In the technical realm we repeatedly enter into a series of social contracts, the terms of which 
are revealed only after the signing.” –Langdon Winner 
 
Introduction 
The idea that the pace of technological change has accelerated to an extremely 
rapid rate—and that society must race to catch up—pervades contemporary 
conversations about technologies. Today the idea of novelty is valorized, especially in 
science and technology. Social discourse abounds with anxiety about the unintended 
consequences of technological change, the failure of legal, policy, and ethical 
frameworks to keep up with new scientific advances, and thus the need to better govern 
new and emerging technologies.  For example, the headline of a recent article in MIT 
Technology Review stated, “Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology: Codes 
we live by, laws we follow, and computers that move too fast to care” (Wadhwa 2014).  
Similar headlines regarding fears of the implications of drones, NSA surveillance, social 
media, genetic modification, and other rapidly advancing areas of technology appear in 
the media on a daily basis.  Younger generations—portraying themselves as more adept 
and adaptable—accuse their elders of being out of touch with new technologies like 
social media, smart phones, and computers and the modes of sociality they enable. 
Nations around the world worry about falling behind their neighbors in producing 
scientists, engineers, and technologically literate publics, as well as in the science and 
technology at the heart of the knowledge economy. The dominant narrative is one of a 
struggle to keep pace as technology hurtles forward.  
These ideas—that there is a perennial lag in responding to technological 
change—are an illusion that we ourselves create. Discursive framings of the relationship 
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between the technical and the social postulate a technology independent of, external to, 
and ahead of attempts to regulate it, thereby creating the mirage (Johnson and Wetmore 
2009). Technology does not, of course, advance by itself, independent of human action 
(Smith and Marx 1994). Technological change emerges out of a variety of social, 
political, and economic processes and arrangements (Hughes 1990). We know that 
people invent technologies in the laboratory. But even as technologies enter the market 
and use, they are still in the process of being made, their trajectories influenced by the 
decisions and actions of a multiplicity of social agents (Kline and Pinch 1996). Even the 
idea that technology shapes society is a fiction: technologies do not enter the world from 
the outside; rather, in putting new technological capabilities to work for social goals, 
people co-produce social and technological orders (Jasanoff 2004; 1996). Perhaps most 
importantly of all, there have always existed an array of capacities for thinking ahead 
about what new technologies might mean for anticipating social and technological 
change and for making choices about and governing those technologies. For example, 
the idea that visions of the future condition how societies envision and construct 
technologies, and put those technologies to work in fashioning social, economic, and 
political arrangements, is at the heart of the concept of socio-technical imaginaries 
(Jasanoff and Kim 2009). Just as engineers not only imagine potential social needs and 
are inspired by science fiction in creating new technologies (Berne 2006), societies also 
engage in anticipation when they develop cultural, legal, and social frameworks for 
integrating new technologies into society (Barben et al. 2008). 
Today is an age of Frankenstein.  Critics decry the rise of Frankenfoods and 
scientific chimera, genetically modified organisms that integrate hybrid DNA from other 
organisms, monsters created in the laboratory rather than from nature (Turney 1998). A 
recent headline in the New York Daily Sun proclaimed: “Frankenstein Babies Legalized 
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in the UK” (White 2013). Scientists, it turned out, had received approval in Britain to use 
a process of mitochondrial transfer via in-vitro fertilization to eliminate the possibility that 
the resulting child would inherit a genetic disease linked to their mother’s mitochondrial 
DNA. If carried out, however, the resulting child would effectively have three genetic 
parents. Yet, Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein was written two centuries ago. Not only 
was the novel, often celebrated as the “first modern work of science fiction,” itself an 
anticipatory exercise, but society subsequently created around the novel and its themes 
a repertoire of cultural understandings, motifs, and discourses for grappling with the 
implications of new and emerging technologies. A purpose of this dissertation is to begin 
to explore these capacities for anticipation. 
Anticipatory Governance 
The idea that society is unable to keep pace with technological development, or 
integrate societal concerns into the governance of technology, was famously captured 
by Winner (1986) in The Whale and the Reactor. Winner argues that society 
“sleepwalks” through the process of constructing socio-technical worlds in a state of 
“technological somnambulism.”  By the time that society realizes the undesired 
consequences of new technologies and “wakes up,” Winner argues, society has already 
signed a social contract, the terms of which have been long set.  By then, it is “too late” 
to go back and renegotiate. Society is stuck with technologies that have enormous social 
consequences but cannot be changed, a perspective also offered by David Collingridge 
(1980) in The Social Control of Technology. 
More recently, the idea that society is responding too slowly to the rapid pace of 
technological change has been revitalized in the field of law. Gary Marchant, Douglas 
Sylvester, and Kenneth Abbott have argued, for example, that technology is “outpacing” 
the law, creating a “pacing problem” in which policy frameworks must race to catch up 
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with emerging technologies (Marchant et al. 2011).  In this view, the law “features as the 
loser in the endless race against ‘technology’,” recalling the imagery of the tortoise and 
the hare, with the slow moving law representing the tortoise, forever trying to catch up 
with the quick and nimble technological hare (Moses 2011, 763-4). 
I argue in this dissertation that this view—that society, law, and policy lag 
technology—is mistaken in important ways. My argument is rooted in the concept of 
anticipatory governance. Research on anticipatory governance maintains that society 
can actively and productively engage with new science and technology as it is being 
built, shaping both the trajectories of technological change and the ways in which 
technologies are taken up and integrated into social, economic, and political 
arrangements (Barben et al. 2008). To date, anticipatory governance has largely been 
viewed as a prospective exercise—that society needs to “build its muscles” for governing 
new and emerging technologies by cultivating the capabilities for governing in a forward-
looking way (Guston 2014). Yet the idea that one must build one’s muscles presumes 
that one has muscles in the first place. Indeed, as scholars such as Ronald Kline and 
Trevor Pinch have demonstrated, society often plays a very powerful role in shaping 
technological trajectories, even as it reconfigures social, economic, and political 
arrangements in and around new and emerging technologies (Kline and Pinch 1996). 
Taking this idea as its starting place, this dissertation has been motivated by the 
question: Are there signs that we are actually not sleepwalking through socio-technical 
configurations?  One such sign would be the identification of de facto anticipatory 
governance.  Thus the dissertation asks, what capacities does society already have in 
place to exercise anticipatory governance? 
To answer this question, the dissertation examines the history of the governance 
of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in the United Kingdom over the course of 
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the twentieth century.  In vitro fertilization and other areas of ART underwent extensive 
technological change in the second half of the twentieth century.  The United Kingdom, 
in particular, stood at the epicenter of this change and in societal efforts to govern this 
suite of technologies, a result of the birth of Louise Brown, the world’s first “test tube 
baby” in Oldham, UK, in 1978. Yet, even in my preliminary investigations, important 
anticipatory elements stood out in UK efforts to govern reproductive technologies.  As 
early as the 1920s, British debates about infertility included speculative assessments of 
future technologies captured, for example, in J.B.S. Haldane’s 1923 lecture, Daedulus, 
or Science and the Future, and Huxley’s novel Brave New World (1932). UK media and 
institutions debated the concept of ART for decades prior to the birth of Louise Brown. 
Even regulatory institutions, such as the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
while created after the birth of Louise Brown in 1990, were not simply reactive but rather 
took shape as part of a proactive, cultural effort to guide the future evolution of these 
technologies and the kinds of society Britain would create around them.  
The analysis of these case studies illuminates several broadly distributed 
capacities for engaging in anticipatory governance. Following the lead of Barben et al. 
(2008), these capacities can be described in terms of foresight, integration, and 
engagement. The dissertation examines capacities for imagining future technologies and 
societies, via a variety of both formal and informal techniques of foresight. Other 
important anticipatory capacities explored include: frameworks for judging and 
evaluating the particular ways in which the social and the technical get integrated in the 
development and application of new technologies; capacities for engaging citizen 
stakeholders in renegotiating governance arrangements around ART, both through 
deliberations in the public sphere, as well as through the courts; capacities for 
establishing normative standards and for using those standards to draw and enforce 
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boundaries around the limits of legitimate technological development; and the 
responsive capacities of scientists within laboratory contexts to think and respond 
critically and proactively to developments and debates taking place in society. 
In developing this argument, I build on and modify Winner’s own idea of a social 
contract for technology to argue that anticipatory governance consists of an ongoing 
exercise in the making and remaking of socio-technical contracts: the coupled 
configurations of social and technological arrangements through which societies 
envision and organize the construction and application of new and emerging 
technologies. Understood in these terms, the dissertation examines how societies 
actively imagine, deliberate, apply, scrutinize, evaluate, and renegotiate these socio-
technical contracts over time—in a forward-looking, anticipatory fashion—and the kinds 
of capacities they develop and exercise in so doing. Anticipatory governance thus 
represents the societally-embedded capacities opening up socio-technical contracts for 
reevaluation and reconfiguration, so as to “shap[e] things to come” (Barben et al. 2008, 
993). 
Governance and Anticipation 
In the rest of this chapter, my goal is to introduce the concept of anticipatory 
governance as I define it in relationship to existing literatures. First, I introduce it in 
relation to the broader concept of governance in political theory and political science.  I 
utilize Machiavelli’s concepts of fortuna and virtu in order to situate anticipatory 
governance within the context of political theory, and the tradition of cultivating leaders 
who have appropriate capacities for dealing with an uncertain future.  I then provide an 
overview of the concept of governance, distinguishing it from studies of government.  
Following recent work in policy studies, I define governance as extending beyond the 
formal institutions of government to include the full array of formal and informal 
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processes that policy action and the diverse actors (government institutions, 
stakeholders, NGOs, social movements, media, and cultural organizations) that 
contribute to them.  Approaching governance in this way helps establish the significance 
and importance of anticipatory capacities distributed throughout society.  
Second, I position my reading of anticipatory governance in relation to the 
existing literature on the concept, especially as it has been developed by scholars 
affiliated with the Center for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University.  I 
position the anticipatory governance framework as one component of the governance 
model discussed and defined within this chapter.  Drawing from the work of scholars 
such as Guston and Sarewitz (2002) and Barben et al. (2008), this section provides an 
overview of foresight, engagement, and integration as key elements of anticipatory 
governance that the rest of the dissertation then explores in British efforts to govern 
ART.   
Third, I introduce the notion of socio-technical contracts as my contribution to 
anticipatory governance.  In doing so, I revisit Winner’s concept of technological 
somnambulism and argue that anticipatory governance is a potential response to 
Winner’s dilemma.  This section develops the socio-technical contract concept as a tool 
for understanding the negotiation and renegotiation of socio-technical configurations. 
Drawing on Guston’s (2000) writings on the social contract for science, which provides a 
basis for the key argument of the socio-technical contract concept, I argue that unlike 
traditional social contracts presented by thinkers such as Locke, socio-technical 
contracts are not tacit, rather, they are (and must be) actively engaged with.   
The idea that governments should be proactive, rather than reactive, is not 
new.  Arguably, all political theory, in its rich and complex tapestry, in some respect 
begins with a disposition towards the future, and concerns itself with the question: how 
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can we prepare for the unknown, for what comes next? While preparing for the unknown 
can be found as a motif in almost any of the writings of the great political theorists, it is 
particularly salient in the writings of Machiavelli.  Machiavelli cautions leaders to be 
proactive in mitigating bad fortune. Rather than leaders attempting to “predict” the future 
through prophesy, oracles, and divination, he argues that there are other ways of 
preparing for the future., In The Prince, Machiavelli paints a picture of a world in which 
two predominant forces are at work, fortuna and virtu.  Fortuna is like a raging river, 
unpredictable and volatile.  All hope is not lost, however, Machiavelli argues. Leaders 
can mitigate the consequences of the unknown fortuna: 
everything flies before it, all yield to its violence, without 
being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, though its 
nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when 
the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both 
with defences and barriers, in such a manner that, rising 
again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their force 
be neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous (1975, 
chapter xxv) . 
It is through virtu that the forces of fortuna can be tamed.  Virtu is a disposition that 
leaders must cultivate if they are to prepare for the unknown.  A state’s leaders must 
embody virtu, in order to approach and handle “a diversity of temporal conditions” 
(Machiavelli 1989, 453).  As James Pocock argues in his seminal work, The 
Machiavellian Moment, Machiavelli’s ideas of fortuna and virtu were taken up widely in 
the formation of new forms of government from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, 
all grounded in the idea that government can act to tame the vicissitudes of history 
through proper planning and foresight (Pocock 1975, 517).  It should also be noted that 
much of what Machiavelli argues for is about the work of techno-science, of controlling 
the volatile forces of nature through works of engineering.  For Machiavelli, virtu is less 
about a broad disposition towards flexibility, and more about engaging in the techno-
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scientific enterprise of, for example, engineering rivers in order to prevent them from 
ravaging the city-state.  Machiavelli provides us with an illustration of the prototypical 
disposition of modernity to engage in the work of techno-science improve the human 
condition with a disposition and eye towards the future.  
Where classic political theory focused principally on the problem of government, 
more recent scholarship has emphasized that the work of governing takes place in 
dialogue with a variety of actors outside the formal legislative arena. Classic works of 
public policy analysis offer competing perspectives for how policy comes to be; however 
a unifying feature of many of these theories is that that policy emerges out of the 
interaction of formal institutional frameworks with broader social and political processes. 
For example, John Dewey, writing in rebuttal to Walter Lipmann’s The Phantom Public 
(1927), in The Public and its Problems (1954), offers an understanding of politics that 
suggests that government is broader and comprises more than just formal institutions.  
Dewey argues that the idea of government must include both the public as well as its 
lawmakers (27-28).  Building on the idea that policy action emerges out of the work of 
both governmental institutions and other actors in society, Lasswell, Jones, Anderson, 
Brewer and deLeon developed the popular idea that policy is made in stages. This 
model divided the policy process into a series of discrete steps: agenda setting, policy 
formulation and legitimation, implementation, and evaluation.  In each of these, 
governmental and non-governmental actors engage one another in a variety of activities 
and spaces to shape policy development (Sabatier 1999).  An alternative to the stages 
model, the policy “streams” model, is best known from the work of John Kingdon who 
based his work on the “garbage can” model of organizational behavior (developed by 
Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972).  Kingdon’s (1984) work views the policy process as a 
confluence of three streams of actors and processes: a problem stream consisting of 
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data about various problems and the proponents of problem definitions, a policy stream 
involving the proponents of solutions to policy problems, and a politics stream consisting 
of elections and elected officials.  These streams usually exist independently of each 
other, except when what he terms a “policy entrepreneur” can couple the various 
streams. 
Others, such as Baumgartner and Jones (1993), assert that policy change arises 
in a “punctuated equilibrium.”  The punctuated equilibrium framework frames 
policymaking as characterized by long periods of incremental change punctuated by 
brief periods of major policy change.  Major change comes when political opponents can 
fashion new policy images and exploit the multiple policy venues characteristic of liberal 
democracies. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s advocacy coalition framework (1988) 
focuses on the interaction of advocacy coalitions – each consisting of actors from a 
variety of institutions who share a set of policy beliefs, within a policy subsystem. Robert 
Dahl (2005) in Who Governs? argues that political parties, which form a bridge between 
government and citizens, are aggregations of diverse interest groups.  The role of 
government is to act as a mediator of these different interests.  Anthony Downs focuses 
on the role of the voter, asserting that government cares only for the vote of a citizen, not 
his welfare, “thus a return to political economy” (1957, 18, emphasis in original). 
More recently, scholars in STS have argued for paying closer attention to 
knowledge and ideas in the policy process.  The notion of civic epistemologies highlights 
the role of both state and non-state actors in shaping critical policy ideas, and thus aligns 
with Dewey’s argument that both governments and their publics are integral to 
determining the public good and imagining public futures.  Civic epistemologies place 
the public, and public capacities for reflecting upon new knowledge claims, as a key 
space for negotiating visions of the public good.  Civic epistemologies represent both 
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tacit and explicit, public and institutional, and formal and informal means of producing 
knowledge for public policy.  Civic epistemologies signify “the set of institutions, norms 
and practices that govern the production, warranting, and use of knowledge for purposes 
of public policy making” (Bandhauer et al. 2005, 178).  Within any society there exists 
shared understandings about what reliable claims consist of, what they should look like, 
how to present, articulate, and defend them.  These understandings vary across cultures 
and countries, as they are “culturally specific, historically and politically grounded, public 
knowledge-ways” (Jasanoff 2005, 249). 
Jasanoff (2005) defines civic epistemologies as the processes through which 
individuals examine and organize knowledge claims that become the foundation for 
making collective decisions.  Each culture has established “folkways” that serve as 
traditional ways of providing a collective framework for viewing the world and social 
interactions, and that as cultures have progressed into the modern “technoscientific” era 
they have developed “tacit knowledge-ways through which they assess the rationality 
and robustness of claims that seek to order their lives.”  Displays and arguments that do 
not meet these checks may be regarded as false or unfounded (Jasanoff 2005, 255).  
Pulling together these ideas from public policy and STS, this dissertation defines 
governance in terms of the dynamics that comprise the policy-making sphere, reaching 
beyond (but also encompassing) formal policy-making institutions such as legislative 
bodies and the courts to also integrate the dynamics of broader political and policy 
deliberations scattered throughout society, such as those fostered by the media, the 
visual and literary arts, and the work of other informal and formal community groups and 
bodies (such as advocacy groups, societies, and informal networks of stakeholders). 
Governance is thus not the same as government; it goes beyond the boundaries of 
government to encompass not only the state, but also includes “actors such as 
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communities, businesses, and NGOs” (Lemos and Agrawal 2006, 298) and other 
participants who “contribute to the development of particular options for action” (Voss 
and Kemp 2005, 6). In this model, activities that might not traditionally be considered 
political, such as the processes of creating knowledge, determining who counts as an 
“expert,” and the basic processes of community building are in fact “deeply political 
exercises” and therefore part of the “broad sweep” of governance exercises that shape 
policy imagination, deliberation, implementation, and evaluation (Miller and Edwards 
2001). The process of governance is thus an ongoing one, constantly in motion, 
distributed throughout society (Macnaghten et al. 2005, 270).   
Anticipatory Governance Today 
Anticipatory governance calls into question the notion that the modes by which 
new technologies emerge and disseminate throughout society are unknowable.  Yet it is 
distinct from “predictive certainty.”  Rather than attempting to predict every potential 
problem associated with a new technology, an anticipatory governance approach draws 
upon and emerges out of a “distributed collection of social and epistemological 
capacities” in an effort to increase preparedness in the face of uncertainty (Barben et al. 
2008, 992).  The current anticipatory governance approach maintains that mechanisms 
are needed for both lay and expert stakeholders, on an individual as well as institutional 
level, to imaginatively grapple with the challenges presented by new technologies prior 
to their development, deployment, and use (Barben et al. 2008, 993).  Guston and 
Sarewitz (2002, 96) argue that technology assessment has not adopted an anticipatory 
approach due to the fear of those in the R&D sector of “untoward political interference” in 
the development of new technologies.  The failure to “apply fully the tools of social 
science to the problem of enhancing the societal benefits of science and technology” 
was largely due to a perceived truth about how technologies emerge and disseminate 
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throughout society, that their trajectories are somehow predetermined, “largely 
unpredictable, and thus not subject to anticipatory governance” (Guston and Sarewitz 
2002, 96). 
Guston and Sarewitz (2002, 98) argue for a new form of technology assessment 
that is “embedded within the knowledge creation process itself” on the level of research 
and development (R&D).  They seek to devise an approach by which to “anticipate how 
research and research-based technologies will interact with social systems” (96).  The 
notion of “real-time technology assessment” (RTTA) builds off of an older concept of 
“constructive technology assessment” (CTA) that integrates societal aspects of science 
and technology into the innovation and design process.  Guston and Sarewitz argue that 
a focus on the level of R&D for technologies is essential and must account for societal 
responses to innovation.  Although the laboratory itself is the primary location for 
engaging in RTTA, Guston and Sarewitz (2002, 100) acknowledge the importance of the 
entire system, from the policy-making sphere to the research sphere, in building capacity 
in the face of an unpredictable future: 
[T]he key to successfully grappling with unpredictability is 
to build a decision process that is continuously reflexive, 
so that the attributes of and relations between co-evolving 
components of the system become apparent, and informed 
incremental response is feasible. 
 
Guston and Sarewitz (2002, 103) emphasize the importance of communication among 
various stakeholders, such as decision makers, researchers, the public, and the media. 
Such communication “significantly determines the complex societal relation with 
innovation.” They go on further to note that very little literature exists regarding 
communication between stakeholders at the beginning of a technology’s development 
(see, also, Wilsdon and Willis 2004), although there is plenty of literature regarding 
retrospective, “back end” communication once a technology has already hit the market.  
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Guston and Sarewitz argue for a “front end” anticipatory approach.  They call their 
approach communication and early warning systems and advocate for content analysis 
of media sources about innovation, social judgment research, and public opinion polling 
efforts (Guston and Sarewitz 2002, 103).  These activities then feed into technology 
assessment and choice, including assessment of the societal impacts of new and 
emerging technologies via foresight and forecasting, scenario development in order to 
foster deliberative processes regarding the trajectories of emerging technologies, and 
evaluating the role of RTTA itself on the research agenda (ibid., 104). 
In their analysis of anticipatory governance, Barben et al. (2008, 983 & 993) 
likewise focus on incorporating societal concerns and perspectives into the R&D process 
at an early stage, arguing that an anticipatory governance approach necessitates and 
calls for a society-wide distributed capacity in “shaping things to come.”  In this sense, 
anticipatory governance emerges as an integral aspect of the broader model of 
governance described above. Anticipatory governance is concerned with cultivating 
capacities for thinking about and governing technologies as they emerge over time. 
“Effective action” in crafting responsive policy, Barben et al. argue, is “based on more 
than sound analytical capacities and relevant empirical knowledge: it also emerges out 
of a distributed collection of social and epistemological capacities, including collective 
self-criticism, imagination, and the disposition to learn from trial and error” (Barben et al. 
2008, 992, italics added). 
Anticipatory governance aligns with the definition of governance presented in this 
chapter in that it presupposes a variety of “lay and expert stakeholders” participate in the 
process of policy-making via “an array of feedback mechanisms.” Through these 
mechanisms, anticipatory governance enables stakeholders to “collectively imagine, 
critique, and thereby shape the issues presented by emerging technologies before they 
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become reified in particular ways.”  Barben et al. (2008) maintain that the process of 
cultivating these mechanisms for engagement with distributed sets of stakeholders gives 
rise to “a distributed capacity for learning and interaction stimulated into present action 
by reflection on imagined present and future sociotechnical outcomes” (992-993). 
Extending this idea, Barben et al. suggest that anticipatory governance should 
also involve the cultivation and “building [of] capacity to more broadly anticipate and 
participate in shaping things to come” (Barben et al. 2008, 993, italics added). Guston 
(2008, 940) similarly argues that societies need to engage in “capacity building” for 
anticipatory governance.  He analogizes anticipatory governance to going to the gym: 
taking steps to be prepared and build capacity for things to come, things that might be 
out of one’s control.  When a person goes to the gym and builds up her strength, she 
does not only spend time working on her arms or legs.  Instead she conditions and 
prepares her whole body for whatever might happen.  No matter what the array of 
challenges that she might experience, the experience of exercise will help her deal with 
them.  Being strong and healthy is useful in any number of circumstances, and by 
preparing as best as she can, she can mitigate the devastating effects of possible 
unknowns.  In this sense, Guston suggests, so must societies continuously engage in 
exercises that enable broad-based capacity development. 
The literature on anticipatory governance identifies three kinds of capacities of 
particular significance: foresight, engagement, and integration.  Foresight emphasizes 
the building of knowledge and visions of the future that can guide pathways of 
technological development.  Foresight includes diverse formal activities and methods for 
anticipating the future trajectories of emerging technologies, such as scenario 
development, but also encompasses the broader imaginative capacities of society.  
Foresight methods are distinct from efforts to “forecast the future” and other techniques 
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that seek to predict rather than anticipate. Forecasting holds an “allegiance to 
technological determinism” (Barben et al. 2008, 985) in that it presupposes that 
technologies follow pre-determined, fixed trajectories that can be precisely predicted.  In 
contrast to forecasting and predictive modeling, which “address powerful industrial and 
governmental actors’ need for limiting uncertainty,” foresight approaches prefer to 
envision multiple possible futures, assume “intrinsic uncertainty,” and adopt more 
participatory methods, such as public deliberation and scenario building.  Through such 
approaches, foresight endeavors to “enrich futures-in-the-making by encouraging and 
developing reflexivity in the system” (Barben et al. 2008, 985) through promoting greater 
awareness of divergent plausible technological trajectories early in the nascent 
developmental stages of new technologies (Rip and te Kulve 2008; Selin 2006).  In 
addition to scenarios, foresight activities explore how stakeholders envision the future 
and the impact of stakeholder imaginings on technological trajectories (Selin 2007). 
Foresight thus engages a variety of methods for anticipating and deliberating the future 
that society is building. 
The capacity for engagement emphasizes the involvement of publics in 
conversations regarding new and emerging technologies.  Engagement goes beyond 
public opinion polling to include numerous sites and methods of involving publics in the 
deliberation of science and technology, such as science museums, consensus 
conferences, and deliberative forums. These strategies bring publics into the 
governance process at an early stage, Barben et al. argue, before the technology hits 
the market and only retroactive approaches are available (Barben et al. 2008, 987-988). 
Prominent examples of engagement include the National Citizens’ Technology Forums 
funded by the National Science Foundation and organized by the Center for 
Nanotechnology in Society at ASU (Hamlett and Cobb 2006, Guston 2014).  These 
  17 
forums were informed and inspired by the Danish Consensus Conferences, which bring 
together Danish citizens for the “purpose of advising Parliament about how to manage a 
specific technology” (Hamlett and Cobb 2006, 632-633).  Other participatory exercises 
include public forums, such as those hosted by the Nanoscale Informal Science 
Education Network, the University of South Carolina, and the Center for Nanotechnology 
in Society at the University of California, Santa Barbara (Barben et al. 2008, 987-988).  
Indeed, arguably, engagement must include the full array of deliberative spaces 
distributed throughout society through which citizens discuss and debate science and 
technology (Dryzek 2010). 
Finally, integration implies the bringing together of the technical and the social in 
amalgamated or hybrid packages (Latour 1993). For example, research on integration 
has explored methods for integrating social perspectives into the innovation process by 
placing humanists and social scientists into the laboratory where they can interact with 
scientists and engineers (see Fisher 2007, Schuurbiers and Fisher 2009).  Of these 
laboratory studies, the Socio-Technical Integration Research (STIR) project, led by 
Fisher and Guston, is the largest and most ambitious to date. STIR investigates the 
“real-time effects of [integration] activities … on scientific practices and decision making” 
with the aim of making decisions more reflexive by “broadening the scope” of what 
scientists take into account in their decision-making processes to include a variety of 
social considerations (Fisher 2007). More broadly, integration is about the hybridization 
of the social and technical: the bringing together of social, economic, political, and 
technical elements into socio-technical configurations or systems (Miller 2001). 
Pulling all of these factors together, Barben et al. argue that anticipatory 
governance reflects a “distributed capacity” in society for learning, interaction, and action 
via foresight, engagement, and integration exercises (Barben et al. 2008, 993).  The goal 
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of this dissertation is to identify and explore this capacity for anticipatory governance as 
it exists in society: the ability of various stakeholders, ranging from policymakers, to 
consumers and impacted populations, to scientists, to the general public through both 
individual efforts and an assortment of feedback mechanisms “to collectively imagine, 
critique, and thereby shape the issues presented by emerging technologies before they 
become reified in particular ways” (Barben et al. 2008, 992-993). 
Anticipatory Governance and Technological Somnambulism: What Sort of Entities are 
Socio-technical Contracts? 
To deepen this concept of anticipatory governance, I argue that it is useful to 
develop a notion of “socio-technical contracts” that are negotiated and renegotiated 
around technologies over time. In The Whale and the Reactor, Langdon Winner argues 
that social and technological change have become tightly coupled in modern societies. 
As a result, he argues, when society engages in the making of technologies it is also 
engaged in the process of making social worlds. The process of world-making is “the 
most important accomplishment of any new technology” (Winner 1986, 10) and occurs, 
Winner suggests, through the negotiation and acceptance of social contracts that arise 
because new technologies demand certain forms of social organization or otherwise 
impinge upon or shape the social, economic, and political possibilities available to a 
society that utilize them. For Winner, the terms of these social contracts are increasingly 
unpalatable and, far too frequently, signed “too late” for society to be able to make 
significant changes in technological trajectories and so avoid the construction of 
undesirable worlds. This, for Winner, is the consequence of “technological 
somnambulism”: sleepwalking through “[v]ast transformations” in the social, moral, and 
cultural fabric of society take place, yet, in the fashion of a sleepwalker not conscious of 
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his or her actions, such transformations “have been undertaken with little attention to 
what those alterations mean” (Winner 1986, 9). 
 Winner’s depiction of the social contracts surrounding technologies implies an 
inflexible contract, unable to adapt to change or to take new social and scientific 
conditions into account.  “In the technical realm we repeatedly enter into a series of 
social contracts, the terms of which are revealed only after the signing” (Winner 1986, 9) 
and, therefore, one presumes, in Winner’s mind, unchangeable. Yet, it is unclear where 
precisely the signing of social contracts takes place in Winner’s model of technological 
change, nor precisely who signs them. Nor is it entirely clear what holds these contracts 
in place. Winner’s view leans, in this sense, as others have critiqued it, toward 
technological determinism: technology as an external causal force shaping society. 
I argue in this dissertation that this perspective on social contracts is too rigid. As 
Button (2008, 3) notes, social contract theory has made one point abundantly clear: 
while the making of a promise is rather easy, the keeping of that promise is more difficult 
and demands ongoing reflection and work by society.  “[P]romises stand to individuals 
as constitutions do to states: they are forms of precommitment that restrain and free us 
at once” (Button 2008, 3).  Button illuminates the inherent tension/dilemma of the 
promises embedded in social contracts: how can promises, made by an earlier 
generation, retain their meaning and not become “petrified barriers to individual and 
collective development” as society evolves and new generations of actors emerge?  In 
the cultivation of a contract, it in turn cultivates those who invoked it: the “institutional 
and cultural forms invoked by it must sponsor and cultivate the very beings who have 
‘authored’ or ‘consented’ to the pactio inter cives” (Button 2008, 7). For Button and other 
theorists of social contracts, the social contract is a living promise that evolves alongside 
the people who continually remake it. 
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Building on this idea, I suggest an alternative approach to contracts from 
Winner’s. Instead of contracts that are signed, once, and then remain immutable, I 
suggest that society engages in ongoing deliberation and reflection on the socio-
technical configurations and worlds being made in the integration of technoscience into 
society. In the process of anticipatory governance, I argue, society continually negotiates 
and renegotiates its socio-technical arrangements or socio-technical contracts, opening 
them up for active reengagement and rethinking.  The socio-technical contract concept 
serves as a metaphor for the thinking through and reworking of fundamental socio-
technical questions in the emergence and use of novel technologies. 
Is It “Too Late” for Anticipatory Governance? 
The shift from Winner’s fixed social contracts to continually renegotiated socio-
technical contracts addresses an issue of temporality that confronts both the concept of 
technological somnambulism and law lag. Winner argues, for example, that society 
awakes from its technological somnambulism only after it is “too late.” Yet, what does 
this mean? Why is it too late to change the way society relates to any given technology? 
Kline and Pinch, for example, observe that well after the automobile was introduced into 
society and the marketplace, rural communities were able to transform the automobile 
from the urban rich man’s toy it began as into a working farm vehicle (Kline and Pinch 
1996). Similarly, even as Winner was finalizing The Whale and the Reactor, which is, as 
much as anything, a critique of nuclear energy, US publics were in the process of 
fundamentally altering the socio-technical contracts surrounding nuclear power plants. 
For the next thirty years, the United States built no new nuclear power plants. 
I distinguish my understanding of “too late” from Winner’s sense of “too late.”  A 
reading of Winner suggests he means the term in the sense of it being too late to avoid 
unintended consequences, that the past cannot be undone.  I suggest the possibility that 
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there are other interpretations of “too late,” and propose opening up a conversation 
around the politics of how we understand the idea.  Too late for whom, or for what?  In a 
world where we have certain freedoms, there will always be victims for whom the 
consequences of certain decisions are too late.  I suggest that anticipatory governance 
is an attempt in thinking about minimizing the unintended consequences of technologies, 
and thinking through such issues sooner rather than later in a multiplicity of venues, from 
laboratories, to government agencies, to a variety of other formal and informal spaces 
where anticipatory governance can occur.     
Therefore, this dissertation conceptualizes the notion of it being “too late” in a 
different sense than Winner’s, in part due to my conceptualization of socio-technical 
contracts.  Socio-technical contracts are not generally actual contracts that get signed 
and enforced as written. Rather socio-technical contracts represent active negotiation 
and renegotiation of the legal and social norms and expectations surrounding 
technologies as they emerge and evolve in an ongoing process of change.  Anticipatory 
governance provides a framework for the shaping of a “future to come” (Barben et al. 
2008) that can be discussed and deliberated at any point in time.  Indeed, the work of 
anticipatory governance will never be complete, as the “future to come” is always still to 
come. 
While the idea of signing a contract works well as a metaphor for helping readers 
wrap their minds around complex socio-technical negotiations, it oversimplifies what 
happens in real cases. Indeed, even in cases where real contracts have actually been 
signed, including some that I describe in Chapter four, it is not necessarily “too late.” 
Societies often revisit and reconfigure their relationships to technologies over time in 
light of new social values or new evidence of problems in existing socio-technical 
arrangements. The metaphor of society “waking up” to discover itself bound to 
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unchangeable social contracts is equally problematic. Throughout my cases, I observe a 
steady and evolving flow of reflection and deliberation in public spaces around the 
responsible governance of new technologies. When we say that something is “too late,” 
it implies that some sort of line has been drawn.  This work identifies the emergence of 
technology as a continuous process, from the germ of an idea to its dissemination and 
ongoing reconfiguration in society.  Given this evolution, it is difficult to “draw a line” or 
identify something as “too late,” due to the evolving and continuous nature of both 
technological development and legislative frameworks.  Neither is static. 
Consider, for example, the case of the atomic bomb. There are those who might 
argue that, once Einstein had articulated the formula E=mc2, it was too late; yet it would 
seem that, during World War II, German scientists did not pursue a bomb project, 
despite having much of the same scientific knowledge available to the United States. Or 
perhaps it was too late when a bomb was invented and tested; yet, even then, it is not 
clear that the world to be created around atomic weapons was pre-ordained. While the 
US did use its weapons in World War II on Japan, the Soviet Union never used its 
weapons during the Cold War, and the possibility of placing all atomic weapons under 
international control was seriously considered by US and Soviet diplomats in 1946. And, 
even after the US and Soviet Union built massive arsenals of weapons in the 1950s and 
1960s, it was possible to shift course and, in the 1990s and 2000s, reduce those 
arsenals by 70%, with further reductions planned. All throughout this period, both 
societies were engaged in deep exercises of anticipatory governance, seeking to 
imagine, individually and together, what kinds of worlds were possible, given existing 
and future anticipated weapons technologies, which were desirable, and how the latter 
might be achieved. In light of the socio-technical contract concept and my reading of “too 
late,” which is distinct from Winner’s notion of the idea of “too late,” at no point was it too 
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late to engage in foresight, integration, or engagement activities that might inform how to 
govern the world of nuclear weapons today such that the world of tomorrow would be 
better. 
Anticipatory governance also provides an answer to the problem of temporality in 
law lag. While the core argument of law lag is that the law and ethics are continually 
lagging behind technological developments, I argue that we might just as easily view the 
problem as one of conflict over anticipatory governance. When societies create laws, 
they anticipate the kinds of worlds—or, more narrowly, socio-technological 
arrangements—they desire to bring into being. Yet within those societies there may be 
or emerge groups with different conceptions of desirable worlds or socio-technological 
arrangements who may seek to force a renegotiation of socio-technical contracts. It is 
not that the law lagged new technology—the law actually preceded it—rather, there is a 
disagreement over what the law should be and how it should be applied to technologies. 
What appears as law lag, then, is actually an exercise in anticipatory governance, in 
which those involved in advancing new technologies are seeking to open up and 
renegotiate previously settled – if not always presciently worded – socio-technical 
contracts. 
Social Contracts and Their Socio-Technical Cousins 
My reading of socio-technical contracts follows a rich tradition of political theory 
around social contracts.  Social contract theory, at its core, seeks to justify why 
individuals should want to enter into a contract, to legitimate certain orders over others.  
The aim of such thought is to grapple with the justification of particular political orders, 
individuals’ relationships with each other, and with their government.  The social contract 
is a long-standing theoretical tool in political thought and is best known from the works of 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  Social contract theory is 
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helpful for grappling with why people would consent to leaving their present state of 
affairs, contracting with each other, and moving into an anticipated better, future 
condition.  The contract is not established to benefit any one individual or group; instead, 
it is meant to elevate and benefit all members of society, helping individuals achieve 
communally what they could not achieve on their own. 
The social contract provides a way of thinking about government that 
understands that trajectories of governance are not predetermined and immutable but 
instead frames trajectories of governance as having the potential to be opened up, made 
accessible to examination by members of society, and ultimately changed.  Even the 
Hobbesian social contract, which has the explicit intention of justifying a strong 
sovereign authority, does not take the established modes of governing as fixed; rather 
Hobbes has to provide his case for why individuals should maintain their sovereign, 
knowing that revolution and change in government is precariously imminent.   
In Between Politics and Science, Guston (2000, 41) takes this argument a step 
further with his concept of a “social contract for science” as a metaphor for the 
relationship between science and government.  Guston illuminates an important 
distinction between traditional social contract thinking and the new “social contract for 
science.”  Unlike the tacit and theoretical social contracts of Hobbes, Locke, and 
Rousseau, Guston argues that social contracts for science are real things that are being 
actively engaged in.  As Guston (2000, 40) notes, “as a theoretical device the social 
contract is merely a hypothetical agreement.  That is, arguments from a social contract 
hold its principles are valid not because actual people actually agreed to them, but 
because people [in a hypothetical ‘initial condition,’ or ‘state of nature,’] had they the 
opportunity to agree to them, would have.”  Guston illuminates this by delving into 
Locke’s social contract.  Locke’s social contract is renewed tacitly, each time an 
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individual partakes “of the material benefits of the state constituted by the social 
contract” (Guston 2000, 40).  For Locke, simply by virtue of walking on the road, one is 
implicitly participating in the social contract. 
By contrast, Guston posits that a social contract for science need not be tacit or 
hypothetical.  Under the threat of Fascism, one could envision a scenario in which 
scientists and policymakers meet and agree that “the government would employ 
scientists to produce knowledge and instruments of war in order to secure the future of 
the free society that exists to their mutual benefit” (Guston 2000, 40).  During the war, 
the social contract would be renewed each time a scientist accepted a contract from the 
government.  After the war ends, the scientists and policymakers would come together 
once again to revisit the social contract in light of changed conditions.  The new social 
contract would include not only national security but also broader considerations 
regarding the health, welfare, and economic security of the nation’s citizens.  This new 
and broadened social contract would be renewed with each new grant from the 
government. The social contracts of traditional political theory comprise a variety of 
different types of constitutions.  For example, Hobbes’s social contract is a contract 
amongst the people in order to set the sovereign above them, while Locke and 
Rousseau present social contracts that encompass joint agreements between the 
people and the government.  Social contracts for science, argues Guston, are a “conjoint 
constitution,” representing an agreement between those that are governing and the 
people being governed.  Scientists and policymakers are not giving up their freedom to a 
sovereign authority in order to benefit from the contract.  The arrangement is conjoint 
because the entities that are subject to the contract are also the ones benefiting from it 
and agreeing to its terms (Guston 2000, 41). 
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Social contract frameworks for understanding the relationship between science 
and government must be “used strategically.”  Because social contracts are implicit, 
there exist no “terms etched in stone to which the parties to this struggle can appeal” 
(Guston 2000, 42).  Guston utilizes the social contract for science idea in order to 
explore the ways in which government trust in the integrity and productivity of science in 
the United States evolved and was reconstituted over time.  Guston’s insights into social 
contracts, and the social contract for science, are key as this project develops the socio-
technical contract concept, particularly in the sense that socio-technical contracts, when 
juxtaposed against their social contract counterparts in political theory, represent active 
negotiation and renegotiation of the social configurations in which emerging technologies 
get embedded, as opposed to the tacit social contracts of thinkers such as Locke.  When 
social contracts are applied to the governance of new and emerging technologies, as 
Guston makes clear, there exist more mechanisms for collective action and active 
renegotiation of the terms of such contracts.  Traditional social contracts are more tacit 
in this regard, and focus specifically on the relationship of the citizen to the sovereign. 
Active Engagement in Social Contracts 
If a social contract has to do with the relationship among citizens and between 
them and their government, then socio-technical contracts incorporate an additional 
element, the modes by which citizens contract with each other and their leaders on how 
to engage with technologies as they make present and future worlds.  What makes 
these contracts legitimate, and how would we know if the contract has been broken?  
Just as Aristotle and Plato posed the question of the good life to the ancient Greeks, 
critically engaging with socio-technical contracts gives rise to this same question in 
contemporary societies: what is the good life, what kind of society do we want to 
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become, and how should we go about making the society that can provide us with the 
good life? 
Winner’s invocation of the social contract in the “technical realm” opens a new 
dimension for exploring anticipatory governance.  Drawing from Winner’s conceptual 
framework, I propose that the purpose of anticipatory governance is, as much as 
possible, to enable societal capacities to think through “socio-technical contracts,” both 
creating such contracts up front, in the initial period of deliberation prior to and 
accompanying the development, marketing, and use of a new technology, and the 
renegotiation over time of that contract under changing social and/or technological 
conditions. Anticipatory governance represents the culturally specific, social capacities 
for making the terms of such contracts clear and open for negotiation.  The anticipatory 
governance approach recognizes that as society integrates new technologies into its 
ways of life, the future is being built today. Rather than attempt to imagine exactly how 
the future is going to be, anticipatory governance opens up tracts for clearer negotiation.  
Anticipatory governance enables the social capacities and dispositions to think through 
socio-technical contracts up front and on an ongoing basis. In this sense, anticipatory 
governance is inevitably enmeshed within culturally differentiated civic epistemologies: 
the ways that political societies understand, reason through, and deploy knowledge 
within specific epistemic contexts (Miller 2008). 
Is it possible to treat the writing of a socio-technical contract with the intentionality 
and deliberateness afforded to the founding of new political orders?  Can questions of 
the relationship between technology and society be meditated upon and debated with 
the acknowledgment that new social orders are being developed as a result?  That 
citizens are building the kind of world they want to live in, creating the future in the 
present?  Can citizens critically consider what types of technological progress they want 
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to consent to?  Social and political theories are largely silent on the questioning of 
technological progress—instead embracing such developments as necessary means to 
a better, more enlightened society.  Technological development is a matter of progress.  
To question it is to halt it (Winner 1989).  Anticipatory governance asks that we pause 
and seriously think about the role of technology in our lives, how we conceptualize the 
role of technology in our understandings of the future. It posits that it is possible to be 
intentional in the governance of technologies, and in the very construction of socio-
technical contracts themselves. 
In connecting socio-technical contracts with the anticipatory governance concept, 
I hypothesize that the terms of the contract can be made clear, and social considerations 
integrated, when operating under an anticipatory governance framework.  This 
dissertation puts that claim to the test.  It seeks to explore, empirically, what it might 
mean to talk about anticipatory governance as a wide-scale, distributed, proactive 
governance activity at the scale of a nation, proactively imagining and deliberating new 
and emerging technologies, creating the possibility of reflexivity from the earliest 
possible stages of technological development. If there were a perfect example of 
anticipatory governance, there would be little work to do in this area.  Rather, like Plato’s 
attempt to know the universal forms through studying particular objects, we must delve 
into particular, case-specific, attempts at anticipation, if we are to understand it. 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
This dissertation examines how British society has attempted, over the last two 
centuries, to actively deliberate the socio-technical contract for reproductive technologies 
and provide it with stewards, making it explicit, keeping it alive, open, interacting with 
various members of and stakeholders in society, and adaptable to technological change.  
These attempts are representative of an approach to managing socio-technical contracts 
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and evolving socio-political orders that attempts proactive governance, of attempts to 
actively build the future with a critical eye towards developing the society that we want to 
become, rather than allow the “building of the future” to progress without pause or 
consideration of the implications that the decisions (both tacit and conscientious) of the 
present have in shaping future worlds. 
The following chapters explore the attempted formation of such anticipatory 
contracts, utilizing case studies of the governance of assisted reproductive technologies 
in the United Kingdom.  The cases, covering nearly two centuries of governance 
dynamics, provide both a historical and ongoing perspective on the development and 
maintenance of the socio-technical contract. 
Why focus on reproductive technologies?  Reproductive technologies enable a 
deep exploration of the notion of the socio-technical contract as it relates to some of the 
most fundamental issues of our time: sex, contraception, marriage, abortion, embryo 
research, and genetic engineering, are just a few topics falling under the umbrella of 
these technologies.  The concept of the “socio-technical contract” takes on a new 
dimension as we begin to explore the role of reproductive technologies in constructing 
social orders, opening up new avenues for building families, and pushing and 
reconfiguring the boundaries of ethical and responsible science and innovation.  Political 
orders are continuously being constructed, critiqued, and renegotiated around large-
scale technological enterprises such as reproductive technologies.  Technologies falling 
into the realm of human reproductive science are widely debated, deployed, and 
contested in every human society and culture.  Reproductive technologies are pervasive 
tools used at both the individual and societal level to control foundational aspects of 
human life.  They fundamentally shape how people choose to lead their lives in relation 
to each other, their broader society, and in relation to future generations.  The most 
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basic and fundamental of human institutions are built around reproduction: the institution 
of marriage legitimates who can have sex with who and legitimizes the enterprise of 
baby-making for those who are eligible to marry.  Rights to citizenship are traditionally 
linked with birthplace, parentage, and marriage.  Millennia-old notions of who can marry 
who are today forming fissures across societies, as some societies reinforce the 
institution of marriage between a man and a woman, and others, in light of shifting 
cultural norms and social circumstances, are broadening the definition to incorporate 
other lifestyles and sexual preferences.  Even when legal definitions shift, and the 
institution of marriage (or legal partnerships) is expanded, reproduction and who can be 
called “parent” remains contested. 
Birth control technologies are contested as “unnatural” and consequently, 
according to some religious communities, immoral, even when used in the confines of 
marriage or used to mitigate transmission of sexually transmitted diseases.  The advent 
of in-vitro fertilization has raised questions and redefined parentage, kinship, and family. 
Such technologies are entangled in the most elemental issues of our age, the politics of 
life and death, questions of control and freedom, rights and responsibilities.  
Fundamentally, this suite of technologies is about the politics of how we order our lives 
and large-scale technological systems around sex and reproduction on a global level. 
There are a number of rich case studies exploring the many facets of 
reproductive technologies.  Charis Thompson’s Making Parents: The Ontological 
Choreography of Reproductive Technologies (2005) is one significant case study.  
Drawing on STS and gender-studies literatures to inform her analysis, Thompson 
conducted an ethnography of ART clinics, charting the “ontological choreography” within 
those clinics, as the activity of the clinic is normalized and naturalized, as both children 
and parents are “made” as technology and society co-produce in new and different 
  31 
ways. Thompson develops the concept of “ontological choreography” to discuss the 
ways in which kinship, identity (of individual patients as well as the couple), gender, 
parenthood, and economic matters are negotiated and renegotiated over time within the 
fertility clinic.  Thompson argues that in the case of assisted reproductive technologies, 
both babies and parents are simultaneously made.  Thompson studies patterns of the 
“biomedical mode of reproduction,” as the social and natural worlds collide and 
reconfigure in new ways.   
In Born and Made (2006), Franklin and Roberts also make substantial 
contributions to our understanding of the relationship between society and assisted 
reproductive technologies.  Franklin and Roberts also take an ethnographic approach, 
delving into the regulation of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) technologies and 
unpacking the “designer baby” framing of the technologies.  PGD technologies, as 
discussed in greater detail in other parts of this project, enable scientists and clinicians 
to biopsy a single cell from a human or animal embryo (created in-vitro), and through 
PCR (polymerase chain reaction) and genetic analysis techniques, determine certain 
genetic traits and genetic mutations within the embryo.  Franklin and Roberts argue that, 
in some sense, we are all “born and made.”  In one way this relates to the basic “facts of 
life,” and how technology has changed the dynamics of human reproduction: 
reproduction can now be achieved through technological means, and “particular types of 
reproduction can be deliberately chosen to a degree never witnessed before” (Franklin 
and Roberts 2006, xvi).   The concept also “pits the view that biological identities are 
‘given’ to us by our genetic origins against the opposite view—that we can, and 
sometimes have an obligation to, remake who we are by intervening in the basic biology 
of the beginning of life” (Franklin and Roberts 2006, xvi).  The “born and made” theme is 
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a key component of their argument, that the born and made concepts are “an important 
new duality of the modern era” (Franklin and Roberts 2006, xvii). 
Sociologist of science Michael Mulkay’s extensive body of work also grapples 
with the role of assisted reproductive technologies in society.  Mulkay’s The Embryo 
Research Debate: Science and the Politics of Reproduction  (1997) grapples with the 
social and ethical controversies associated with human embryo research.  Mulkay 
provides an historical overview of key cases that preceded the 1984 publication of the 
Warnock report, including the thalidomide controversy and the abortion debates of the 
1960s. These cases, and the resultant calls for better regulation, helped shape the 
British context into which Louise Brown was born.  Mulkay provides insight into the 
complex regulatory terrain that makes up the governance of assisted reproductive 
technologies in Britain.  Mulkay integrates the multiplicity of stakeholder groups and 
interests involved in the debates into his analysis.  He illustrates the significant role that 
pressure groups played, and the ways in which various cultural myths played into the 
debates.  Mulkay concludes his analysis of the British dynamics with a comparison to the 
U.S. context, noting the differences between the two contexts, and also strategies that 
might translate into the U.S. context. 
As this brief literature review indicates, assisted reproductive technologies 
present “fertile” ground for exploration of the above issues in light of the socio-technical 
contract concept, and how such contracts are negotiated on multiple societal levels, from 
the immensely personal world of the bedroom, to the regulatory arena, to the highest 
courts in the nation.  This is anticipatory governance – the messy, hard-to-define, 
complex processes ongoing in institutions formal and informal that comprise the 
questioning, reimagining, and critical evaluation of the role of technologies in society, as 
they relate to both present, future, and even past worlds.  Thinking critically about the 
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role of technologies and the contracts that we enter into explicitly and tacitly, knowingly 
and unknowingly, is an essential aspect of anticipatory governance.  The how and why 
of anticipatory governance as it occurs in various institutions, communities, and societies 
needs to be explored. 
Assisted reproductive technologies are also significant in that they bridge societal 
capacities for anticipatory governance with capacities for anticipatory governance within 
government. ART manipulate, explore, and impact life in a variety of ways.  The same 
can be said for a number of other emerging technologies, such as nanotechnology and 
biotechnology, that these technologies impact and alter our lives in a myriad of ways; 
however, ART is particularly unique because some countries, including the UK, have 
decided to address it by forming regulatory agencies.  While the establishment of 
agencies to regulate a particular technology or set of technologies, is not novel or 
ground breaking, it nonetheless represents a significant socio-political act. Moreover, the 
decision to address ART in such a way is arguably an anticipatory act. The rationale 
behind creating these agencies was that because ART represents a controversial, 
important, and revolutionary suite of existing and future technologies that raise 
significant political, ethical, and cultural questions, the best mode of action would be to 
create agencies tasked specifically to answer those questions.  The idea behind such 
agencies is to “get ahead” of the technology, via licensing and other regulatory activities, 
so that the benefits and promises of the technology can be fulfilled and the negative 
societal impacts can be mitigated as much as possible. 
The history of ART in the UK provides a window into anticipatory governance.  
Following the birth of Louise Joy Brown, the first “test tube baby” and a new “social kind” 
(Star and Bowker 1999), the UK government established the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) as the first regulatory agency of its kind.  Alongside the 
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creation of the HFEA, the UK also established new scientific kinds such as the “pre-
embryo,” the classification of an embryo that is less than fourteen days old, which 
therefore created what was perceived as a more legitimate space for embryo research, 
since the object of study was not an embryo, but a “pre-embryo” (Jasanoff 2005).  In 
addition to new scientific kinds, other new social kinds were born, particularly in the form 
of the “ethics expert,” Mary Warnock, who chaired the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology (Jasanoff 2005).  Both the complex history and present-day 
operations of the HFEA demonstrate that there is no easy answer to the governance of 
ART, and provide an example of an agency that was tasked with grappling with an 
emerging technology that, at the time, had no policy precedent. Inclusion of the HFEA in 
this study provides a case in which ART policy and regulation can be observed over a 
period of three decades, beginning with the birth of Louise Brown, the first in vitro 
fertilization baby, to the present day.  It enables an opportunity to engage with and study 
an agency that has emerged and evolved alongside the ART science and technology.  In 
others, it allows a historical and present-day lens into the evolving British socio-political 
orders as the technologies and the governance of them continues to evolve. 
Overview 
Utilizing the rich, complex, and controversial suite of assisted reproductive 
technologies as an exploratory tool in further developing and engaging the concept of 
anticipatory governance, this work explores how societies imagine the future, and 
grapple with the challenges of the present.  It examines the negotiation, renegotiation, 
and maintenance of socio-technical contracts and political orders, as citizens attempt to 
realize the type of society that they want to become.  Here I provide a brief conceptual 
overview of each chapter.  Each chapter serves as an account of a particular case study 
in the governance of reproductive technologies in the UK (and in chapters four and 
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seven a comparative account including Canadian dynamics).  While each case study 
has been informed by archival work, ethnographic research, and approximately eight 
months traveling to various sites of governance activity (including laboratories, 
workshops, agency meetings, conferences, and even trade shows), it was the personal 
narratives and stories that seized my attention: narratives of individuals struggling with 
infertility, same sex couples desperate for a child of their own, “genetic orphans” 
searching for their sperm-donor parents, and families looking to preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis as the miracle-technique for eliminating debilitating genetic diseases from their 
family line.  It is these human stories, in which everyday people navigate socio-technical 
contracts and all that accompanies them—desperation and hope, politics and culture, 
despair and faith—that shaped the research foci and trajectory, and ultimately led to the 
conceptual exploration of anticipatory governance as a means of critically navigating, 
imagining, and opening socio-technical contracts. 
Each chapter delves into a specific case study that explores the negotiation and 
renegotiation of socio-technical contracts over time and analyzes the capacities for 
anticipatory governance that emerge.  The second chapter delves into the evolution of 
the imaginative capacities that have developed over the last two hundred years to shape 
contemporary approaches to the governance of assisted reproductive technologies. The 
chapter explores long-running conversations in British society that occurred prior to the 
1978 birth of Louise Brown, demonstrating that the contemporary governance of 
reproductive technologies did not happen in a vacuum, rather that anticipatory 
governance is an ongoing societal activity distributed amongst a number of formal and 
informal societal capacities that evolve in tandem with emerging technologies. This 
chapter explores conversations around the biological sciences, fertility, and reproductive 
technologies as they emerge over time, highlighting the role that evolving societal 
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governance capacities have in shaping the conversations around such technologies. 
The first episode explored in this chapter cover dynamics surrounding an early emerging 
technology, galvanism, and the subsequent publication of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein 
in 1818.  Frankenstein is widely considered to be the first modern work of science fiction 
and has been deployed as a metaphor for the dangers of science out of control.  The 
second episode focuses on the publication of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, and 
the ways in which it was used to frame conversations around new reproductive 
technologies.  The third episode explores the dynamics leading up to the birth of Louise 
Brown, and the ways in which the stories, metaphors, and motifs generated by 
Frankenstein and Brave New World shaped the debates around the responsible 
innovation of reproductive technologies.  I illustrate the evolving nature of anticipatory 
capacities over time, and paint a picture of anticipatory capacities as culturally 
embedded, distributed tools, or resources, for grappling with the possibilities and 
challenges presented by emerging technologies. 
The third chapter begins with the birth of Louise Brown.  It explores how the 
capacities elucidated in the second chapter are deployed within British dialogues around 
Robert Edwards and Patrick Steptoe’s in-vitro fertilization breakthrough.  Utilizing 
archival newspaper articles and other primary-source materials, the chapter traces the 
negotiation of the socio-technical contracts that resulted in the establishment of the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority in the UK.  Specifically, the chapter 
delves into the atmosphere following the birth of Louise Brown, exploring public fears 
that science was careening out of control, calls for control, and the special capacity of 
experts within British society for reigning in “runaway social forces” (Jasanoff 2005).  The 
primary governance capacity explored in this chapter is the capacities for judgment 
  37 
embedded within the British experts tasked with negotiating the socio-technical contract 
around assisted reproductive technologies. 
The fourth chapter explores two examples of the re-imagination and 
reassessment of the governance arrangements for donor conception technologies, and 
the legal and cultural shifts in British Columbia and the United Kingdom from frameworks 
of primarily anonymous donation to donor identification. Specifically, the chapter 
explores capacities for the renegotiation of socio-technical contracts.  With advances in 
cryopreservation technologies in the early 1970s, donor sperm became more readily 
available, and donor conception became a popular option for couples experiencing 
infertility.  Sperm donors in both Canada and the United Kingdom donated under a 
presumption of anonymity.  As a result, thousands of children who were conceived 
through the process have grown up not knowing who their genetic fathers are. In the 
early 2000s, donor offspring plaintiffs claiming rights to identifying information on their 
donor challenged the right to anonymity, via court cases.  This specific chapter utilizes 
the comparative method in order to illuminate national approaches to anticipatory 
governance and, especially, the possibility of renegotiating socio-technical contracts on 
an ongoing basis for a well established technology. 
The fifth chapter delves into deliberative capacities for governance in the case of 
British approaches to embryo selection, also known as preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD), a technique in which embryos are created in-vitro (outside of the body), and are 
tested for genetic flaws. The implications of embryo selection are no longer the stuff of 
science fiction, e.g., movies such as Gattaca (1997), where embryos are selected for 
their superior genetic traits and lack of genetic diseases.  In 2009, the first baby was 
born who had been tested for the BRCA 1 breast cancer gene as an embryo.  This event 
was hearkened as a scientific miracle by supporters and as a case of “playing God” and 
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an era of new eugenics by critics.  Alongside using preimplantation genetic diagnosis for 
analyzing the BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 genes, many laboratories around the world possess 
the capacity to test for other non-medical characteristics, such as gender, height, and 
eye color. This chapter explores how British society has navigated the issues presented 
by PGD technology in light of the deliberative capacities for negotiating socio-technical 
contracts. 
The sixth chapter applies the socio-technical contract lens to the savior sibling 
controversies of early 2000’s Britain.  During this time, a new dynamic entered the PGD 
arena.  It now was possible to apply HLA tissue-typing technology and PGD to in-vitro 
embryos, and create a perfectly matched donor for a sick relative.  While families stated 
that they only wanted to utilize the stem cells in the umbilical cord in order to provide 
lifesaving treatment for their ill child, fears arose that the resulting baby would be viewed 
as a medical device or commodity, and would not have the ability to consent to any 
procedures utilizing his or her blood and other genetic materials.  This chapter explores 
the role that policy language, specifically the “welfare of the child” policy language, 
played as a boundary-negotiating tool in shaping the regulatory terrain around “savior 
sibling” technology in the United Kingdom. 
Chapter seven concludes the project by taking the socio-technical contract 
concept from the macro-level of national regulatory activity to the micro-level of the 
scientific research laboratory, and offers insight on how socio-technical contracts might 
be negotiated and navigated in the “midstream,” at the level of R&D activity, in light of 
the anticipatory governance framework.  The chapter includes ethnographic case studies 
from two genetics laboratories, one in Oxford, United Kingdom, and one in British 
Columbia, Canada, and specifically draws its methods from the integration sphere of the 
anticipatory governance framework to test and understand the capacities for thinking 
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about and reimagining socio-technical contracts in the places that emerging genetic and 
reproductive technologies emerge from – the laboratory context itself. 
At the Nexus of Theory and Practice 
This project operates at the nexus of theory and practice, drawing upon the fields 
of public policy, comparative politics, and political theory to build the conceptual 
framework for interrogating anticipatory governance as a distributed suite of societal 
capacities that contribute to national policymaking.  Through the analysis of empirical 
cases studies at the level of national governance activity, the project seeks to provide a 
robust account of anticipatory governance as it operates within society.  The socio-
technical contract concept, an idea developed within the dissertation, contributes a new 
analytic tool to the anticipatory governance canon, providing a space in which 
anticipatory governance can be examined as an ongoing phenomenon, a series of 
societal negotiations and renegotiations, rather than specific moments in time that are 
determined to be anticipatory or not anticipatory.  The empirical aspect of the 
dissertation provides an historical account of the governance of reproductive 
technologies that stands in contrast to the current scholarship on the subject, which 
tends to examine governance activity from the birth of Louise Brown onward.  By 
examining historical governance capacities and negotiations around biology and the life 
sciences in the United Kingdom, the project situates the first “test tube” baby within a 
broader context of historical negotiations around this suite of technologies, providing 
practitioners and scholars alike with a new resource for thinking about anticipatory 
governance and how it can be activated within a variety of socio-cultural arenas. 
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CHAPTER 2 
WAKING THE SLEEPWALKER: FRANKENSTEIN, BRAVE NEW WORLD, AND A 
RABBIT IN A PASSENGER SEAT 
“[T]he futuristic discourse of [technologies], as well as their fundamental technical and social 
uncertainties, requires the cultivation of a societal capacity for foresight, by which we mean not 
only formal methodologies but also more generalized abilities to bridge the cognitive gap between 
present and future.”  (Barben et al. 2008 991, emphasis added)  
 
“Surely acceptance of the beginning does not necessitate embracing undesirable ends?”  
(Edwards and Steptoe 1981, 100-101) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There exists a mythology around the birth of Louise Brown, that her 1978 birth 
suddenly shocked society out of its technological somnambulism, its sleepwalking stasis.  
That the convening of the Warnock Committee and the passage of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act were the first significant nodes of anticipatory activity 
around assisted reproductive technologies.  A common theme in social discourse around 
technology is the notion that society tends to lag behind technological progress, and that 
it is constantly racing to catch up (e.g. Winner 1986).  That new technologies are 
advanced with little attention given to their potential implications until it is too late.  One 
predominate perspective is that “ethics and law have typically lagged far behind 
technological change,” and that if something is not done, technology will continue to 
outpace law and ethics, and if “we allow the lag time to increase, it will grow 
exponentially until both ethics and law will be realistically viewed as an irrelevant antique 
of a time long past and not fondly remembered” (French 2011, ix).  The purpose of this 
chapter is to challenge this perspective, and to provide examples in which society is 
actively thinking about the implications of new and emerging technologies far before the 
technologies themselves came into existence.  Specifically, the chapter explores the role 
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of imaginative capacities in stimulating reflective thinking about socio-technical futures 
and seeks to make an empirical case against the lag and technological somnambulism 
arguments.  First, the chapter provides a conceptual overview of what I mean by 
“imaginative capacities.”  Second, it delves into the societal conversations surrounding 
galvanism, and how it, in part, inspired Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), and gave 
birth to the monster motif.  Third, the chapter explores the historical background that 
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932) was embedded in, and the societal dialogues 
around ectogenesis (or gestation of a fetus outside of the womb), embryo analysis, and 
government control of reproduction decades before Steptoe and Edwards’s first 
successful in vitro fertilization procedure.  Finally, the chapter explores the societal 
conversations and governance activity leading up to the birth of Louise Brown and the 
ways in which the stories, myths, and motifs generated by Shelley and Huxley’s work 
served as tools for thinking about new reproductive technologies.          
The anticipatory governance literature has proposed that it is indeed possible to 
remedy the lag between emerging technologies, ethics, and the law - that technological 
somnambulism is not an inevitable byproduct of technological advancement, and that 
with the proper tools and by establishing governance capacities throughout society it is 
possible to proactively govern and critically assess technological progress as it is 
happening, in real time.  In further developing the anticipatory governance concept, this 
chapter advances the notion that anticipatory governance is an ongoing societal activity 
distributed amongst a number of formal and informal societal capacities that evolve in 
tandem with emerging technologies.  Specifically, the chapter explores historical 
deliberative moments in the governance of biological and reproductive technologies, and 
the ways in which those moments indicate the cultivation of capacities for grappling with 
new and emerging technologies.  It challenges the assumption that society is 
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sleepwalking (Winner 1986) through fundamental socio-technical configurations, that the 
issues are not well understood by society and that it is not well equipped to grapple with 
such issues.  Rather, historical and contemporary capacities for anticipatory governance 
do exist, beyond entities such as the HFEA, and these capacities are rich and extensive 
in a way that perhaps seems surprising, especially when juxtaposed against commonly 
held assumptions that society is perennially lagging behind.   
Barben et al. (991, 2008) posit that “futuristic discourse” around technologies, 
and the accompanying societal considerations and uncertainties, calls for “the cultivation 
of a societal capacity for foresight” and “more generalized abilities to bridge the cognitive 
gap between present and future.”  What are those “generalized abilities” for connecting 
the present with the future, and what are the modes by which societies cultivate their 
capacity for foresight?  A reading of Barben et al. suggests that these capacities must be 
cultivated, and this chapter delves into anticipatory capacities as they evolve and are 
cultivated over time, utilizing Miller and Bennett’s (2008) work exploring the role of 
science fiction in the construction socio-technical futures. 
Miller and Bennett’s work serves as an entry point for thinking about the ways 
that the imaginative capacities of society might also serve as important anticipatory 
capacities.  Miller and Bennett argue that this approach is not “prediction.”  Instead, 
“tools built on science fiction might serve as a means for building a reflexive capacity into 
the governance of technology: for helping individuals and communities to meaningfully 
deliberate technologies and to democratically construct technological futures” (Miller and 
Bennett 2008, 598).  Miller and Bennett maintain that a major challenge for modern-day 
democracies is to “engage the public in questions about the future.”  Miller and Bennett 
argue that integrating narratives of socio-technical futures into technology assessment 
practices might serve as a means of combating Winner’s problem of technological 
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somnambulism (Miller and Bennett 2008, 599).  Miller and Bennett highlight Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, and others have “cast 
indelible shadows over the meaning and imagination of science and technology in 
modern societies” (Miller and Bennett 2008, 599).  Science fiction, they maintain, can 
provide a means for the public to “engage vitally with scientific and technological futures” 
(Miller and Bennett 2008, 605).    
Another useful concept for thinking about the role of imagination as reflexive 
capacity is Jasanoff and Kim’s (2009) sociotechnical imaginary concept.  Jasanoff and 
Kim note that sociotechnical imaginaries are both “instrumental and futuristic.” They 
“reside in the reservoir of norms and discourses, metaphors and cultural meanings out of 
which actors build their policy preferences.”  They “activate collective consciousnesses,” 
deploy “visions of what is good, desirable, and worth attaining for a political community,” 
and they also can serve as warnings of possible risks and implications of rapid scientific 
and technological development.  Through imaginaries, people “create the political will or 
public resolve” to avoid or achieve them, deploying in the “understudied regions between 
imagination and action”  (Jasanoff and Kim 2009, 122).  This leads to the question, can 
imaginaries be created and deplpyed as anticipatory capacities for grappling with the 
implications of new and emerging technologies? 
One area in which the socio-technical imaginary concept has not been fully 
explored is the ways that they are deployed and articulated in media materials and 
popular culture (Jasanoff and Kim 2009, 122).  This chapter explores the role of science 
fiction narratives in shaping and negotiating societal debates around the use of 
reproductive technologies leading up to the birth of Louise Brown in 1978.  Visions of 
what was socially desirable and not desirable were being deployed far before Louise’s 
birth, as Frankenstein and Brave New World made the “transitional jump” from story to 
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metaphor to motif. As the stories evolved from stand-alone fictional accounts to serving 
as perennial motifs in the British social consciousness, they provided shared societal 
framings through which questions around the limitations and implications of reproductive 
technologies could be debated and discussed.   
The chapter explores three periods in British history that gave shape to the 
contemporary socio-technical contracts that are the focus of this project: the 
Frankenstein period, the Brave New World period, and the pre-Louise Brown period.  
These periods center around three significant and interwoven eras in Britain around 
questions of the biological sciences, technology, and society. Each period focuses on 
the evolving set of cultural tools available to the British to make sense of and shape the 
relationship between emerging technologies and society.  The periods in this chapter, as 
well as their transition and integration into the British socio-technical contract around 
reproductive technologies, are divided into three main sections.  The below chart 
illustrates this transition and provides a broad outline of the flow of this chapter and the 
evolution of the stories that would ultimately be deployed as framing devices around 
emerging reproductive technologies in the 18 year period leading up to the birth of 
Louise Brown.  I frame the evolutionary process of the stories as the transition from story 
to metaphor to motif.  I define “story” as a narrative with the intention to educate, instruct 
or entertain.  I define “metaphor” as an idea used to represent something else, such as 
the metaphor of the “mad scientist” representing the notion of science out of control.  I 
define motif as a recurring theme or idea that progresses through time and embeds 
within a socio-cultural context.  An example of an ongoing motif that emerged from 
Frankenstein is the idea of the biological monster, created through scientific ambition.  A 
perennial motif that emerged from Brave New World was the idea of the “test tube baby” 
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– a term that continues to appear in headlines, television, and other media to the present 
day. 
Figure 1: 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore long-running conversations in British 
society that occurred prior to the 1978 birth of Louise Brown, the first baby born via in-
vitro fertilization.  Conception and gestation outside of the human body and the 
manipulation of sperm, eggs, and embryos have been intertwined in broader 
conversations about the role of technology in human life, questions of whether scientists 
  46 
are “playing god,” and the limitations of scientific research that reach back centuries into 
the British social consciousness.  Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, The Modern 
Prometheus, published in 1818, and Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, published in 
1932, provide a lens into the framings, values, and perceptions of emerging technologies 
in the time period each work was embedded in.  Both works, in their own right, served as 
metaphors for the socio-technical contract gone awry, and the potentially monstrous 
implications of human attempts to manipulate nature.  
Frankenstein and Brave New World transcend beyond their specific time and 
place to be woven into an ongoing and uniquely British socio-technical contract, 
integrating into the large-scale sociotechnical imaginaries that frame, limit, and shape 
debates around the science of life itself.  They do not only represent the era in which 
they were written, but are also tools in an evolving set of distributed capacities for 
thinking about and governing the British science-society relationship.  The pre-Louise 
Brown negotiations explored in this chapter further illustrate this point, and provide an 
illustration of the transitional jump from story to myth to motif.  As opposed to 
representing isolated instances, the modes in which societies grapple with the scientific 
issues of a particular day and age become woven into a broader socio-cultural fabric as 
metaphors and tools that frame how contemporary issues are perceived, understood, 
and tackled. 
The Birth of a Monster 
Imagine a scientist standing over a dead man.  Metal rods, awaiting electrical 
impulses, are affixed to various places on the body, including face, torso, and 
appendages.  The scientist and the body are not alone; encircling them is a crowd of 
onlookers, holding their breaths in a hush of fearful anticipation.  Will the dead man 
come back to life? they wonder.  The silence becomes even more palpable as the 
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scientist makes a motion to apply electricity to the metal rods.  Electricity courses 
through the rods into the body of the deceased.  The dead man begins to move. 
The scene described above is not a scene from the latest TV science fiction 
drama, or the most recent of the summer blockbusters.  The year was 1803, and the 
scientist was a real scientist, Giovanni Aldini, and the dead man was a real dead man – 
the body of convicted murderer George Forster. The most well known of Aldini’s 
demonstrations was the one in which he used electricity to animate Forster’s freshly 
executed body.  In January 1803, at the Royal College of Surgeons, Aldini applied 
bimetallic electricity via metal rods to make Forster’s body convulse and move as if it still 
had vestiges of life left in it (Parent 2004, 638).  When electricity was applied to Foster’s 
mouth and an ear via metal rods, “the jaw immediately began to quiver, the adjoining 
muscles were horribly contorted, and the left eye actually opened.”  When Aldini applied 
the rods to both ears, the entire face began to convulse, and “a motion of the head 
manifested.”  When Aldini also applied electricity to Forster’s rectum, “such violent 
muscular contractions were excited, as almost to give the appearance of re-animation” 
(Aldini 1819, 80). 
Aldini’s experimental theater was the birthplace of the Frankenstein motif, an 
image that would ultimately come to represent the science as a runaway force, as 
innovation out of control.  Aldini’s gruesome experiments, part of an emerging field 
known as “galvanism,” catalyzed early debates around the limitations of responsible 
science and whether scientists were overstepping their boundaries.  The newspapers 
reported on the experiments in vivid detail over the course of the next few decades.  The 
accounts illuminated the tension between whether the galvanists were controlling nature 
in order to raise the dead, or whether the research could provide important societal 
benefits, if appropriately regulated. 
  48 
Even as early as 1800, the societal benefits of galvanism were being discussed 
in the public square.  An article by William Pigram, writing for the Observer in 1800, 
provides one such example.  The application of electricity to medicine had seen great 
successes, commented Pigram, “where the blind have been restored to their sight, the 
deaf to their hearing, and the palsied limb to vigour and health.”  Despite the advances 
that had been made by trailblazers such as Benjamin Franklin, Pigram noted that the 
science was “yet in its infancy.”  The new science of galvanism, remarked Pigram, has 
given insight into the properties of different metals, that some “have an influence on 
animals, and so powerful indeed, as to occasion their limbs to contract, and to evince 
other symptoms of life, even after the animal is dead!”  Research in this area would not 
only be philosophically gratifying, stated Pigram, but could also “provide in the highest 
degree useful to mankind.”    
Other commentators provided similar sentiments, that the extraordinary science 
had made great strides in manipulating life itself, that scientists had “succeeded in 
restoring animals, whose lives have been suspended by hanging and drawring” 
(Observer 1803). The galvanic experiments, “conducted on a large scale, and with a 
view to discovery, might produce results of the utmost importance to mankind” 
(Manchester Guardian 1823). Another commentator quipped that if galvanism was not 
“discredited by unskillful operators” it “promises to afford the most important services in 
its physical application […]” (Observer 1803b). 
Scientific Gratification 
While Aldini was unable to restart the heart of a dead animal or human, he did 
travel through Europe demonstrating his experimentations in sending electrical currents 
through dead bodies in order to make them convulse and move as if alive.  In one 
instance, Aldini used the bodies of decapitated kittens to demonstrate the power of 
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electrical current.  By removing their spinal cords and replacing them with zinc and silver 
batteries, Aldini was able to start the hearts beating, and the bodies even “bounded 
around” for a short amount of time (Pilkington 2004).    
An early newspaper account of Aldini’s experiments describes his experimental 
work to the British public in vivid detail. He captivated the attention and imagination of 
his audience by applying electricity to the body of a dead dog, whose head had been 
severed from its body, causing it to move as if vestiges of life were still present.  Aldini’s 
display made such an impact that it elicited the suggestion that, out of curiosity, 
galvanism might be tested on the fresh body of a dead criminal:   
Dr. Aldini, lately exhibited at the house of Mr. Hunter, some 
curious experiments on the body of a dog newly killed.  
The head of the animal was cut off.  The head and the 
body were put beside each other, on a table rubbed with a 
solution of ammonia.  Two wires, communicating with the 
Galvanic trough, were then applied, the one in the ear, and 
the other at the anus of the dead animal, when both head 
and body were thrown into the most animated muscular 
motion.  The body started up with a movement, by which it 
passed over the side of the table: and the head moved; its 
lips and teeth grinning violently.  A curiosity was expressed 
to have these experiments tried on a criminal newly 
executed. (Observer 1803c). 
 
George Forster would have the unfortunate honor of serving as Aldini’s most well known 
human experimental subject.  
Lectures and displays of galvanism garnered public attention and curiosity.  In 
these demonstrations, galvanism was applied to the dismembered limbs of various 
animals, evincing both horror and fascination.  Such demonstrations were so popular, 
that multiple events were planned to accommodate the large numbers of curious 
attendees.  For instance, the Observer announced that there would be another 
demonstration following a particularly popularly lecture by Mr. Hardie, nothing that the 
event would provide the public with “an unusual opportunity of Scientific Gratification.” 
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In consequence of many Ladies and Gentlemen having 
been disappointed for want of room at his Lecture-Rooms, 
Somerset-street, Portman-Square.  Mr. Hardie will repeat 
his interesting lecture upon his New Hypothesis of the 
Electric and Galvanic fluids, at the Large Theatre, Lyceum, 
To-morrow, Monday the 27th instant, when the surprising 
Effects of the Galvanic Influence upon the Muscular and 
Nervous System will be evinced, by exciting the Actions of 
crawling, kicking, leaping, &c. in the detached Limbs of 
dissected Animals. – The Functions of smelling, biting, 
chewing, swallowing, winking, and other voluntary motions, 
will be induced in the Head of a Sheep, Ox, or other large 
Animal, long after separation from the Body. –[…] the 
Public will have an unusual opportunity of Scientific 
Gratification.” (Observer 1804) 
 
Reflections on the Darker Side 
Other reflections on galvanism illuminated its darker side, speculating that the 
possibility of raising the dead could be a tangible reality.  In January 1820, a 
commentary on galvanistic experiments labeled the practice as “horrible phenomena!”  
The experimentation, carried out by Dr. Ure on a murderer known as “Clydsdale” was 
labeled as “truly appalling.”  In one of the experiments on the body of the dead murderer, 
electricity was applied to the neck of the corpse: 
laborious breathing instantly commenced: the chest 
heaved and fell; the belly was protruded and collapsed, 
with the relaxing and retiring diaphragm; and it is thought, 
that but for the complete evacuation of the blood, pulsation 
might have occurred!! (Johnson 2007, original quote from 
the Medical Repository 1820) 
 
Many people left the room over the course of the experimentations, and one person 
fainted, from “terror or sickness” (Johnson 2007). When electricity was applied to the 
nerves in the elbow, some of the spectators thought the criminal had come back to life, 
and the experimenter, Dr. Ure, felt that the body would have fully reanimated had the 
spine not been severed.   
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Emerging alongside the graphic descriptions of the effects of galvanism on dead 
bodies also surfaced accounts regarding the healing properties of galvanism – that it 
was “found beneficial in cases of blindness as well as deafness” (Observer 1803d). The 
technique was reported to have “great success” in combating paralysis of the optic 
nerve, and even cured a man of madness.  The mad man, who had been bitten by a 
dog, had in his illness, suddenly become petrified by water and any object that shined.  
He was taken to Professor Rossi at Milan, where the application of galvanism led to an 
“astonishing cure”: 
The patient suffered much during this operation, which, 
after several shocks, rendered him so weak, that he was 
unable to stand: being then extended on the floor, he was 
Galvanised with facility, the operation producing a copious 
perspiration.  At two o’clock on the day succeeding, the 
process was repeated, and at six o’clock on the following 
morning, the man went alone to M. Rossi, to tell him he 
was perfectly cured, for he felt no pain; the inflammation in 
his throat had subsided, and he had entirely lost all 
aversion to water and other liquids.  Some time after, he 
again submitted to the shock, and is now perfectly 
recovered. (Observer 1803e) 
 
The Observer article that described the fantastic recovery of the man’s hydrophobia also 
reflected that galvanism could “do much harm by misapplication.”  However, if the 
technology was “judiciously-regulated” it could do a great deal of good “at the moment 
when any accidental cause has suspended the functions of the vital organs, [it] may 
preserve the lives of thousands” (Observer 1803e). 
 Other accounts surfaced of ill individuals who were “indebted […] to the 
successful application of Galvanism,” such as Francis Cooke, a “poor blind sailor” whose 
sight was restored.  Following examination by medical experts at Bath, it was declared 
that “the sight of one eye was perfectly recovered” (Observer 1804b). 
Credible Science versus Swindle: Humphry Davy Calls for Debate and Educated 
Citizens 
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As galvanism emerged, so too did conversations regarding what comprised 
credible scientific work.  The debate around legitimate versus illegitimate scientific 
practice was headed by chemist Sir Humphry Davy, a friend of Mary Shelley. He was 
considered a renowned and “eminent [British] chemist” (Manchester Guardian 1825). 
Davy was known for lecturing on galvanism and giving public demonstrations, and was a 
public critic of many practitioners of galvanism, arguing that many of the galvanists were 
pretenders masquerading as scientists.  In one lecture, detailed in the Observer, Davy 
emphasized the importance of the history undergirding galvanism/electrical 
experimentation, remarking on the work of “illustrious characters” such as Benjamin 
Franklin in providing foundational knowledge of electricity (Observer 1811).  Davy 
discussed the dangers of having an unformed public when it comes to issues of science 
and medicine.  An uninformed public could easily be taken advantage of.  Members of 
the public that could not understand the science were setting themselves up to be 
swindled: 
Dr. D. in the course of his lecture, took notice of the 
various impositions which had been practiced by 
pretended applications of electricity to medical purposes; 
amongst these the most eminent were the metallic tractors.  
They were made of iron and brass; of all the metals which 
have been chosen, these possessed the least power of 
producing electricity from mutual action by contact.  Their 
only real effect was that of drawing money from the 
pockets of the credulous. (Observer 1811) 
 
Davy remarked that it was the duty of scientists to “pursue and disclose the truth,” that 
he would prefer to “be persecuted and die a martyr to its sacred cause, than live the 
slave of error, and be the parasite of false opinions” (Observer 1811).   
Davy stated that there was a direct connection between the “progress of science” 
and “political freedom,” using the example of ancient Greece, known for the freedoms 
afforded to its citizens, where “science was cultivated with the greatest success.”  He 
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argued for an atmosphere of “public freedom,” where the public can freely discuss the 
aims of science – in ancient Greece, due to the culture of freedom and discussion, the 
“mind was roused to energy.”  Davy maintained that science is best cultivated in 
environments that value free and open discussion, rather than environments where 
freedom is stifled: 
The ages of Greece most distinguished for heroism and 
freedom, were those in which science was cultivated with 
the greatest success.  The mind was roused to energy by 
the cheering voice of public freedom and popular 
applause.  The patronage of a tyrant might for a short 
period give a sickly encouragement to science, but it could 
only strike root and flourish with a vigour in a land where 
men enjoyed the power of free discussion, and were in 
possession of their civil and religious rights. (Observer 
1811) 
 
Although Mary Shelley was only a little girl at the time of Aldini’s famous demonstration 
at the Royal College of Surgeons, Davy recounted the experiments in vivid detail to her 
over a decade later.  
 Other accounts poked fun at the hype surrounding galvanism, which was viewed 
as a panacea for all sorts of ailments.  “Galvanism in Piccadilly,” a cartoon by Robert 
Middleton (1800), satirically illustrates galvanism as a “cure all.” in the cartoon, a wealthy 
gentleman is hooked up to a galvanistic machine in an effort to cure his faltering libido.  
Upon being connected to the machine, the patient immediately sees a return to form, 
exclaiming, “Mercy on me, what a wonderful effect - bless me, theres a pretty girl over 
the way - I've a greate mind to run after her.”  The operator treating the patient replies, 
“Dere mi - you Angloise - you no believe in galvanism - be gar two-dree shock more 
make you young again” (Middleton 1800). The Galvanism in Piccadilly illustration throws 
a comic light on the practice, inviting its viewers to question whether galvanism really 
can make the young old, and the old virile once again.  
Figure 2: 
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In addition to comics and newspaper commentaries on the subject, Aldini’s 
controversial experiments also informed one of the first works of science fiction. Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein, first published in 1818, provides an early example of the “mad 
scientist” archetype, a figure that has been frequently deployed as a warning against 
unrestrained scientific activity since its inception onward.  Widely considered to be the 
first modern work of science fiction, Frankenstein sparked the imaginative capacities of 
the British consciousness in grappling with the evolving relationships between human 
beings and technology, of the increasing capacities of scientific endeavors to control and 
manipulate human and animal life.  The mad scientist archetype developed in 
Frankenstein became a cultural metaphor for “the ever present possibility that scientists, 
by the very nature of their activities, may get things disastrously wrong and that ordinary 
people may suffer as a result” (Mulkay 1996, 159).  The story of Frankenstein has been 
called the “foundation-stone of the modern genre of science fiction” (Stableford 1995, 
11) and the “first myth of modern times” (Hitchcock 2007, 4).   
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 Shelley’s family and social circle also shaped her intellectual environment and 
gave her insight into a number of competing philosophical and scientific perspectives.  
Her father was William Godwin, a utilitarian Enlightenment philosopher, and her mother 
was Mary Wollstonecraft, an early feminist known for writing the influential 1792 feminist 
treatise, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (2004).  In addition to her connections 
with British scientists, such as Humphry Davy, Shelley was also friends with a number of 
Romantic poets and philosophers, including Lord Byron, and would eventually marry 
Romantic poet Percy Shelley (Bright MacWilliams 2008, 16).  Davey’s descriptions of the 
Aldini experiments and discussions regarding “the nature of the principle of life” captured 
the imagination of Mary Shelley, who, one night was unable to sleep at all, and in her 
tossing and turning, a vivid imagery came to her: 
My imagination, unbidden, possessed and guided me, 
gifting the successive images that arose in my mind with a 
vividness far beyond the usual bonds of reverie.  I saw – 
with shut eyes, but acute mental vision, - I saw the pale 
student of unhallowed arts kneeling beside the thing he 
had put together.  I saw the hideous phantasm of a man 
stretched out, and then, on the working of some powerful 
engine, show signs of life, and stir with an uneasy, half 
vital motion. (Hitchcock quoting Mary Shelley 2007, 38) 
 
 Scholars argue that Shelley was ideally situated to illuminate the underlying 
tensions and dynamics of emerging socio-technical configurations, of humanity’s 
increasing understanding of and control over the basic mechanisms of life, and the 
oftentimes conflicting and competing values that such advances represented.  Shelley 
was writing during a time of significant political shifts in Britain.  As Bright MacWilliams 
(2008, 13) recounts, Napoleon had been recently defeated, with his defeat came 
widespread political changes, and a radicalized population of poor, a population that had 
grown larger due to the return of the military population back to civilian life following the 
Battle of Waterloo.  There existed a backlash against the Enlightenment philosophies 
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that were closely associated with the French Revolution, such as a mechanistic, anti-
religious view of nature promulgated by the scientific philosophies of the day (Bright 
MacWilliams 2008, 15).   
 Shelley wove the real life activities of Galvanism with the fictional account of a 
“monster” coming to life in such a way that would capture the public consciousness to 
the extent that it would continue to permeate public debate about the responsible 
conduct of science for almost two centuries, and is no less salient in the present day.  
Frankenstein exposed the reader to the internal discourses of the scientific realm, at 
once illuminating the immense potential of scientific discovery, the man-driven insights 
into the building blocks of nature itself, as well as the perils of extreme danger when 
well-intentioned science does not go as planned, when the results of the scientific 
enterprise do not line up with the real-life outcomes.  As the novel’s young scientist 
Victor Frankenstein recounted, there seemed to be no downside to his work, he viewed 
himself as a benevolent creator, bringing new life into a “dark world”:      
Life and death appeared to me ideal bounds, which I 
should first break through, and pour a torrent of light into 
our dark world. A new species would bless me as its 
creator and source; many happy and excellent natures 
would owe their being to me. No father could claim the 
gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve 
theirs (Shelley 1818, ch. 4).  
 
Shelley’s subtitle of the book, The Modern Prometheus, further signifies the dilemma of 
pushing science beyond its socially constructed (ethical, moral, social) limits.  If we do 
not push the limitations, how are we to know what might be on the other side?  On the 
other hand, if we do penetrate those limits, do we really want to know what exists on the 
other side?  The book’s subtitle ties the modern myth of Frankenstein to the ancient 
myth of Prometheus, the “mythical technologist” and a Titan who defied the gods and 
gave humanity the gift of fire.  Frankenstein, like Prometheus, pushed the boundaries of 
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convention making his way into the realm of the forbidden, going “beyond what has been 
done before and, entering forbidden territory, steals knowledge from the gods.  He 
develops techniques for creating life, a secret and mysterious act previously known only 
to the gods” (Warrick 1980, 37).   
A major theme represented in the book is the lack of foresight and ethical 
thinking exhibited by Frankenstein.  The brilliant scientist’s creation soon turns into his 
worst nightmare, and he becomes enslaved by a fervent desire to destroy what he has 
created.  
I had desired it with an ardour that far exceeded 
moderation; but now that I had finished, the beauty of the 
dream vanished, and breathless horror and disgust filled 
my heart. Unable to endure the aspect of the being I had 
created, I rushed out of the room[.] (Shelley 1818, ch. 5) 
 
Frankenstein was published during the industrial revolution in Britain, a time of 
major social and technological reconfiguration.  New ways of transferring knowledge and 
information were emerging, and with the increasing use of the copy machine (invented 
by James Watt in 1779), information was moving across Britain at increasingly rapid 
rates, and at lower cost.  Frankenstein provided the lower segments of society with 
access to scientific ideas and debates that had previously been inaccessible to members 
of the middle and lower classes. Like Frankenstein’s creature itself, Mary Shelley’s novel 
was a first in many aspects, and as noted previously, it is considered by some to be the 
first “modern myth,” a scenario that envisions science taken to its farthest logical (and 
most fantastic) limits.  In Shelley’s time, deceased human bodies moving about, 
powered by electrical currents, as Aldini’s decapitated kittens “bounded about,” 
appeared as if reanimation could be a possibility in the near future.  The novel 
highlighted questions about the boundaries and limits of scientific practice in a salient 
way, the value conflicts presented by the industrial revolution, the French revolution, 
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Enlightenment ideas, and the immense potential and peril of science pushing the 
boundaries of convention.   
Frankenstein, in tandem with new socio-technical configurations brought about 
by the Industrial Revolution, provided a new mode of sense-making for the British public, 
one that would become a historically embedded tool, evolving and deploying within the 
British cultural consciousness over time.   Shelley’s Doctor Frankenstein gave birth to 
what has become the perennial motif of the “monster” – the biological atrocity of man’s 
own conscientious making.  The unnamed creature, born of a scientist’s dream to 
master nature and bring light to a “dark world,” still lurks in the shadows of contemporary 
debates around responsible innovation and the appropriate limitations of scientific 
research.  The metaphor of Frankenstein’s monster has been deployed in a number of 
different arenas (such as the debates around the genetic engineering of food, e.g. 
“Frankenfood”), but has also served as a central motif in conversations around 
ectogenesis, embryo research, and advances in reproductive technologies (Mulkay 
1996). 
Critical Moments and Monstrous Motifs: Early Calls for Anticipatory Governance    
Public newspaper documents detailing the practice of galvanism, and the 
reactions of both lay publics and the prominent scientists of the day, illustrate that 
concerns around the responsible boundaries and limitations of scientific practice reach 
far back in British history. The panacea-like qualities of galvanism that were highlighted 
in some accounts are reminiscent of the modern day promises of some emerging 
technological and scientific domains, such as nanotechnologies and stem-cell research.  
With promises to give sight to the blind and life to the dying, the societal benefits 
appeared endless.  However, historical accounts of galvanism also illuminate ethical 
dilemmas and societal fears around the practice – that scientists were overstepping 
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ethical boundaries, tampering with life in unnatural ways, and manipulating life in such a 
way that should be left to God alone.   
A critical anticipatory capacity, that of an informed and engaged public, was 
recognized as an important component in the cultivation of responsible scientific 
practices. The role of an informed and educated public was emphasized by Humphry 
Davy, as well as illuminated in satiric newspaper illustrations (such as “Galvanism in 
Picadilly”), in fostering a societal capacity for recognizing “credible” scientific claims from 
cheats and frauds that would claim expertise in order to make a profit.  Davy’s call for an 
engaged public suggests that he recognized the value that every day citizens can 
contribute in the shaping of technological trajectories.  Davy’s stance also indicates that 
the shaping of scientific practice rests beyond just those with scientific expertise – rather, 
an educated and engaged public contributes to an atmosphere of free, open, and public 
debate, which in turn cultivates more “truthful” scientific practices.  
Why are the historically embedded practices of galvanism and the Frankenstein 
narrative significant to the anticipatory governance of assisted reproductive technologies 
in the United Kingdom? The era signifies a critical moment in which story and science 
merged together to produce the first “modern myth.”  While it appears that there were 
indeed calls for responsible innovation in the realm of galvanism as far back as the 
1800s, equally significant for the purposes of understanding anticipatory governance is 
the modes in which Frankenstein was deployed as an ongoing motif in shaping 
discourse around the responsible governance of assisted reproductive technologies.  In 
a sense, Frankenstein evolved into an important “tool” in the societal tool belt for thinking 
about, grappling with, and governing emerging technologies.  The ways in which this 
motif was woven in the social discourse of 1960s and 1970s Britain is at times quite 
subtle, and at other times quite clear.  This era, and its accompanying scientific 
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controversies, and the societal tools for managing and conceptualizing such 
controversies will be explored in the third section of this chapter, the “pre-Louise Brown” 
negotiations.  
Infertility is in the Air: An Increasing Focus on Fertility and Infertility 
 While Frankenstein’s monster was making its way into popular discourse, the 
British state, for the first time, began a national registry of births and deaths.  The 
enterprise of tracking births and deaths can be traced back to epidemiologist William 
Farr, who “developed the first national vital statistics system and assured its use as a 
surveillance instrument” (Lilienfeld 2007, 985).  An understanding of the population 
within its borders was important for the Britain of the 1800s, as statistics emerged, in 
part, because states wanted to count people, to know how many resources they had in 
order to fuel their armies. In his writings, Farr emphasized that increases in population 
corresponded with overall advancement of the state:       
Great economic changes in land are wrought by human 
skill and labour.  The land units and the human units go on 
improving together and increasing in value; and generally, 
the more people a land supports the more valuable are its 
acres, the more advanced are its inhabitants. (Farr 1877, 
570) 
 
At this point in British history, a fertile population was essential, as the “wealth and 
strength of a state depended strongly on the number and character of its subjects” 
(Porter 1995, 19). 
Moving into the early 1900s, British government officials were becoming 
increasingly concerned with the declining birth rate.  Coupled with people emigrating out 
of the country and the overall general poor health of the nation, health and fertility 
became a significant focal point.  The British needed a robust workforce in order to 
remain an international industrial power.  Additionally a strong military was perceived as 
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necessary, due to the tensions in Europe that threatened to become volatile (Census 
1911: Fertility and Marriage). 
Aldous Huxley’s novel, Brave New World, was firmly nestled in the midst of a 
period in which fertility and population decline were an increasingly significant social 
issue for the British. The period of 1860-1940 represented a major decrease in British 
fertility.  During this time, the amount of live births for each woman decreased from 
almost six per woman to approximately two (Szreter 1996, 1).  Infertility was in the air, 
and while concerns about the quality of British reproduction reached back over a 
century, British population issues reached new heights in the aftermath of World War I. 
Millions died in the trenches as a result of the war, and the male population was 
particularly “decimated” (Bowley 1924).  Population scholar A.L. Bowley chronicled the 
declining British birth rate:  “The birth-rate per 1,000 women aged 20 to 45 was in 1911, 
122, in 1921, 115, in 1922 about 105, and in 1923 only about 101.” (Bowley 1924, 191). 
In 1911 the British conducted a census that for the first time included a fertility 
component. In this year, the falling fertility rate was “placed on an entirely new footing of 
observational rigor,” with the British government, for the first time, seeking to compile a 
full overview of “fertility patterns” for the entire nation (including England and Whales, but 
excluding Scotland) (Szreter 1996, 2).  The results of the census were published in two 
reports, one in 1917 and one in 1923 – population reports – general register office (Farr 
is head of).  In part, the explanation for the decline became one of birth control 
technologies – that the wealthier classes were utilizing new methods of birth control in 
order to limit pregnancies, and the lower classes were following suit.  
The Wings of Daedalus: The Brave New World of the 1930s 
Forty-six years prior to the birth of Louise Brown, the world’s first “test tube 
baby,” writers, journalists, scientists, and citizens were debating the consequences of 
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reproductive technologies that had not yet come into existence.  At the time, as noted 
above, fertility was becoming a national issue for the British.  Aldous Huxley’s 1932 
novel, Brave New World, provided citizens with a glimpse into a future in which 
reproduction extends beyond all current scientific and social conventions, where 
reproduction begins outside of the womb and human embryos are selected for based on 
their genetic characteristics.  The term “brave new world” originates from Shakespeare’s 
The Tempest, (Act V, Scene 1), and is uttered by Miranda when she first sees 
civilization: 
“O wonder! 
How many goodly creatures are there here! 
How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world, 
That has such people in't.” 
 
Some of the foundational ideas in Huxley’s novel were likely influenced by his 
intellectual relationship with biochemist John Burdon Sanderson (JBS) Haldane, a 
prominent biologist who co-founded the Journal of Experimental Biology with Aldous’s 
brother, Julian Huxley.  Haldane was one of the first scientists to argue that ectogenesis, 
reproduction outside of the human body, was a distinct possibility in society’s near-
future, and he was the first to use the term in describing human reproduction outside of 
the body (Nicol 2007).  In his Daedalus; or, Science and the Future, which was the text 
of a 1923 lecture that Haldane gave at the Cambridge Heretics Society, Haldane made a 
number of predictions about scientific advances, particularly in the realm of biology.  
Haldane predicted that ectogenesis would become universal, and in the 1923 
lecture, painted a future-earth that was at once as compelling as it was horrifying.  
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Haldane envisioned that the first ectogenic child would be produced by 1951, and that 
the practice would quickly begin to replace traditional reproduction: 
Now that the technique is fully developed, we can take an 
ovary from a woman, and keep it growing in a suitable fluid 
for as long as twenty years, producing a fresh ovum each 
month, of which 90 per cent can be fertilized, and the 
embryos grown successfully for nine months, and then 
brought out into the air. […] the news of [the] first success 
caused an unprecedented sensation throughout the entire 
world, for the birthrate was already less than the death rate 
in most civilised countries. France was the first country to 
adopt ectogenesis officially, and by 1968 was producing 
60,000 children annually by this method. In most countries 
the opposition was far stronger, and was intensified by the 
Papal Bull ``Nunquam prius audito'', and by the similar 
fetwa of the Khalif, both of which appeared in 1960. 
(Haldane 1924) 
 
In Haldane’s near-future, less than thirty percent of children would be born from a 
woman, rather, they would be produced by ectogenesis.  The separation of sex and love 
was “by no means wholly satisfactory” and traditional family life did have its benefits.  In 
Haldane’s future world, women could be induced to lactation by injection, “and thus 
conserve much of what was best in the former instinctive cycle.”  However, Haldane 
predicted that society would move towards a eugenic system of breeding, the benefits of 
which would compensate for lost familial love: 
The small proportion of men and women who are selected 
as ancestors for the next generation are so undoubtedly 
superior to the average that the advance in each 
generation in any single respect, from the increased output 
of first-class music to the decreased convictions for theft, is 
very startling.  Had it not been for ectogenesis there can 
be little doubt that civilisation would have collapsed within 
a measurable time owing to the greater fertility of the less 
desirable members of the population in almost all 
countries. (Haldane 1924)  
 
Haldane closed the lecture with the haunting description of a scientist, working towards 
the new biological revolution, fully cognizant of its terrible beauty: “The scientific worker 
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of the future will more and more resemble the lonely figure of Daedalus as he becomes 
conscious of his ghastly mission, and proud of it.” 
 While neither Julian Huxley or JBS Haldane claimed credit for the scientific 
underpinnings of Brave New World (Nicol 2007), the parallels between Haldane’s visions 
of the impending biological revolution and Aldous Huxley’s dystopian World State are 
clear. 
Huxley’s novel opens with a visual of the Central London Hatchery and 
Conditioning Centre.  Despite the plainness of the “squat” thirty-four-story building, the 
ensuing description of what occurs inside is jarring.  Here, the assembly-line concept 
pioneered by Henry Ford is applied to human reproduction.  This center, and others like 
it scattered across major cities in the World State, is where ectogenesis occurs.  
In Huxley’s future London, human reproduction has become completely 
automated, and human “viviparous” reproduction, by which mothers carry and give birth 
to live young, has been replaced by an assembly-line model of reproduction.  Human 
sperm and eggs are mixed together in large vats, and the resulting embryos are 
classified into different castes.  The ruling class of people, the Alpha and Beta castes, 
are born from embryos that are created via one unique egg and one unique sperm.  The 
lower castes are reproduced by “Bokanovsky’s Process,” by which embryos “bud,” 
creating hundreds of genetically identical individuals.  This process serves as “one of the 
major instruments of social stability,” enabling the speedy production of thousands of 
identical lower-caste embryos: “The principle of mass production at last applied to 
biology.”  The developing embryos are predestined to both a caste and an occupation.  
As they make their way down the assembly line, they are “conditioned” to the 
characteristics of both their caste and their predestined occupation.  For lower castes, 
embryos are kept in “below par” conditions, for example, being deprived of oxygen in 
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order to inhibit development of higher intellectual abilities: “The lower the caste […] the 
shorter the oxygen.” 
Huxley paints a world in which sex is not necessary for reproduction.  Indeed, the 
vast majority of the World State’s population is engineered during fetal development to 
be infertile.  The small minority of upper-caste women who do have functioning ovaries 
are conditioned to consistently take contraceptives (the practice of which is called the 
“Malthusian drill”), which are typically stored in a box attached to a “Malthusian belt.”  
The name of the belt is an allusion to Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus.  Malthus, a 
late-18th century Englishman, proposed that long-term economic stability and the 
advancement of society towards utopia would be hindered by uncontrolled population 
growth.  Malthus argued that population growth must be in line with available resources:  
The happiness of a country does not depend, absolutely, 
upon its poverty, or its riches, upon its youth, or its age, 
upon its being thinly, or fully inhabited, but upon the 
rapidity with which it is increasing, upon the degree in 
which the yearly increase of food approaches to the yearly 
increase of an unrestricted population. (Malthus 2004, 
Chapter VII) 
 
Huxley’s World State is predicated upon the notion that the collective happiness afforded 
by social stability is paramount.  Indeed, the World State’s motto, “COMMUNITY, 
IDENTITY, STABILITY,” is emblazoned on the front of the Central London Hatchery and 
Conditioning Centre.  The stability of the World State comes from precise population 
control and conditioning of human beings from their conception onward.  In order to 
maintain stability, reproduction is solely in the hands of the government, and sexual 
relations serve as a means of pleasure only.  
Brave New World Enters the Public Lexicon 
“Mr. Aldous Huxley’s “Brave New World” is going to be fearfully and wonderingly 
read by everyone,” declared the Observer (Observer 1932).  Huxley’s “Brave New 
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World” stands out as one of the novels of the year which linger persistently in the 
reader’s memory,” quipped another reviewer (Linford 1932).  The novel was praised by 
the Observer as being one of the top four novels of 1932 (Observer 1933).  While the 
novel received critical reception (a mixture of praise and luke-warm cynicism) upon its 
release, perhaps the Australian reception is the most perplexing.  The book was banned 
in Australia, not allowed to pass through customs (Manchester Guardian 1933a).  The 
British themselves were quite perplexed when talk of Australia banning the book hit the 
newsstands: “The author himself may not be surprised; he might quote this new ban as 
supporting the most appalling thesis of the book itself – that the absolute denial of liberty 
[…]  Is Australia doing its best to bring that day nearer?” (Manchester Guardian 1933b). 
A number of British reviews of the book praised it for its prophetic qualities.  One 
reviewer commented that the “metabiological nightmare” that Huxley brought to life 
“might well be more prophetic than he imagined” and that the novel served as a 
provocative “deterrent [rather] than a summons to salvation by science”  (Brown 1932).  
Another reviewer noted that Huxley’s “fanciful but compelling ingenuity” illustrated the 
world as it might be “if our present scientific control of nature were carried to its logical 
extreme” (Marriott 1932). 
The phrase “brave new world” almost immediately was integrated into the British 
vernacular.  The term implied the lofty intentions of scientific progress going completely 
and horrifically wrong (e.g. see A Brave New World? 1932, Manchester Guardian).  
British newspaper commentaries discussing scientific, political, or social developments 
readily seized the idiom.  A review of British newspaper articles before and after 1932, 
the year that “Brave New World” was published, illustrate use of the phrase 
corresponding with the book’s publication.  Prior to 1932, the phrase was virtually absent 
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within the public lexicon.1 One commentary discussed the shift towards mass production 
and labor-saving measures and employed the vision of a “brave new world” in illustrating 
this transition to mechanized labor processes, which, in turn, would strip people of their 
individuality: 
All the work of the world will be done by a few brains which 
will be highly paid and kept in moral safes and a few 
executants, the function of whom will be the maintenance 
of the necessary machinery.  Without even adventuring 
oneself into a brave new world, human effort, all around 
us, is steadily being made impossible by the withdrawal 
not only of the big necessities but of the little things which 
occupied our minds and our hands.  Even the flowers will 
soon be sent home ready arranged. (Manchester Guardian 
1932c) 
 
“Brave New World” was often mentioned in popular discourse regarding the 
potentials and pitfalls of scientific development, and the role/responsibility of scientists 
themselves in the application of their research.  In a newspaper review of a collection of 
essays entitled “The Frustration of Science,” for example, the “brave new world” of 
scientific advancement was described as a balancing act between “what science might 
do for the world if we would only let it” versus the potential undesired implications of 
scientific advancement.  Essays such as “The Invention of Sterility” and “Bacterial 
Warfare” set the stage for this balancing act, that “neither science nor fascistic reactions 
against science can save us” (Manchester Guardian 1935). Some scientist-writers in the 
book grappled with the results of scientific discovery being turned into “instrument[s] of 
warfare”: “The scientific investigator has no control over the uses to which his work is 
put, and one aim of this volume is to call the attention of scientific workers to their 
responsibility for such uses” (Desch 1935, 558).  
                                                
1 Based on a search using ProQuest Historical Newspapers research database: The 
Guardian (1821-2003) and The Observer (1791-2003). 
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The “Frustration of Science” was not alone in exploring the “brave new world” of 
the future, however.  “The Book of the Future,” by Ritchie Calder, sought to translate 
cutting-edge scientific research for lay readers.  Calder visited a number of prestigious 
laboratories, whose research he recounted in the book, in an effort to “explain to the 
common man (so far as explanation is possible) how science is getting on, and what it is 
aiming at” (Observer 1934).  Calder, in the style of Huxley’s “Brave New World,” 
attempted to give readers an idea of how scientific research endeavors of the present 
would affect the future, for better or for worse.  He predicted that  
We shall have television and harnessed tides, and 
euthanasia and a stabilized birth-rate, and there will be 
‘very different views’ on the subject of divorce.  Men and 
women will be some two inches taller, much less liable to 
disease, and will be bred, more or less, ‘according to plan.’ 
(Observer 1934) 
 
Calder was “not entirely happy” about the future scenario that he illustrated in the book.  
He feared that advances in science and technology would be accompanied by a 
mechanization of human life, where industry would subsume everything else. 
The Social Significance of Infertility in Britain 
The period between the publication of Huxley and Haldane’s work and the 1978 
birth of Louise Brown was a time of transition.  The advent of World War II signified a 
transformation from “how big are your armies” to “how big are your bombs”.  The pre-
World War II conversation, with its focus on fertility and the declining population, was 
different from the conversation that evolved after the war.  There was a line being drawn 
between what Haldane and Huxley raised concerns over (babies being born without 
mothers), and the evolving post-WWII framing of research on human reproduction.  In 
the 1960s, with news that researchers were attempting to grow humans outside of the 
womb, it seemed as if Haldane and Huxley’s fears could soon become reality – that 
modern scientists might become real-life Doctor Frankensteins and create monstrosities 
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born through ectogenesis.  Frankensteins and Brave New Worlds would continue 
shaping and framing the debates around human reproduction, but the predominant 
societal framings around research on human reproduction would evolve again, to focus 
on the tensions between helping infertile couples have children and the responsible 
limitations around fertility research, as Patrick Steptoe and Robert Edwards took center 
stage, accompanied by a rabbit in the passenger seat. 
An Unconventional Passenger 
In 1970s England, it was not uncommon for gynecologist Patrick Steptoe to be 
seen driving from Oldham to Cambridge with a rabbit in the passenger seat (Doyle 
1978).  Steptoe’s unconventional driving companion served as an ideal incubator for 
human eggs, which he would remove from women during gynecological surgery and 
house in the womb of the rabbit for the road trip.  Once the eggs successfully arrived in 
Cambridge, physiologist Robert Edwards would mix human sperm with the eggs in an 
attempt to create in-vitro embryos, or embryos conceived outside of the human body 
(Doyle 1978).  Fertilization had been successfully achieved with hamster and mouse 
eggs, but consistent, successful in-vitro fertilization of human eggs was proving to be a 
greater challenge, both technically and ethically (Tucker 1969).   
Societal hackles were raised early on when in 1961, Italian embryologist Daniele 
Petrucci claimed to have achieved successful fertilization of a human egg in a “test 
tube,” destroying the embryo after 29 days of development, “because it had become 
monstrous and was about to outgrow its glass cell” (The Miami News 1961).  The 
Vatican condemned the activity, stating that creating human life outside of its “natural 
conditions” would have “monstrous consequences” (Guardian 1961). Reflecting on the 
moral implications of his research, Petrucci said that he did nothing that went against his 
Catholic faith.  He did say that researchers should proceed carefully “from the moral or 
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practical point of view, we must be very careful […] Since we don’t know when God 
sends the soul into the body, we must not try anything that would separate them […]” 
(CBC 1961).  Petrucci did not publish his results in a scientific journal, which caused 
members of the research community to doubt his statements.   
A few years later, Petrucci claimed to have created forty embryos through IVF in 
a device he called a “biological cradle” (Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph 1964), but again, 
rather than publishing his results in a scientific journal, made his announcements 
through the popular press.  Lacking support from Italy and most of Western Europe and 
the United States, Petrucci moved to the Soviet Union, where he and Moscow scientists 
claimed to have developed artificial wombs to keep embryos alive and growing.  They 
even claimed to have kept a fetus alive for six months outside of the womb before it died 
(Henig 2004, 32-33).  Petrucci’s claims stirred up dystopian images of cheapened 
human life and mechanized baby factories:  
Petrucci’s account to an Evening Standard reporter of his 
work at Bologna reads like something out of Aldous 
Huxley’s Brave New World.  The artificial conception in the 
“biological cradle” takes place between chamois leather 
disks to simulate the natural site of implantation.  Plasma 
from other pregnant women is dropped in and the 
temperature carefully controlled.  (Quebec Chronicle – 
Telegraph 1964).   
 
Unlike Petrucci, Edwards was not interested in keeping embryos alive outside of 
the womb for an extended period of time.  However, he would regularly get quizzical 
looks from gynecologists when he would ask them to provide him ripe eggs removed as 
a result of surgery.  They would look at him as if he was crazy, and would quickly try to 
change the subject (Doyle 1978):   
Trying to persuade other UK gynaecologists to donate […] 
pieces of ovary removed for surgical reasons had usually 
been a dismal failure.  Those consultants had narrowed 
their eyes, withdrew instinctively when the word embryo 
was mentioned, then suddenly discovered an urgent 
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appointment that demanded their immediate departure. 
(Edwards 2003, 353) 
 
Edwards expected similar attitudes when in 1965 he traveled to Johns Hopkins Hospital, 
Baltimore, to search for “slivers of ovaries” from gynecological surgeries, so he could 
study the maturation of human eggs, and to also attempt to produce human embryos.  
During this six-week visit, he met Georgeanna and Howard Jones, an endocrinologist 
and gynecologist, respectively.  Edwards began collaborating with the Jonses, and 
managed to create human eggs with pronuclei in-vitro.  Edwards hesitated calling the 
experiment a true in-vitro fertilization, because while the sperm had successfully entered 
the egg, it had not yet fully fused (Edwards 2003, 352-353).  Following publication of 
Edwards’s write-up of the experiment in the Lancet, a British scientific publication, he 
read about his own research in the Sunday Times: “I noticed the headline on the other 
side of the front page.    BIRTHS MAY BE PROXY.  Underneath it my own name 
featured in a story about ‘experiments reminiscent of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World’” 
(Edwards and Steptoe 1981, 57).   
Steptoe and Edwards began collaborating after they met at the 1968 meeting of 
the Endocrinological and Gynaecological section of the Royal Society of Medicine.  
Edwards was impressed with Steptoe’s use of laparoscopy in order to diagnose 
gynecological conditions.  The procedure was minimally invasive, with the slender 
instrument working to provide clear images of the internal organs in the abdomen.  
Steptoe showed vivid pictures of a patient’s ovaries at the meeting, prompting Edwards 
to ask Steptoe about using laparoscopy to remove eggs from the ovaries (Steptoe and 
Edwards 1981).  Steptoe, the “world’s master of the method” (Edwards 2001, 1092), was 
able to use laparoscopy to successfully remove eggs from the ovaries of some of his 
infertility patients, providing Edwards with access to far more eggs that he had 
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previously (de Melo-Martin 1998, 51).  Edwards and Steptoe discussed the safety of 
their methods, as well as the potential ethical ramifications: “We agreed to work together 
as equals, pursue our work carefully, and stop if any danger emerged to patients or 
children, but not for vague religious or political reasons” (Edwards 2001, 1092).  For 
Steptoe, the collaboration presented a “unique opportunity” to help people: “He was a 
scientist, I was a doctor.  We both wanted to help people who had seemingly insoluble 
infertility problems.  So why not?” (Steptoe and Edwards 1981).                  
New Hope for the Childless 
In 1969, The Guardian announced a “startling discovery” in Cambridge. Patrick 
Steptoe and his team had been successful in fertilizing a human egg with human sperm 
outside of the human body.  They had produced a fertilized embryo, but destroyed it 
over the course of experimenting on it. The nightly news piece that originally covered the 
story reported that the nascent technology could go “even further,” by “continu[ing] to 
develop the fertilised egg artificially and perhaps even produce a human baby without 
using the mother’s body again at all” (Guardian 1969).  The Guardian also quoted a 
Nature commentary, praising the potentialities of the emerging technology: 
The day of the test tube baby is not here yet, and the 
advantages of this work are clear.  These are not perverted 
men in white coats doing nasty experiments on human 
beings, but reasonable scientists carrying out perfectly 
justifiable research.  One of the possible benefits of this 
research could be the treatment of some forms of infertility, 
probably in older women, who are thought to produce a 
high proportion of abnormal embryos which fail to develop. 
(Guardian 1969) 
 
In this account, the author is arguing that Steptoe and Edwards are very different from 
the “perverted” Frankenstein-esque Dr. Petruci, trying to create monsters in test tubes.  
Rather, these “reasonable scientists” are working for the betterment of society, helping 
families suffering from infertility.  The Nature and Guardian commentaries signify a shift 
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in societal conversations around the nature of research around human reproduction.  
Steptoe and Edwards are framed as helpers of the infertile, working to solve a national 
health issue, rather than renegade scientists seeking to push the boundaries of nature.  
Despite the shift indicated in these commentaries, the tensions between, on one hand, 
the solving of health/infertility issues, and on the other hand, scientists “playing god,” 
would continue to permeate and shape social debates. 
Out of Control Monsters 
The February 15th, 1969 issue of the Guardian featured a cartoon of a scientist 
clad in a white laboratory coat placing sperm into a test tube containing an egg (Tucker 
1969). As the cartoon progressed, the scientist looked at the test tube in happy 
anticipation, and a baby emerged from it.  The next frame showed the scientist standing 
next to the baby, patting him on the head.  The baby then began to grow quickly…very 
quickly.  Before the scientist knows it, the baby is taller than him, and begins to turn into 
a grotesque monster.  The baby-monster is soon much larger than the scientist, and is 
now patting the scientist on the head.  The last two frames illustrate the out-of-control 
monster stuffing the scientist into a test tube.  The final visual that readers are left with is 
the scientist, squished inside a test tube, shouting “Son!  Let me out son.  Listen to me 
son.  Son!!!” 
Figure 3: 
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The accompanying article to the comic, authored by Guardian Science 
Correspondent Anthony Tucker, advised readers to not jump to conclusions, however. 
That while it might be a distant possibility that an embryo could be developed to full term 
within a laboratory, as the Italian scientist Petrucci claimed to have achieved, “tinged 
with horror and hedged round with all manner of moral, ethical and legal problems,” that 
the “potential human value of being able to manipulate fertilisation outside of the body” 
should not be disregarded.  Hereditary diseases and genetic conditions could be 
avoided using the technique.  Lady Summerskill, an “ardent campaigner for women’s 
rights,” stated that these new developments could eventually make it so that “no woman 
need ever be without a baby if she wants one.” However, in the same statement, she 
also advocated for control over access to the technologies, expressing her concern with 
the “need to improve human stock” – in an overpopulated world where people with 
“mental defectives” and people “irrespective of genetical health” can “produce anything 
they like.”   
Tucker wrote that while dystopian human selective breeding programs were likely 
not right around the corner, the responsibility would rest on society to ensure such a 
future does not come into existence: 
What society makes of advances in biological or other 
knowledge is not under the control of scientists but of 
society itself.  […] What is possible and what is permissible 
are very different things, but society now has to face up 
squarely to new and potentially disturbing possibilities and 
decide unequivocally what is permissible. (Tucker 1969) 
 
Sylvia Allen: A “Step Nearer to Test Tube Baby” 
In 1970, after experimenting with fertilizing donated human eggs with donated 
human sperm outside of the body (always having destroyed the fertilized eggs following 
the experiments), Edwards and Steptoe took a new step in their research, illustrating to 
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the professional gynecological community that their experiments have “practical 
application” to issues of infertility.  The February 4th, 1970 issue of The Guardian 
reported that Robert Edwards had successfully fertilized a woman’s egg with her 
husband’s sperm in-vitro. Thirty-four-year-old Sylvia Allen, from Lancashire, had blocked 
fallopian tubes and was unable to become pregnant.  She hoped to produce “the world’s 
first test-tube baby,” and was willing to take on the risks presented by the implantation 
operation (Guardian 1970). Allen volunteered to take part in the experiment after 
watching a TV program featuring Patrick Steptoe and his research.  Allen had already 
undergone four separate operations to remove eggs from her ovaries.  While two eggs 
had been fertilized with her husband’s sperm, neither was suitable for implantation.   
After the announcement, leadership in the Church of England and the Roman 
Catholic Church were vocal about their concerns regarding the moral and ethical 
consequences of the new technologies (Guardian 1970). The Church of England stated 
that 
The use of this particular development in scientific 
technique will need to be assessed carefully on moral, 
social, and legal grounds.  Because it may prove 
technically possible does not mean that it should be done. 
(Guardian 1970). 
 
Catholic Cardinal Gordon Joseph Gray issued a warning, advocating for vigilance in the 
face of new scientific developments:  
 
I certainly feel that these developments need very careful 
examination.  I think we have to look beyond this particular 
case. […] As anyone will realize, the possible effects of 
developments in longterm ‘biological engineering’ are 
frightening.  I am all for genuine scientific research, but  
society, for its own good, must be constantly vigilant on 
where the developments are taking us. (Guardian 1970) 
 
A representative of the Methodist Church, Reverend Leslie Marsh, expressed 
concern over the decisionmaking of the individual scientists involved in the experiment: 
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The doctor who is to produce the first test-tube baby says it 
is not for him but for society to say whether he is right or 
wrong.  How can we have confidence in such a doctor?  
The moral responsibility is on the doctor’s shoulders.  He 
cannot put the blame on society.  [...] The doctor may be 
able to link the chemistry of the body, but the secret of the 
relationship between chemistry, consciousness, and 
personality has not yet been opened to scientists.  Until 
more is known of the things that really matter, is the doctor 
justified in experimenting with human lives? (Guardian 
1970) 
 
Members of the medical community also expressed their concern.  Dr. Douglas 
Bevis from Sheffield University’s department of obstetrics and gynecology was worried 
about the psychological and emotional implications of the procedure on hopeful patients: 
“I am terrified about the number of patients who are going to come up and are just going 
to be disappointed.”  Other doctors advocated that Steptoe’s experimentation should be 
halted in its tracks until guidelines could be issued by the Royal College of Obstetricians 
and Gynaecologists.  The British Medical Association also acknowledged that the 
technology presents new ethical concerns, and that the “public would need reassurance 
on a number of points” (Guardian 1970). 
While Sylvia Allen had expressed her hope that the successfully fertilized eggs 
would be implanted in her within a few weeks, the implantation was never performed 
(Wilson 1996, 125). 
Around this time, Edwards became increasingly frustrated with media portrayals 
of his work, declining to participate in a BBC documentary on the “increasing control 
over early life,” including cloning.  Edwards declined the interview, and when the 
program aired, was glad that he did not participate:  
Terrible Brave-New-World visions such as those we had 
just viewed irritated me.  They still do.  They are based on 
the pessimistic assumption that the worst will happen.  The 
whole edifice of their argument is fragile – that nuclear 
physics led inevitably to the atom bomb, electricity to the 
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electric chair, civil engineering to the gas-chambers.  
Surely acceptance of the beginning does not necessitate 
embracing undesirable ends? (Edwards and Steptoe 1981, 
100-101) 
 
Steptoe and Edwards “Ride [out the] storm in a test tube” 
 In October 1971, Edwards participated in a public debate with leading scientists 
and theologians (Auerbach 1971). In the debate, titled “Fabricated Babies: the Ethics of 
the New Technology in Beginning Life,” Edwards was urged to halt his work.  James 
Watson, biologist who co-discovered the molecular double-helix structure of DNA, 
warned Edwards that his research could have immensely undesirable consequences, 
and that careful thought would be necessary before moving forward: “You can only go 
ahead if you accept the necessity of infanticide. […] There are going to be a lot of 
mistakes, what are we going to do with the mistakes?  We have to think about some 
things we refuse to think about.”  Paul Ramsey, a Princeton theologian and specialist in 
medical ethics, and Leon Kass, with the National Academy of Sciences, joined Watson 
in his criticism of Edwards.  They called for Edwards to consider the welfare of the 
potential resulting child, that there was no way of knowing how such experimentation 
would affect the development of the child, that it could do “irreparable damage” to the 
baby, and that the “slightest lapse or mistake would be disastrous to a future possible 
human being” (Auerbach 1971).   
 Edwards said that the attacks on the research were influenced by dogma, and 
were “ultra-conservative” and “unacceptable,” that the benefits of the work (in the form of 
hope for infertile couples) were being ignored.  Edwards was not alone in his defense of 
his work.  Dr. Howard Jones, Edwards’s American collaborator from John Hopkins 
University, compared the attacks made on Edwards to the “tribulations of Galileo.”  
Jones stated that it was “unthinkable that there should be any area of scientific 
investigation set off limits.”  When it was suggested to Edwards that he and Steptoe stop 
  78 
their work until an international body reviewed it, Edwards stated, “We will do our 
transplants and go on with our work as we decide, not as anyone else decides” 
(Auerbach 1971).  
 Despite his outwardly maverick attitude about doing research on his own terms, 
Edwards exercised caution with moving forward with implanting an embryo into a 
volunteer.  In 1973, Steptoe and Edwards were “reasonably sure” that the “incidence of 
abnormality in any developing foetus would be no higher than is normal throughout the 
population.”  However, of the dozen embryos that Steptoe and Edwards attempted to 
implant, none were successful.  Other researchers were also moving from the laboratory 
into the clinic, and were attempting to achieve a successful pregnancy using the 
“external” fertilization technique.  All of the attempts resulted in failure (Doyle 1974). 
The First “Test Tube Babies”?  
 In January 1972, Dr. Douglas Bevis, a leading researcher at Jessop Hospital in 
Sheffield announced that he was ready to move ahead with implanting an embryo in a 
human womb.  He stated that it had to be the right patient, however.  “When I find her I 
am in a position to go ahead.  It could be as soon as next week or much longer” 
(Guardian 1972).  Bevis, apparently found the right patients in 1974, when he claimed to 
have successfully implanted embryos in women who gave birth nine months later 
(Parkin 1974).  The gaunt and unassuming gynecologist made this announcement at the 
annual meeting of the British Medical Association, and said that he had learned of the 
three births in casual conversation with colleagues (Bakalar 2011).  Without fanfare, 
Bevis passed out a press release of this news prior to presenting a paper on embryo 
research. Following the announcement, Bevis was hounded by the media for the names 
of the mothers and their babies.  It was reported that he was offered £30,000 for the 
rights to the story.  Bevis refused to divulge the names of his patients.  He cloistered 
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himself in St. James’s Hospital, and would not take calls or talk to reporters.  A hospital 
spokesperson announced that Bevis needed time, as he “want[ed] to think of the 
implications of what he has said” (Hildrew 1974). 
The introverted Bevis was “bewildered” and frustrated with the constant barrage 
of media attention, and announced on July 18th, 1974 that he was giving up research on 
in-vitro fertilization.  On the same day that Bevis announced that he refused to do further 
research in the field, the New Law Journal published a feature that called for the 
Government to investigate the issue:  “The rights of the child thus born, and the rights 
and duties of the parents and of society raise fundamental matters of morality and of 
practical law” (Parkin 1974). 
 Doubts regarding the validity of Bevis’s claim began to quickly emerge.  Bevis 
was criticized for his secrecy and for not providing verifiable evidence of a successful 
birth.  Patrick Steptoe announced his harsh criticism of Bevis, for “making claims 
unsupported by scientific evidence.”  Steptoe stated that he was “astounded that 
Professor Bevis would have made this statement. […] As far as I know, no one in this 
country or anywhere else has yet succeeded in this technique.”  Not documenting his 
successes, Steptoe argued, was “a very unethical way to behave” (Hildrew 1974).  
Others believed Bevis, that he would usher in a new era of “brave new bab[ies]” despite 
his lack of evidentiary support (Rorvik 1974). Whether Bevis was telling the truth, or not, 
the shocking announcement of “test tube” births opened the floodgates of debate.  
Questions of what might become of the “first man” to allegedly “transplant an entire 
human life” plastered newspaper headlines for a brief period (Rorvik 1974).  However, 
Bevis faded back into obscurity, passing away in 1994, never having revealed the 
names of his patients (Dewhurst 1994). 
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A Cross Between a Virgin Birth and a Frankenstein? Anticipatory Activity Four Years 
Prior to the Birth of Louise Brown 
 In 1971, the British Association for the Advancement of Science formed an 
interdisciplinary study group to examine emerging issues associated with new 
reproductive technologies, such as laboratory fertilization, sperm banks, and artificial 
insemination.    The British Association viewed itself as playing the “special role” of an 
“intermediary body” by providing linkages between scientists and society, “educating the 
public on the one hand and ensuring consideration for the state of science and its social 
implications by leaders in all walks of life on the other” (British Association 1974, 3).  The 
aims of the study group, which was known as the Committee on Social Concern and 
Biological Advances, were as follows: 
1) to educate the public by presenting the state of 
scientific knowledge and research; 
2) to foster contacts between scientists and Members of 
Parliament, government officials, the press, 
theologians, community leaders, and others; 
3) to explain to Members of Parliament and others 
developments in science where these advances have 
important social, ethical, and legal ramifications; 
4) to produce at intervals reports on scientific issues of 
social significance; 
5) to anticipate needs for information about developments 
in science before publicity, which, if sensationalized, 
could distort issues and give rise to unnecessarily 
emotional public response. 
6) to organize meetings and symposia. (British 
Association 1974, 3) 
 
The report of the study group, entitled “Social Concern and Biological Advances,” stated 
that social issues were increasingly being seen as involving issues of science.  
Additionally, the report noted, “scientific advances themselves often cause difficulties for 
society.” (British Association 1974, 3)  The study group, comprised of scientists, 
including Robert Edwards, church representatives, politicians, journalists, and legal 
  81 
professionals, called for urgent overhauls of existing law and “entirely new measures for 
control”  (Tucker 1974). 
 The report stated that while in-vitro fertilization, once “perfected,” would have 
many implications similar to that of anonymous sperm donation, it would also have 
additional unique issues, in part because a woman would be able to give birth to a child 
that she had no genetic relation to.  The safety of a child conceived through the process 
should be paramount, contended the report.  It noted that animal research indicated that 
chances of abnormality from in-vitro fertilization would be no higher than that of natural 
conception.  Despite this, it “in no way detracts from the ethical question of whether or 
not it is justifiable to use a procedure with human beings which, in view of the lack of full 
knowledge, is in some degree experimental.” (British Association 1974, 8).   
 Another ethical problem raised was that of the destruction and disposal of human 
embryos used in the in-vitro fertilization process, especially at the current stage in the 
technology, because in-vitro embryos had yet to be successfully implanted in a human 
womb, thus all embryos used in the process were ultimately discarded/destroyed.  
Among the issues raised in this vein was the continuing one of “when human life could 
be said to begin.”  (British Association 1974, 8) 
At present 24 weeks is the maximum gestation period 
during which an abortion can legitimately be induced.  How 
does this precedent relate to the controversy concerning 
research on in vitro fertilization?  How is medical 
knowledge to be obtained and in what circumstances is it 
justifiable to attempt to obtain it.  Research on in vitro 
fertilization has contributed to a better understanding of 
human embryology, and it could lead to improved methods 
of contraception.  But if it can be argued that the life of a 
man or woman begins in vitro (i.e. in laboratory glassware), 
then difficult problems are posed. (British Association 
1974, 8) 
 
The Committee argued that IVF would likely not contribute to overpopulation 
issues, as “its use will always be limited.”  Additionally, the low numbers of babies up for 
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adoption in the UK provided a “good reason for instituting other ways of providing 
children for some infertile couples.”  If IVF were to be limited to “husband and wife 
couples,” many of the issues associated with anonymous sperm donation could be 
avoided.  The Committee cautioned against abuse of IVF technology by women who 
would want to hire “hosts” to carry their child for them.  However, a “host” carrier could 
be a “legitimate recourse” for a woman who has an “absent or damaged” womb.   
While caution was urged by the study group, researchers, such as Anne 
McLaren, an Edinburgh scientist, argued that an IVF birth would have greater chances 
for “normality” than a regular birth: “There will be a public tendency to regard the 
unfortunate child born in this way as a cross between the virgin birth and 
Frankenstein[… however] the chances would actually be lower with an egg transfer than 
with a normal conception because the baby is going to be monitored the whole time” 
(Guardian 1974). 
 The media quickly picked up the report, with Anthony Tucker writing that such 
changes were necessary and “urgently needed” British society was to “cope successfully 
with the problems posed by sperm banks, artificial insemination, and laboratory 
fertilisation of human eggs.”  The recommendations put forth by the report to proactively 
grapple with the emerging issues, included special “specifically targeted meetings” 
between stakeholders (community leaders, politicians, and scientists) to address 
emerging issues, “public dangers,” and a course of action.  Other recommendations 
included: legally defining the status of children born through donor conception, regulating 
sperm banks, and creating a framework that outlines procedures for the procuring of 
sperm. 
 While the report recommended that research on laboratory fertilization 
techniques should move forward, the government and scientists “must be prepared to 
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set quickly to ‘prevent abuse,’ and that there must be a continuing review of advances in 
research on genetic engineering so as to foresee ‘implications and social 
consequences’” (Tucker 1974). 
1975– The First IVF Pregnancy 
 Dozens of attempted embryo implantations failed between 1973 and 1975.  
While on vacation in the summer of 1975, Edwards received a frantic telegram from 
Steptoe: “Pregnancy test positive.  Ring me urgently.  Patrick” (Le Fanu 2002, 143-144).  
Steptoe and Edwards attempted to reimplant an embryo into a patient experiencing 
infertility from impaired tubal function.  Following implantation of the embryo into the 
patient’s uterus, the pregnancy appeared to progress normally fourteen days in.  Seven 
weeks into the pregnancy, an ultrasound showed “an enlarged uterus, approximately 
nine weeks in size, with identifiable fetal parts.”  However, the next week, the patient 
began to experience mild pelvic pain.  At the ten-week point, the patient’s pelvic pain 
increased.   The ultrasound showed lack of fetal movement and lack of a fetal head.  
The patient’s pregnancy tests turned negative.  Laparoscopy showed that the pregnancy 
was ectopic, meaning that rather than the embryo implanting in the uterus, it implanted 
in the fallopian tube.  Following thirteen weeks of gestation, the embryo was removed.  
While the embryo could not be carried to term, Edwards and Steptoe’s work served as 
the “first documented evidence that human embryos cultured for four and a quarter days 
are capable of implantation” (Steptoe and Edwards 1976, 880 – 882).   
 Despite the breakthrough in achieving an actual implantation, Edwards reflected 
that this period was a difficult time for his patients, both mentally and physically.  The 
patients “who realized how close [Steptoe and Edwards] were to helping them” had to 
endure “a long slow haul” including the long hospital weights, the intensive hormone 
  84 
treatments, the laparoscopic removal of their ripened eggs, and more hormone 
treatments in preparation for the implantation.   
And after all that, and after the tests to see if they were 
pregnant, the going home to a house generally without 
children’s voices in it, going back from where they had set 
out and returned in disappointment and with the taste of 
nothing on the tongue. […] New and drastic departures 
from our routine were obviously needed. (Edwards and 
Steptoe 1981, 133) 
  
Sea-Change: Imaginative Capacities 
 Anticipatory governance is more than a formalized process - something that 
resides only within specialized institutions such as the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority.  Rather, it is also embedded within a diverse array of social 
institutions, including fairly traditional and also less conventional institutions that are 
struggling to make sense of ongoing socio-technical reconfigurations.  Such institutions 
include the courts (explored in Chapter 4), the media, and the stories and narratives 
embedded within a particular political culture.   
The episodes represented in this chapter are relevant to an understanding of 
anticipatory governance because they represent evolving capacities for thinking about 
and engaging in the governance of emerging technologies.  They illustrate the capacity 
of society to participate in anticipatory negotiations of socio-technical contracts – far 
before the technologies themselves come into existence.  In each era, socio-technical 
reconfiguration is ongoing, and accompanying each reconfiguration existed debates 
about how that reconfiguration should happen.  In this chapter, the capacities for 
negotiating socio-technical reconfigurations are reflected in the ongoing stories, 
metaphors, and motifs that shape and engage societal perceptions and debates around 
new and emerging technologies, specifically, in this case, the biological sciences and 
reproductive technologies. 
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Socio-technical imaginaries emerge at moments of co-production.  The episodes 
explored within this chapter each represent moments of co-production, moments in 
which technological orders and narrative arcs coalesce around evolving sociotechnical 
configurations.  The imaginaries deployed by stories such as Frankenstein and Brave 
New World can illustrate what are both attainable and desirable futures for a society, but 
they can also provide visions of what is not desirable, and the possibly dangerous wrong 
turns that socio-technical trajectories can take.  While socio-technical imaginaries 
typically do not emanate from one individual (instead usually emerging from 
governments and other bodies and institutions), in the episodes presented in this 
chapter, socio-technical imaginaries emerged from a confluence of activity: technological 
development, imaginative dystopian narratives, and lively public dialogues around the 
issues, together, setting the framework for a robust deliberative capacity for creatively 
grappling with present and future socio-technical configurations.     
 The capacities explored in this chapter generate a sense of the issues that 
existed within each specific time frame, and the ways in which citizens were reflecting 
upon them.  Debates about socio-technical configurations and reconfigurations are not 
embedded within just one locus of activity, rather the historical capacities represented 
here support the idea that debates are distributed across society in an ongoing manner.  
Imaginative capacities open up conversations, and are also simultaneously capacities 
about judgment – how society judges at what point it becomes necessary to rethink 
socio-technical contracts.  
The rabbit in the passenger seat represents more than just the mildly amusing, 
unexpected, and ultimately jarring image of Patrick Steptoe driving on narrow, winding 
roads through England’s rainy countryside, with a rabbit packed full of human eggs 
seated next to him.  It represents what would soon become a fundamental shift in 
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technological capacities for human reproduction.  The rabbit in the passenger seat is 
indicative of a sea-change in the conversations around reproductive technologies.  In-
vitro fertilization of human embryos would no longer be the stuff of speculation, science 
fiction, and heated debates.  It was on the cusp of realization, and Louise Brown, the first 
IVF baby, in her own process of becoming, would herald in changing socio-technical 
configurations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
“STOPPING ‘BRAVE NEW WORLD’”: THE BIRTH OF LOUISE BROWN, THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HFEA, AND THE ROLE OF BRITISH EXPERTS IN 
NEGOTIATING THE SOCIO-TECHNICAL CONTRACT 
“Society's views on the new techniques were divided between pride in the technological 
achievement, pleasure at the new-found means to relieve, at least for some, the 
unhappiness of infertility, and unease at the apparently uncontrolled advance of science, 
bringing with it new possibilities for manipulating the early stages of human 
development.” (Warnock 1984, 4) 
 
Capacities for Judgment: Reigning in Runaway Social Forces 
The United Kingdom’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) is 
viewed as an exemplar of anticipatory governance, of how countries might proactively 
govern assisted reproductive technologies, and other new and emerging technologies.  
Established in 1990 with the passage of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 
the authority is delegated with writing and managing national policy regarding the use of 
human gametes (eggs and sperm) for scientific research and clinical practice.  The 1990 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act was both novel and revolutionary in that 
it established the first national agency for regulating assisted reproductive technologies.  
Much of the HFE Act, and resulting establishment of a licensing authority, was based on 
recommendations from a government appointed Royal Commission, known as the 
“Warnock Committee,” named after its chair, Oxford philosopher and Baroness Mary 
Warnock. 
This chapter examines the period spanning from the birth of Louise Brown, the 
first “test tube baby,” to the establishment of the HFEA and the ways in which the British 
negotiated the emerging socio-technical contract around assisted reproductive 
technologies. Specifically, this chapter explores capacities for judgment.  How would the 
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socio-technical contract be negotiated?  Who would negotiate this transition?  In what 
groups or people is this capacity located?  Following the birth of Louise Brown, what 
mechanisms were present that enabled British society to make judgments about how 
new reproductive technologies should be governed?  While the chapter seeks to provide 
a historical overview of the period from Louise Brown’s birth to the establishment of the 
HFEA, it focuses specifically on two areas of inquiry.  The first focuses on the public 
atmosphere following Louise Brown’s 1978 birth, and the overarching public sentiment 
that the birth represented the potential for reproductive science, if unregulated, to careen 
out of control, that the new modes of creating life would lead to a breakdown in social 
order.  This section sets the stage for an examination of how the British negotiated the 
runaway forces, a threat to public order, into a controlled governance framework, and 
the role of the expertise-laden Warnock Committee in “Stopping [a] ‘Brave New World’.” 
The second focuses on the establishment and structure of the Warnock 
Committee, of the capacity for integrating lay concerns into expert processes, and the 
special role of experts within British society in facilitating the negotiation of socio-
technical contracts.  This chapter raises a number of questions in relation to the role of 
experts, specifically, the ways in which British experts were pulled in to reign in and 
provide order to what was perceived as science out of control.  Jasanoff (2005) provides 
an insightful and informative analysis of the role of British experts in the demarcation of 
the “pre-embryo” from the fourteen-day-old embryo proper, with a specific focus on the 
period of Parliamentary debate following the publication of the Warnock report.  While 
this chapter includes the timeframe that Jasanoff delves into, and the timeframe leading 
up to the establishment of the HFEA within it, the main focus is examining the period 
prior to it - the “out of control” atmosphere following Louise Brown’s birth, and the role of 
Warnock and her committee in facilitating “dissent without disaster” (Shapin 1994) and 
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serving as negotiators of the new socio-technical configuration around reproductive 
technologies in Britain.   
Experts are “indispensable to the politics of knowledge societies” (Jasanoff 
2005).  They quell the knowledge insecurity that is common to contemporary society.  
Individuals are bombarded on all sides with new information, issues, and questions – 
their understandings are incomplete (as no one can know everything) and their 
environments can impact their knowledge perceptions.  Jasanoff asks “how can 
governments ever know enough to act wisely or publics be persuaded that their 
governments are behaving responsibly?”  She poetically states that “the unknown 
threatens continually to engulf the known,” and individuals and policymakers are unable 
to act unless “ground rules” are set down for what types of evidence lends to 
authoritative knowledge.  The responsibility ultimately rests on the shoulders of experts 
who must “satisfy society’s twinned needs for knowledge and reassurance under 
conditions of uncertainty” (Jasanoff 2005).  Given this focus, the chapter delves into a 
number of questions: What was the role in the experts that constituted the Warnock 
Committee in negotiating the socio-technical contract around assisted reproductive 
technologies? What is the meaning of “expertise” in light of the British historical context?  
Who counts as an expert and why?  What are the tensions and pressures put on the 
notion of expertise in such a context?  In the context of governing assisted reproductive 
technologies in the UK, how does one become an expert and have either a formal or 
informal role in governance activities?  For historical purposes and to provide further 
context for the following chapters, this chapter also chronicles the period following the 
publication of the Warnock Report, including initial public response to the report and the 
debates leading up to the 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act and the 
establishment of the HFEA. 
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England, 1978 
For the British, the 1970s were a time of change and unrest, where declining 
relations between the government and unions led to strikes, resulting in the most basic 
services, such as electricity and hospital care, coming to a grinding halt.  New industrial 
technologies developed in the 1960s made some jobs obsolete, and others required new 
training for workers with outdated skills( The National Archives ). For many, the decade 
is remembered as “the decade of strikes, electricity shortages, and piles of rotting 
rubbish on the street” (BBC News 2007b). Rolling blackouts and industrial strikes made 
the activities of everyday life a challenge.  University students had to write essays by 
candlelight.  Children wore bright yellow bands on their coat sleeves so they could be 
seen in the darkness.  In the cold of winter, students in science class huddled around 
Bunsen burners for warmth.  Families were forced to get by on miniscule amounts of 
water.  Even the hallowed hallmarks of British pride and identity fell victim to the strikes, 
with Trafalgar Square transformed into a “mountain of black garbage bags twitching with 
rats” (BBC News 2007b). Others recall that the tumultuous decade gave rise to a new 
generation of politically active young people with a decidedly “anti-authoritarian” streak.  
Youth would gather in large cities and small towns, debating British politics and the plight 
of third world countries, galvanized by the protest music of Bob Dylan and other artists 
(BBC News 2007a).  Fervor surrounding the election of Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher with her promises of reigning in out-of-control union activity were promising to 
many, giving British citizens hope that tumult of the decade were coming to an end.   
This Britain, a Britain full of hope yet trepidation in the face of an uncertain future, 
was the Britain that Louise Brown was born into.  Louise Brown, famously known as the 
first “test tube baby,” was the proof-of-concept for John Edwards and Patrick Steptoe’s 
in-vitro fertilization (known colloquially at the time as an “embryo transfer” or “test tube 
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baby”) technique.  The baby, conceived in a petri dish and subsequently transplanted 
into Lesley Brown’s womb as an embryo, elicited in the British public equal parts hope 
and horror.  In one sense, Louise Brown served as a human manifestation of the out-of-
control atmosphere present in 1978 Britain, in another sense, she also represented the 
potential for the British to negotiate chaos into order, to bring structure and regulation to 
what otherwise might be an unruly social kind, the “test tube” baby.   
The “First Test Tube Baby”: “All Hell Will Break Loose”? 
After trying to become pregnant for nine years, Lesley and John Brown arrived in 
Patrick Steptoe’s office in 1976.  Steptoe and Edwards felt that the Browns were an ideal 
couple for treatment.  They had tried a multitude of other treatments ranging from 
hormones to surgery.  Despite these many failed attempts, the Browns remained 
positive and determined. The IVF team warned the Browns that the embryo implantation 
treatment could fail, but the Browns were willing to take the plunge (Maienschein 2003).  
In April 1978, the Guardian dubbed the Steptoe and Edwards duo “test tube men” and 
reported that they were remaining tight-lipped regarding Lesley Brown’s pregnancy, and 
would not confirm with the media whether the first test tube birth would soon be a reality.  
Edwards stated that the team would play by its own rules if and when it announced a 
successful IVF birth, and said “When the time comes, if the time comes, we will make 
our own statement in our own way.  Until then, everything is speculation” 
(Anonymous1978, 3). 
Two months following Edwards’s statement, Dr. Ronald Barnes, a researcher 
who had been performing embryonic research on mice and rabbits at the Middlesex 
Clinical Research Centre, called for a moratorium on “test tube” baby research, until it 
could be proven that the technique was safe.  Barnes published his warning in the 
medical journal Pulse, stating that he had abandoned his research on mouse and rabbit 
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embryos because of “adverse results” (i.e. “malformed embryos”) in the course of in-vitro 
fertilization experiments.  Barnes was also head of the sub-division of Embryology and 
Foetal Development at the Clinical Research Centre, which was part of the Medical 
Research Council, an entity funded by the British government.  Four years previously, 
the Council had been asked to fund research on in vitro fertilization, but had refused 
given that animal studies had resulted in abnormal embryos.  Barnes expressed concern 
regarding the unknown risks to the mother and baby, such as the effects of hormone-
induced superovulation (which stimulates a woman to produce more eggs than she 
naturally would).  Animal research had demonstrated that higher than usual amounts of 
hormones resulted in a “direct relation” to abnormal embryonic development.  Other 
concerns centered on potential increases in chromosomal abnormalities in in-vitro 
human embryos, as experiments on in-vitro mouse embryos produced much higher 
rates of chromosomal abnormality when compared to those conceived naturally.  Until 
IVF was confirmed to be safe in animal studies, maintained Barnes, it should not be 
attempted in humans “until the risk is eliminated.”  Steptoe and Edwards had no 
comment on Barnes’s remarks (Deeley 1978, 3). 
Media inquiries and speculation regarding the first test tube baby came to a 
roiling boil in the late weeks of June and early July.  On July 12th, the Guardian named 
the unborn baby the “£325,000 test tube child,” due to the newspaper bids for the 
exclusive story with the family.  After a “gigantic international auction,” the Daily Mail won 
the rights to the story.  The Browns had entered into the contract on Steptoe’s advice.  
Steptoe stated that there was a “double purpose” to the deal – it would “take the 
pressure off the parents; and secondly to secure a financial future for their child.”  The 
massive price tag attached to the exclusive rights for the story of the first test tube baby, 
and the role of hospital officials in facilitating the deal raised concerns regarding the 
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appropriateness of such a deal in the face of such a groundbreaking event.  One 
hospital administrator commented that the flurry of media activity around the birth was 
causing interference with normal hospital operations: “it is having great difficulty in 
maintaining normal services in that part of the hospital because of the enormous 
numbers of press, radio, and television reporters who are seeking admission” (A Staff 
Reporter 1978, 22). 
While the media jostled for the best vantage point of the impending birth, others 
expressed concern over the possible future implications of the new embryo transfer 
technology.  Christine Doyle postulated that the new technology could lend itself to an 
assisted insemination by donor “in reverse.”  Legal and ethical problems could arise if a 
woman who had healthy eggs, but was unable to carry a baby, solicited another woman 
to carry the baby for her.  Doyle called this a “modern form of ‘wetnursing.’”  Doyle also 
noted that there was a “warning in the background.”  That while use of and desire for 
cloning and genetic engineering on humans was “‘light years’ away” from becoming a 
reality, that the creation of an embryo outside of the human body was the first step to 
such a possibility, which “cannot be ignored” (Doyle 1978, 2). 
As the birth of the baby crept closer, Members of Parliament expressed their 
unease over potential risks related to the Steptoe and Edwards embryo transfer 
technique.  Labor MP Leo Abse called the technique “exciting but perilous” (Dunn 1978, 
2).  He requested that Shirley Williams, the Secretary for Education and Science consult 
the advisory committee on “genetic manipulation research into the fertilizing of a human 
egg by a sperm in a laboratory.”Abse wanted the committee to explore what sorts of 
control would be necessary in the emerging field and requested that the committee be 
expanded in order to the “ethical and social aspects” of the research.  Abse stated: 
It is the hope of all of us that a safe delivery will be given to 
the eager parents of the first test tube baby, but the very 
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success of the transplant will bring nearer the fulfilment of 
the prophecy of some biologists a few years ago that a 
woman would soon be able to buy a tiny frozen embryo, 
take it to a doctor, have it implanted into her uterus, carry it 
for nine months and then give birth to it as though it had 
been conceived in her body. 
 
We are now moving to a time when an embryo could be 
sold in effect with a guarantee that the resulting baby 
would be free of genetic defect and the purchaser could 
select in advance the colour of the baby’s eyes and hair, 
its sex, its probable size of maturity, and its probable 
IQ.(Dunn 1978, 2) 
 
While some doctors, such as Dr. Barnes, voiced concerns regarding the speed at 
which IVF technology was developing, others could not understand why the birth was 
being made into a media spectacle.  The impending birth was “regarded with 
equanimity” by the British Medical Association.  The secretary of its central ethical 
committee, Dr. John Dawson, stated “This is a non-starter as far as medical ethics are 
concerned.”  Dawson further commented that “All you are talking about is medical 
intervention; the doctor is not involving anyone outside the family unit.  Medical ethics 
are concerned with trying to do what is best for your immediate patient.  What Mr. 
Steptoe is doing is within our guidelines” (Anonymous1978a, 1). 
On July 25th, shortly after midnight, the Brown’s baby was delivered via a planned 
caesarian section procedure.  The birth was about a week premature, as it was 
discovered that Mrs. Brown had toxemia, a condition that is characterized by blood 
poisoning.  While the doctors knew the sex of the baby prior to its birth, the Browns 
opted to keep it a surprise. It was reported that Mrs. Brown, known as the “Test Tube 
Mother,” had a girl (Beresford 1978, 1). 
Pictures of the baby girl, named Louise Joy Brown, were immediately plastered 
across newspapers around the world.  Patrick Steptoe stated that the baby was born 
“crying its head off and in a very good state, a beautifully normal baby”(Anonymous1978, 
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22). The media marveled at her apparent normalcy, with articles announcing in their 
headlines observations such as “Test-tube baby can cry”(Anonymous1978b, 1). Steptoe 
and Edwards described the birth in a letter to the Lancet, entitled “Birth after the 
reimplantation of a human embryo”(Steptoe and Edwards 1978, 366-366).  In their letter, 
Steptoe and Edwards announced the successful birth, stating: “We wish to report that 
one of our patients, a 30-year-old nulliparious (never having previously borne a child) 
married woman, was safely delivered by Caesarean section on July 25, 1978, of a 
normal healthy infant girl.” 
Steptoe and Edwards emphasized that they were only trying to help along a 
natural process and that they were not interested in “doing anything other than helping 
infertile couples.”  However, despite Edwards and Steptoe’s claims that their work was 
ethically neutral, in the hours following the baby’s birth, mixed viewpoints emerged on 
the new technique from religious communities. Pope Pius XII of the Roman Catholic 
Church emphasized that the artificial creation of human life – “artificial fertilisation of any 
kind” went against church teachings and “violated the law of nature and was contrary to 
the right of marriage and morality.”  Others in the Catholic community came out in 
defense of the new treatment, such as Bishop Augustine Harris, who stated that the 
technology can help married couples with a “deep desire for children” to conceive.  
Harris argued that in these types of situations, science is “support[ing] the loving and 
natural ambitions of the couple to produce a new life.”  Scottish Cardinal Gordon Gray, 
the Archbishop of St. Andrews, stated that he had “grave misgivings” over Louise 
Brown’s Birth.  Giles Eccleston, of the Church of England’s Board for Social 
Responsibility, welcomed the technological advances, arguing that it was a step through 
“‘which man had taken responsibility for shaping the conditions of his life’”(Morris 1978, 
22) 
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The sentiment of Dr. Dawson of the BMA, that the first IVF birth was a “non 
starter,” was starkly juxtaposed against the voices of others in the scientific community.   
In an article written two days after Louise Brown’s birth, entitled “Brave New World of 
Test Tube Babies,” Anthony Tucker reported that “Baby Brown” made “reverberations 
throughout the Western world.”  The article reflected on James Watson’s prediction that 
“All hell will break loose” upon the birth of the first artificially conceived baby (specifically 
the ethical and moral dilemmas that would accompany the baby).  However, the article 
incredulously reported, there was little outrage to be found.  Rather, it stated, 
gynecologists from around the world saw the test tube birth as “a great boon to the tiny 
percentage of infertile women to whom it may be of value, and you can almost hear the 
cash registers ringing with joy” (Tucker 1978, 11). 
While some lamented the commercialization of Louise Brown’s birth, others 
expressed concern over the frenzied attempts of the media to get a sighting of “young 
Miss In Vitro” and her family: “May she later escape the morbid attentions of the daily 
Press and the film crews who clamour even now to get in on her arrival in a world she 
did not ask to join, and will doubtless regret she ever did.”  The article, entitled “Birth 
Frights,” stated that by comparison, the birth of Jesus Christ in Bethlehem was less 
frenzied: 
This has been a pretty nasty story.  Childbirth is humanity’s 
most wonderful phenomenon; it is sad to see it demeaned 
into the Steptoe Sideshow.  Poor Baby Brown.  There was 
less vulgarity about a birth in Bethlehem 1978 years ago.  
But then the spectators were Wise Men, not reporters. 
(Anonymous1978, 10) 
 
Calls for Control 
Alongside the excitement over Louise Brown’s birth, also emerged new 
perturbations in existing social and legal frameworks around reproduction and the family. 
In some aspects, the nascent technology presented new complexities that were 
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presently unaddressed by the law. Tucker’s “Brave New World” emphasized that the 
“unsavory” implications of the technology was being masked by the joy of Louise 
Brown’s birth (Tucker 1978, 11). The article expressed concerns regarding a lack of 
control of the emerging technology.  The knowledge in the wrong hands, he warned, 
could be disastrous.  Once Steptoe and Edwards published their technique, Tucker 
contended, there was currently no way of reigning in the potentially unsavory uses of the 
technology, both in Britain and on a global scale. Tucker painted a dystopian portrait of 
what the world could potentially look like once Steptoe and Edwards published their 
work, and unleashed it into an unprepared society that lacked the necessary regulation 
and governance.   
But what happens after the full publication of their [Steptoe 
and Edwards’s] techniques, when a full spectrum of the 
medical and biochemical professions can practise on mice 
and then have a go?  How can you control that, 
worldwide? 
 
Tucker reasoned that one of the most frightening possibilities of Edwards’ and Steptoe’s 
work was the potential emergence of an underground market of women hiring 
themselves out as surrogates – surrogate mothers who would carry an IVF embryo 
created with a couple’s egg and sperm to full term.  The egg would come from another 
woman rather than the surrogate herself.  
[After] all, if you can pop an undamaged blastocyst – 
fertilised and nurtured through its first cell divisions in the 
laboratory – back into its mum’s womb and bring it happily 
to full term, you can probably bring it to full term in 
somebody else’s womb. 
 
 Tucker predicted that the “surrogate mums” for hire could make a “decent living for a 
decade or so.”  The surrogate mother enterprise would not come without a plethora of 
social and legal issues.  Such a practice, noted Tucker, would “worry our administrators” 
(Tucker 1978, 11). 
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 Tucker also raised concerns regarding the lack of regulation of embryos created 
for scientific purposes.  With the new technical knowledge from Steptoe and Edwards’ 
successful work, the prospect of creating human embryos en masse for a variety of 
scientific research projects seemed like a distinct possibility:        
Chick embryos are a crucial component of many research 
and pharmaceutical operations, but there are a vast range 
of research areas in which human embryos would be 
preferable.  Many disease organisms, for example, will not 
grow satisfactorily in culture – but they will grow in an 
embryo.  And if you want to test a substance for its effect 
on the growing foetus, why not do it in batches in the 
laboratory? 
 
Surely, given the technique which blessed us with Baby 
Brown, we can put this enormous wastage [of unused 
sperm and eggs] to important use? In the clinical and 
anonymous isolation of the laboratory any sense of 
personal attachment is lost: and since no “life” is created 
(the life resides in the oocyte and spermatozoa) and no 
additional humans result (experimental animals are 
disposed of at the end of an experiment) there appear to 
be great advantages. 
 
Frightening scenarios of distant futures of human cloning were not needed for citizens to 
“begin to get worried” stated Tucker.  The scientific breakthroughs presented new 
implications that should not be pushed aside in the excitement of Louise Brown’s birth: 
Today’s cheers and congratulations, however warm and 
appropriate, have little to do with implications.  As Dr 
James Watson said, all hell will break loose, politically and 
morally, in a world already grossly overcrowded, it is not 
easy to understand the joy.  Perhaps that is because 
knowledge and wisdom are far from synonymous. (Tucker 
1978, 11) 
 
 
Tucker was not the only writer to express concerns regarding the ethical and legal 
implications of the emerging technology born alongside Louise Brown.  Jill Tweedie 
wrote that while IVF was presently not a panacea to resolve all issues of infertility, the 
  99 
implications of Louise Brown’s birth should be delved into: “It is the implications behind 
this breakthrough that interest me and ought to preoccupy us” (Tweedie 1978, 11). 
 Tweedie voiced concerns similar to Tucker’s, that the technology could open 
ethically and legally ambiguous realms that had previously been nonexistent.  Tweedie 
also shared the example of surrogate motherhood as an area where no regulation 
existed, yet possible negative implications were imminent.  She recounted a story of a 
British prostitute who was paid by a couple to carry the husband’s child, since his wife 
was unable to.  The surrogate mother decided to keep the baby.  The legal arena would 
become even grayer, suggested Tweedie, if surrogate mothers carried offspring that 
were not at all genetically related to them:       
 
Recently a childless couple paid a prostitute to have the 
husband’s child that his own wife could not carry.  
Obviously, the next step now is to pay women to bring to 
full term in their own wombs an implanted egg donated by 
another woman and fertilised by her husband’s sperm.   
 
The practice of implanting an embryo created with a male sperm and the egg of another 
female into a separate female to carry was not an outlandish notion, as the practice was 
routinely used in the process of livestock breeding, with the embryo of one species even 
being temporarily carried by another species: 
 
Already this process is used by stockbreeders.  A fertilised 
egg from a strain of cattle is implanted in a rabbit and the 
rabbit is then shipped overseas, where the buyer gets the 
egg removed and implanted again in a cow, thus saving on 
transport costs, since it is a lot cheaper to cart rabbits 
about than pregnant cows.  A practice for which I feel a 
certain distaste on behalf of the rabbit.   
 
But is the same sort of thing equally distasteful in 
consenting human beings?  A spokesman for the Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese of New York thinks so – he has 
already pronounced upon test tube babies by saying: “It 
turns the marital bed into a chemisty(sic) set,” which 
seems to me a fairly irrelevant statement since many a 
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woman, by the end of an ordinary pregnancy, has had so 
many tests and probings of various kinds that she feels like 
a chemistry set as it is. 
 
[The] first breakthrough obviously puts the next very much 
on the cards, particularly in view of the extreme shortage of 
babies reported by all adoption agencies. 
 
The questions were numerous, and the answers uncertain, with Tweedie’s concerns 
specifically resting with the complexities presented by utilizing IVF technology in 
surrogacy arrangements.     
 
If a woman carries to term in her own body a baby that is 
not genetically hers, how much less is she the mother of 
that child than a woman who puts her genetic offspring up 
for adoption?  The prostitute who gave birth to a man’s 
child for him in lieu of his wife changed her mind and held 
on to it after birth – would she have done so if no part of 
her own genes had been involved? 
 
Tweedie argued that the issue should be examined in a different light, focusing not only 
on the adult parties involved, but also on the resulting children and the impact that such 
arrangements might have on their emotional and psychological development.  She drew 
from the experiences of adopted individuals, and children who had primarily been raised 
by nannies to elucidate her point that genetic ties might not be the only factor in 
determining whether a child feels attached to an adult figure.  Thus, a child that is carried 
in the womb of a woman that is not genetically related to that woman might still desire a 
connection with her. 
 
Perhaps the whole problem should be stood on its head.  
We usually think in terms of the parents when we discuss 
parenting but the children’s reactions deserve 
consideration too.  Children who had devoted nannies felt 
as strongly about them as they would have felt about their 
own mothers, had they been raised by them.  That and the 
love adopted children feel for their foster parents is the 
argument for long-term mothering.  
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But adopted children often also want to meet their real 
mothers later on.  Do they only want to find out about their 
own inherited characteristics or would they feel the same 
about a woman who had simply given them birth?  
 
Tweedie also highlighted the possible implications on the surrogates themselves, using 
the term “rentawombs” to describe women who are hired as surrogates.  While the IVF 
technology was new and presented unique challenges, it also hearkened back to 
historical exploitation of poor and disadvantaged women over the centuries, who have 
resorted to livelihoods such as prostitution because they are unable to make an income 
any other way.  
 
Women’s biology, they used to say, was our destiny.  Will 
biology, in the future, become a way of earning a living, 
hiring ourselves out as rentawombs?  Women today are 
prostitutes because there is a market in catering to male 
sexual needs and many women are unable to make a 
reasonable living in other ways.  The same principle may 
soon apply to women carrying other people’s children.  
Shall we regard this as exploitation, another unacceptable 
use of the female sex or will we think of it as just another 
job?   
 
Tweedie concluded by expressing her fears that the same economically disadvantaged 
women who “once wet-nursed and cared for rich women’s children,” were now going to 
give birth to them as well. “It seems to me extremely likely…” she postulated, and 
finished her article by posing a question to her readers: “What do you think?” (Tweedie 
1978,11). 
The first wave of articles surrounding Louise Brown’s birth created flurry of 
reader feedback (Anonymous1978, 10).  Guardian readers from across Britain wrote in, 
sharing their thoughts, hopes, and fears regarding the breakthrough and its implications.  
Reader Maire Davis took issue with Tucker’s article, arguing that in his writing, he forgot 
one key component of surrogacy arrangements – the women.  Davis argued that Tucker 
objectified women as incubators: “Women are people, not incubators.”  Davis argued 
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that it was difficult to imagine that most women would be able to easily part with a baby 
that she carried, even if it was not genetically hers, given the complex emotional and 
psychological issues that would manifest from a surrogacy arrangement:      
 
It is unlikely that many women could carry a baby for nine 
months, feel it move, give birth to it, perhaps even suckle 
it, and then calmly part with it.  The evidence so far points 
the other way – for example the prostitute surrogate 
mother who kept her baby despite being “highly paid” to 
hand it over.  Many thousands of adoptive mothers are 
deeply attached to children who are not even their own to 
this extent. 
 
Davis felt that Tucker as well as the scientific community were making incorrect 
assumptions when they speculated that such surrogacy arrangements would be likely.  
Davis argued that women would seek other ways of making a living, rather than subject 
themselves to a painful (physically and emotionally) surrogacy arrangement when there 
are “less painful and time consuming methods of earning a living.”  She issued the 
challenge: “What makes all these eager scientists so sure that women will cooperate in 
their megalomaniac schemes?” (Anonymous1978, 10). 
 Other letter writers provided alternative views on the subject, sharing their own 
experiences of infertility, and sought to defend the progress of the rapidly evolving 
science of reproductive technologies.  Helene Neal wrote to the Guardian describing her 
personal story of infertility, a life filled with “anguish and despair, […] longing and 
inadequacy.”  She described her struggle as a constant up and down battle of hope and 
loss of hope: “The months of sobbing; every month the hope – then despair – then 
regained hope.”  Helene felt that time had run out for her, and felt that at the age of 38, 
she would no longer be a suitable candidate for infertility treatment: 
The years go by: time runs out.  I am now 38.  An infertility 
clinic in London recently wrote to me offering me an 
appointment to try something new.  It was for a year 
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ahead!  Time has run out for me.  I replied that someone 
younger should have the appointment. 
 
In a society dedicated to “the family with regulation two-four children,” Helene asserted 
that infertile women are “made to feel different by the people who share our lives.”  The 
“frustration and sadness” of Helene’s infertility was only exacerbated by comments from 
friends, such as “Don’t they want any?” and “They’d better hurry up…” 
 Helene asked her readers who were “blessed with children not take them so 
much for granted and think of us [infertile women] occasionally.”  With “hopes dashed” 
and marriages “teetering on the brink,” infertile couples struggled to “make something of 
that which was ‘primarily ordained for the procreation of children.’”  Helene concluded 
that infertility should be treated as any other medical issue: 
We all benefit from the enterprise and success of brilliant 
scientists: kidney transplants, radiotherapy, hip-joint 
replacements, spectacles – the list is endless.  Why should 
the problems of infertility be any different? 
  
Ms. M. Williams also wrote in, echoing Helene Neal’s concerns that the article 
writers were being “unthinking and insensitive” in how they were framing the issue.  
Williams stated that the article writers did not “seem to understand the unhappiness of 
people who cannot have children.”  She argued that the stance that “human beings 
shouldn’t tamper with nature” was “profoundly reactionary.”  Scientific breakthroughs that 
benefit humanity tend to be “unnatural,” she quipped, such as airplanes and modern 
medical technology that saves lives (Anonymous1978, 10). 
Concerned citizens wrote in response to Tweedie’s article.  Many felt that the 
technological advances were moving far too quickly, and that the future implications 
would be dire (Anonymous1978, 10).  Dystopian narratives such as A Brave New World 
and 1984 were alluded to.  Michele Richman of London expressed fears that a 1984-esq 
scenario could be around the corner, if women had to be evaluated by a panel of social 
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workers, doctors, and psychiatrists in order to determine whether she was mentally fit to 
carry a “test tube embryo.”  Such a notion would “give rise to a new and sinister 
connotation of the word ‘babysitting,’” argued Richman.  Others, such as Theresa 
Doughty of Surrey and Rory Fenton of London, expressed fears that surrogate mothers 
would be little more than “breeding cow[s],” and that the wealthy would be able to “buy 
their way out of” childbearing by employing surrogates.  Fenton was “filled with disgust 
and dismay” at the prospect.  She asked, “Are we people whose primary purpose is to 
develop our humanity, or are we animals whose primary purpose is the propagation of 
the species by all and any means?”( Anonymous1978, 9). 
Others expressed agitation that money and resources were being poured into 
developing technology to help infertile couples, that there was such an emphasis on 
having “children of our own bodies,” while “the world is over populated and thousands of 
children in homes are deprived of a loving family.”  Rather than putting that money 
towards creating “test-tube” babies, Maureen Ambrose of Sunderland argued that it 
should be put towards education and social services programs to help children that 
already exist and need looking after.  Susan Seager of London stated that if she were 
infertile, she would “prefer to offer a loving home to a child who exists here and now and 
is in urgent need of love and care rather than go to extreme lengths merely to propagate 
my own and my husband’s flesh and blood” (Anonymous1978, 9). 
Res Mitchelmore of London expressed trepidation over the prospect of sex 
selection of embryos.  She argued that advanced infertility treatments could, “in a few 
years, be the final weapon that is needed to control women completely.”  A Brave New 
World was in the realm of imaginable futures, but in this Brave New World, women 
would be rendered near obsolete: 
If it comes to sex selection of babies before birth – a matter 
of one or two years – how many parents will choose to 
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have boy children instead of girls?  When it comes to 
population control , hitherto left to the chancey affair of 
men and women getting together and hitting it off, who will 
decide how many children are born into a Brave New 
World of imitation placentas and sex selection?” 
 
Huxley naively allowed the girls to have as much chance 
as the boys in his version of the future.  But 40 years later 
we are still nowhere near real equality, so what indication 
is there that men will create equal numbers of presumably 
obsolete women and equal opportunity when they have 
systematically excluded us from every arena of power and 
decisionmanking – not to mention the arts – for the past 
few thousand years? (Anonymous1978, 9) 
 
“Panic Stricken Reactions”: “There is a difficult line to draw” 
 
“There is a difficult line to draw,” stated the author of “The Making of Baby 
Brown”(Hawkes 1978, 9).  While growing a baby from conception to birth in a test tube 
would perhaps satisfy the curiosities of a few scientists, it would “clearly be offensive” 
and furthermore would be “medically pointless.”  The article grappled with the distinction 
between the embryo transfer technique that facilitated the birth of Louise Brown, and the 
use of other, more seemingly mundane, techniques for helping infertile women, such as 
ovary-stimulating drugs and surgery to clear blocked Fallopian Tubes.  These 
techniques are “unnatural,” but also “cause little fuss.”  If the embryo transfer technique 
could be “demonstrated to be safe, reliable and free of complications” it would likely join 
the arsenal of existing tools in treating infertility.  Complications would arise, however, if 
babies born as a result of the technique had a higher chance of abnormality.  If there 
was a high risk of abnormalities, “the balancing of risk against benefit would then 
become extremely difficult, with individual parents making different judgments from the 
mass of the medical profession.”  Like abortion in years past, infertility treatment might 
be “forced underground.”   
Considerations like these may have been behind the 
decision of the Medical Research Council some years ago 
not to support Dr Edwards’s work, and the opinions 
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expressed by some doctors and scientists that the work 
should stop.  Committees, of course, are not always right; 
Jenner would probably never have been allowed to invent 
vaccination against smallpox if he had to seek approval 
from an 18th century MRC. 
[…]So we already know that society is able to resist ideas 
which it finds offensive and we need not necessarily 
assume that whatever is scientifically possible will be done.  
It is good to discuss these things, since only by public 
discussion will the necessary social guidelines be drawn 
up; but panic-stricken reactions are neither necessary or 
helpful. (Hawkes 1978, 9) 
 
 
Birth of the Blues 
As the media eagerly followed every move of Louise and her family, ranging from 
Louise’s growth progress to her trip to Japan in March 1979 (Anonymous1979, 1), 
hundreds of hopeful women signed up for waiting lists as the first IVF clinics prepared to 
open their doors (Anonymous1979, 7). In Cambridge itself, however, two years after 
Louise Brown’s birth, it seemed as if Steptoe and Edwards’ goal of opening a clinic in 
Bourn Hall (a British mansion that the doctors intended to retrofit) was at a standstill.  As 
the Guardian reported in “Birth of the Blues” in March 1980, a “deathly hush” had fallen 
over Bourn Hall and Steptoe and Edwards’ IVF program.  “Nearly two years have been 
wasted,” the article lamented, “two years that may have done something to dim the 
‘hope and joy of thousands of childless couples’” (Anonymous1980, 17). 
Steptoe and Edwards continued performing their embryo implantation procedure, 
despite the lack of their own clinic, and by 1979, had performed the procedure thirty-two 
times, with four of those implantations leading to pregnancy.  One of those pregnancies 
had resulted in Louise Brown, and another had resulted in the Glasgow birth of Alastair 
Montgomery.  In July of 1980, tides appeared to be turning, as reports emerged that 
Steptoe and Edwards had officially purchased Bourn Hall from Associated Newspapers 
(Rusbridger 1981, 1).  In preparation for the opening of the clinic, Steptoe and Edwards 
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sent the Department of Health and Human Services a draft code of conduct that they 
had developed for the clinic.  The purpose of the code was to “safeguard patients 
against any possible abuses of their work.”  The code prohibited use of surrogate 
mothers, a policy that was different from comments Steptoe had expressed the year 
prior, in which he stated that “fertilised eggs might be placed in stand-in mothers, if the 
real mother was unable to carry the baby to term.”       
While clinics, such as that of Steptoe and Edwards, were making progress in 
producing self-imposed guidelines of responsible practice, concerns about the welfare 
and rights of children produced through the new methods were being discussed in 
citizen organizations and in the media.  The National Association for the Childless called 
for a focus on rights.  It advocated for a Royal Commission to further grapple with the 
policy and legal implications associated with the new technology.  The Royal 
Commission, it argued, could make decisions regarding issues of legitimacy and 
parental rights (Hills 1978, 9). 
Bringing in the “Great and Good” Warnock: “The Queen’s Government Must Go On” 
In 1982, Dame Mary Warnock was appointed chairwoman of a Committee of 
Inquiry to examine the societal, legal, and ethical implications of ART.  Wilson (2010) 
provides an excellent overview of the internal processes within the Departments of 
Education and Science (DES) and Health and Social Services (DHSS) that resulted in 
Warnock’s selection as chair.  Wilson (2010) writes that ministers of Parliament called 
for a government inquiry because they did not feel that the professional consultations 
(primarily from the medical community) that had been conducted accurately reflected 
public opinion on the subject.  Norman Fowler, the Secretary of State for Health and 
Social Security, made efforts to distance the government inquiry from the inquiries that 
had already been conducted by the medical community.  The ministers wanted a diverse 
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committee, with varying religious and professional backgrounds, and they wanted 
someone from outside of the medical profession to lead it.  Warnock was the top choice 
on a short list of individuals that might lead the committee, and was considered to be 
“very well qualified for the job” by civil servants within DES and DHSS.  Even more 
important than Warnock’s “outsider” perspective as a philosopher, argues Wilson, was 
her reputation as one of the “great and good” of Britain: “She had led a previous 
committee, was known for her organizational skills, and was typical of the well 
connected, Oxbridge educated figures that civil servants looked to when selecting 
committee members.”  Warnock agreed to serve as chair of the inquiry in June of 1982 
(Wilson 2011, 121-141). 
Mary Warnock was born Mary Wilson on April 14, 1924, in Winchester England.  
Although her father died while her mother was still pregnant, the family remained 
financially well-off, as her grandfather was a wealthy banker.  Mary attended highly 
regarded schools as a youth, and following an education at St. Swithin’s School in her 
hometown, attended St. Prior’s School.  Julian and Aldous Huxley were among the 
school’s alumni, and the school was originally founded by the Huxley family.  She then 
attended Oxford, where she studied philosophy and met her husband, Geoffrey Warnock 
(Wilson 2011, 121-141).  
An article profiling the “Good Woman” from Oxford highlighted Warnock’s zeal for 
public service and public engagement, her good character, and “composure and 
aplomb”(Anonymous1984, 7).  An “Oxford philosophy don,” declared the next Mistress of 
Girton in Cambridge, “also a well-seasoned warrior in the regiment of the great and good 
who fight honourable battles in the committees and quangos of British public life.”In the 
profile, the “sagacious” Dame Warnock stated that she was “prone to say yes to 
anything” related to public service, because she did not want to “get too walled up in 
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school.”  The article illuminated perceptions of Warnock’s excellent reputation and her 
ability to multitask several important responsibilities at once, having served on a number 
of commissions, including the Royal Commission for Environmental Pollution, the UK 
National Commission for UNESCO, the Economic Social Research Council, serving as 
chair of the Oxford Committee on the Disabled,“ and also fits journalism and the (annual) 
awarding of Harkness fellowships into her prodigious workload” (Anonymous 1984, 7). 
Due to this proclivity for service and involvement, the article noted that Warnock 
“is perhaps in danger of taking on too much, spreading herself too thinly,” that she was 
“fashionable committee’s first choice.”  However, citizens should not worry, as Warnock 
“has a reputation for not accepting anything unless she can do it properly.”  Warnock 
was considered adventurous with her commitments, as well: “She will plunge into areas 
of which she knows nothing, but she is a quick student and what a colleague called ‘a 
good examinee.’”  That same colleague also stated that there was a “trace of playing 
God” embedded within Warnock’s “deep sense of public duty,” quipping that “‘I think she 
actually believes that the Queen’s Government must go on.’”  Despite her many 
commitments “in her conscientious to British Public life she has forfeited nothing,” and 
perhaps even “gained – in personal charm.”  In terms of her personality and physical 
presentation, “She has a beautiful voice; wears good clothes; is welcomed for the 
humour and sharpness, as well as the intellectual rigour, clarity and force, she brings to 
the toughest debate.  She also likes a drink.” 
Warnock is an individual, “her own person” noted a Tory junior Minister.  She is a 
valuable public servant: “her reports are her own: and that’s what makes her so valuable 
to government.”  Warnock made it a point and a “habit” when on a committee to “declare 
her own views and prejudices straight away, so that colleagues can jump on her if she 
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gets too ‘bossy and schoolmistressy.’: clearly, in her case, both a more attractive and a 
more effective device than a poker face” (Anonymous 1984, 7). 
The profile described the issue of reproductive technologies as incredibly 
complex, a subject “not for the squeamish.” “Two British Women, hired through an 
agency for surrogate mothers, are now expecting babies they will exchange for cash at 
birth.  Two frozen ‘orphan embryos’ are alive in a tank of liquid nitrogen in Melbourne, 
Australia, while their millionaire American parents have been killed in an air crash.  An 
eminent French scientist has predicted it may soon be possible for a man to become 
pregnant.” Mary Warnock, however, was up for the challenge.  “Dame Mary is not 
squeamish […] and she has found the philosophical questions raised by this inquiry very 
much to her taste.  She has made no secret of her own views, notably her distaste for 
surrogacy; but nothing she has learnt or looked at with this committee has stirred the 
repugnance she has felt in walking through certain laboratories as chairman of the 
Advisory Committee on Animal Experiments” (Anonymous 1984, 7). 
As Wilson (2010) recounts, Warnock, in collaboration with Norman Fowler and a 
team of civil servants, went to work recruiting an array of the “great and good” of Britain 
to serve on the committee.  The committee Warnock recruited comprised a number of 
different professional and religious backgrounds.  The committee was consisted of 
seven individuals from the medical/scientific field, and eight from other fields, including 
social workers, an executive from the Immigrant’s Advice Service, theologians, a court 
recorder, and solicitors (Wilson 2011, 121-141). In her note to Norman Fowler and other 
government officials at the beginning of the report, Warnock wrote that the “professional 
expertise” of members of the committee, in addition to their diverse religious 
backgrounds, “enhanced the report” (Warnock 1984).  The below chart details the 
composition of the committee as it appears in the final report (Warnock 1984):       
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Table 1: 
 
Professor W G Irwin MB BChir BAO MD 
FRCGP D Obst RCOG 
 
Head of Department of General Practice, 
Queens University Belfast. 
 
Professor J Marshall DSc MD FRCP 
(London) FRCP (Edin) DPM 
Professor of Clinical Neurology, Institute of 
Neurology Queen Square, London. 
Professor M C Macnaughton MD FRCP 
(Glas) FRCOG FRSE 
Professor of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, 
University of Glasgow. 
Dr A McLaren MA DPhil FRS Director, Medical Research Council 
Mammalian Development Unit. 
Mr D J McNeil WS Solicitor, Edinburgh. 
Professor K Eawnsley CBE MB ChB 
FRCPsych FRCP DPM 
Professor of Psychological Medicine, 
Welsh National School of Medicine. 
Mrs MJ Walker JP MA APSW Psychiatric social worker, former student 
counselor at Cambridge University. 
 
 
The decision of the government to appoint an expert advisory group - the Royal 
Commission – to explore the social, legal, and ethical issues presented by advances in 
reproductive technologies was underscored by overarching themes in British 
Dame Mary Warnock DBE MA B 
Phil(Chairman) 
 
Mistress of Girton College, Cambridge; 
Senior Research Fellow, St Hugh's 
College, Oxford. 
 
Mr Q S Anisuddin MA 
 
Legal Executive; Vice-President, UK 
Immigrants Advisory Service. 
 
Mr T S G Baker QC 
 
Recorder of the Crown Court. 
 
Dame Josephine Barnes DBE FRCP 
FRCS FRCOG 
Consulting Obstetrician and 
Gynaecologist, Charing Cross Hospital. 
Mrs M MCarriline MA 
 
Social Worker; Former Vice-Chairmanof 
British Agencies for Adoption and 
Fostering. 
 
Dr D Davies MA PhD 
 
Samuel Ferguson Professor of Social and 
Pastoral Theology, University of 
Manchester. 
Mrs N L Edwards OBE J P B L SRN SCM 
 
Chairman of Gwynedd Health Authority. 
 
Dr W Greengross MB BS D Obst RCOG 
 
General Practitioner; Chairman of Sexual 
and Personal Relations of the Disabled. 
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policymaking, such as faith in the state and, by extension, the law in reigning in 
“runaway social forces” (Jasanoff 2005).  Tied to this perspective is the value placed in 
empirical evidence and trustworthy experts in synthesizing that evidence to provide wise 
policy recommendations in the face of uncertain technological futures (Jasanoff 2005).  
Beyond Professional Expertise 
Warnock’s inquiry was comprised of a group of sixteen individuals that, as the 
final report notes, had “professional expertise” (Warnock 1984).  While the notion of 
British professional expertise does place high importance on experience in one’s 
profession, it goes beyond an individual’s membership in a particular professional body 
and is rooted within the British aristocratic context – a historical context that places high 
value on individual excellence, one that that ties expertise to individuals as opposed to 
professions (e.g., being a barrister does not necessarily equate to being an expert of 
law, one must have demonstrated character, experience, and good judgment in order to 
provide expert advice). The British expert must demonstrate both aristos, excellence, in 
their field, and also kratos – the demonstrated capacity to engage in wise governance.  It 
is through the British expert’s character, experience, and achievements that enables him 
or her to “possess the transcendental capacity for discernment” (Jasanoff 2005).  As 
Jasanoff notes, it is the British expert’s “function” to not only apply his or her technical 
skill and knowledge to problem solving, but to also “discern the public’s needs and to 
define the public good” (Warnock 1984).   Indeed, the Committee viewed its role as 
“discover[ing] the public good,” noting in the forward, “it was our task to attempt to 
discover the public good, in the widest sense, and to make recommendations in the light 
of that” (Warnock 1984).  
The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology: The 
Warnock Report 
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 Warnock and her committee were assigned the following task: 
"To consider recent and potential developments in 
medicine and science related to human fertilisation and 
embryology; to consider what policies and safeguards 
should be applied, including consideration of the social, 
ethical and legal implications of these developments; and 
to make recommendations." (Warnock 1984) 
 
 The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(1984), widely known as the “Warnock Report,” was developed following consultation of 
the Royal Commission with a variety of individuals and groups, including religious 
bodies, scientists, professional associations.  The report opened with a reflection on the 
concept of ethics, and noted that for the committee’s purposes, the concept would need 
to extend beyond notions of proper, or “acceptable,” professional practice, to 
foundational questions related to the underlying principles upon which regulation and law 
“would rest” (Warnock 1984).  Thus, the committee was “obliged” to operate under a 
“less restrictive” understanding of ethics in order to conduct its inquiry.  Furthermore, the 
report argued, that in dealing with the matters at hand, “reason and sentiment” are not 
necessarily contradictory.  However, because “moral indignation, or acute uneasiness, 
may often take the place of argument,” the report presented the arguments for the 
committee’s recommendations, and also counterarguments as well.  The committee 
emphasized presenting both sides of each argument because it believed its task was to, 
as noted above “to discover the public good” (Warnock 1984). 
The report noted that the main commonality linking the developments within the 
“still developing, and rapidly changing” “sphere of activity” that it was studying was “the 
anxiety they generated in the public mind” (Warnock 1984).  The report, in discussing 
the establishment of the committee, described the public atmosphere at the time of its 
establishment.  The “new horizons” that Louise Brown’s birth opened up also created 
new public anxieties and trepidation:  
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It was now possible to observe the very earliest stages of 
human development, and with these discoveries came the 
hope of remedying defects at this very early stage. 
However there were also anxieties. There was a sense 
that events were moving too fast for their implications to be 
assimilated. Society's views on the new techniques were 
divided between pride in the technological achievement, 
pleasure at the new-found means to relieve, at least for 
some, the unhappiness of infertility, and unease at the 
apparently uncontrolled advance of science, bringing with 
it new possibilities for manipulating the early stages of 
human development. (Warnock 1984) 
 
 The report sought to make “practical proposals, capable of implementation” 
(Warnock 1984).  It made sixty-three recommendations regarding ART.  It recommended 
that commercial surrogate motherhood be made illegal.  The report allowed research on 
spare and deliberately created embryos until the fourteenth day of the embryo’s 
development.  According to bioethicist Albert Jonsen (2005), the Warnock Report stands 
as a “bioethical milestone,” principally for its support of the fourteen-day research limit on 
developing embryos.  It recommended the establishment of a regulatory body that would 
regulate both ART research and practice, arguing that of all of the recommendations that 
it made, the establishment of a statutory body, “within whose powers would fall the 
licensing and monitoring of provision for infertility treatment and of research on the 
human embryo,” would be the most critical.  The committee recommended that the body 
comprise professional representatives from the medical and scientific communities, but 
that it also integrate members of the lay public in its representation: “None of our other 
recommendations can have any practical impact until such a body is set up” (Warnock 
1984).   
Expert Capacities:  Identifying Trustworthy Agents 
The appointment of Mary Warnock as chairman of the Committee of Inquiry 
signifies a specific capacity for negotiating socio-technical contracts, specifically, that of 
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expert capacities, and the modes by which societies identify trustworthy agents to 
navigate complex and ethically nebulous socio-technical configurations.  Social stability 
has traditionally been maintained in Britain through an aristocracy, an assembly of 
individuals that through good reputation, lineage, and character possess the capacity for 
judgment.  In 16th century France, the term “aristocracy” made its first appearance in 
Europe. It was derived from the Greek aristokratía, meaning that the best citizens, the 
most excellent (aristos), govern (kratos).  The term embodied one of Aristotle’s ideal 
forms of government – rule by the wise and educated citizenry.  Because of their wealth, 
these citizens had the time and energy to cultivate their wisdom through education and 
to focus on the “general welfare of the rest of society” (James 2010). Steven Shapin, in 
A Social History of Truth, provides historical context and insight into the role of the 
British aristocracy in establishing public trust and maintaining social order.  Trust, argues 
Shapin, can be viewed as a “device for reducing social complexity” (Shapin 1994).  
Good-decision making was embodied in the British gentleman: “He was accounted to be 
such a man as had no inducement to misrepresent the case, no forces working on him 
that would shift his utterances out of correspondence with reality.” It requires the 
mobilization of certain kinds of people: 
“These traditions suggest that the fabric of our social 
relations is made of knowledge – not just knowledge of 
other people, but also knowledge of what the world is like – 
and similarly, that our knowledge of what the world is like 
draws on knowledge about other people – what they are 
like as sources of testimony, whether and in what 
circumstances they may be trusted.  Accordingly, the 
making of knowledge in general takes place on a moral 
field and mobilizes particular appreciations of the virtues 
and characteristics of types of people.” (Shapin 1994) 
 
Historically, public trust in British policymaking has been established through 
“embodiment in trustworthy people” (Jasanoff 1997, 221-232).  Epstein (1998) also 
illuminates this tension.  He notes that both the lay public and the scientific community 
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often find themselves assessing claims of authority or knowledge, and “asking who or 
what they should trust and believe.”  However, the issue, contends Epstein, is that 
assessments of credibility can only be made indirectly, “through the scrutiny of external 
markers of credibility” (Epstein 1998). 
The aristocracy served as mediators in reigning in social forces.  This can be 
observed in the aristocracy’s historical involvement in cultivating and regulating religious 
practice, for example.   Religion served as essential social glue and also served as a 
way of organizing political power.  Differing religious beliefs and practices could lead to 
conflict or unrest and threaten the stability of society.  The term “nonconformist” comes 
from this era in English history – when those who did not conform to Anglican doctrine 
were considered threats to established order.2   In 1662, for instance, Parliament sought 
to resolve conflicts between competing Protestant sects by passing the Act of Uniformity, 
which established national standards for religious practice in England.  When social 
activity appeared to be out of control, England looked to the aristocracy to assert its 
wisdom and reign in and regulate the social threat.  Throughout British history, the 
aristocracy was a primary force in reigning in out of control social movements. Given the 
ongoing British motif of reigning in forces that are perceived as threats to the realm, it is 
not farfetched to see why British leaders would react so strongly to the birth of Louise 
Brown, and why they would turn to Britain’s aristos, i.e. its most excellent citizens, for 
guidance. 
In light of these historical British sensibilities in reigning in perceived out-of-
control forces, the way in which the British responded to the birth of Louise Brown, 
framing the meaning of the birth as science potentially out-of-control and calls for 
government control, is not necessarily a stretch.  Within this context, the “test tube 
                                                
2 See Edmund Calamy “The nonconformist’s memorial” 
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baby,” a new, unusual social kind, could be viewed as a threat to traditional social 
forces.   Bringing in Warnock as a negotiator of the socio-technical configurations 
associated with ART indicates a slightly broadened notion of the “great and the good” 
concept of the traditional guardian of the realm.   Warnock serves as an illustration of 
larger dynamics about how governments managed transitions and deal with novelty – 
especially how they deal with perceived threats and runaway social forces.  In Britain, 
the issue is addressed by pulling together a certain kind of people, the “great and the 
good” to negotiate the transition.  In the context of Warnock, there exists a motif of 
science out of control, and a sense that the state feels obligated to address a radical 
new technology invented within its borders.  The solution is to bring the Great and Good 
together.  
Jasanoff (1997) provides further insight into the role of the Great and Good, and 
the important role of advisory bodies (and the composition and leadership of such 
bodies) in British policymaking.  She notes that in British policymaking, “personal 
integrity and public influence walk hand in hand.”  One must demonstrate character 
before one can exert influence: 
It is no accident that difficult policy choices are so often 
committed to advisory bodies of the ‘great and the good’—
to people, that is, who couple power with virtue, whose 
capacity for governance has been tested in gradually 
widening spheres of action until they are seen as reliable, 
discreet and worthy of public trust. […]They do, however, 
presume a relationship between a society and its ‘great 
and good’ representatives—a relationship founded on 
shared values and deference to expertise […]. (Jasanoff 
1997, 221-232) 
Warnock illustrates that British expertise is not strictly contained within professional 
expertise.  In British policy advising, “It is enough to show that the best people were 
selected to evaluate the situation and to draw the appropriate conclusions. Their 
collective judgment could not be bettered by inserting other, less experienced people in 
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their places” (Jasanoff 1997, 221-232).  While an entirely separate discipline of bioethics 
had to emerge for in the United States in order for philosophers to engage in 
conversations related to advances in the life sciences, for example, in the British context, 
Mary Warnock represents a great deal more.  Within this context, the expectation exists 
that someone like Warnock would be appointed in leading these socio-technical 
negotiations.  The British are not hiring an abstract set of expertise, rather, it is 
embodied within the individual.    
Initial Response to Warnock 
The completed Warnock Report was made public without delay.  The report 
received both praise and criticism immediately following its publication.  Mary Warnock 
acknowledged that criticism of the reports conclusions would be “inevitable,” however, 
she believed that the report made two significant contributions: “a reasoned discussion 
of the issues which should help a high standard of public debate; and a coherent set of 
proposals for how public policy, rather than the individual conscience, should tackle 
developments in the field”(Wainwright 1984, 4). 
An editorial in the Guardian praised the report for its “calm and balanced” 
assessment of the current state and future of reproductive technologies.  The Warnock 
Report, which “itself has spent so much obvious anguish over its conclusions,” provided 
an opportunity for society to engage with the implications of a set of emerging 
technologies before it outpaced efforts to regulate it: 
Recent history is littered with examples, of which the Bomb 
is the most dramatic: technology races ahead, fired by its 
own particular imperatives; society’s response lumbers far 
behind.  Moral and political implications are left largely 
unexplored until sever years, and many anguished 
headlines, later.  Nowhere are the issues more sensitive 
and disturbing than in human reproduction, touching as 
they do the deepest religious and human instincts and 
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triggering hair-raising fears of a brave new world of genetic 
engineering. 
 
The editorial argued that the report provided a blueprint for public debate, a debate in 
which emotions can easily overwhelm rational argument:  “As a text for the political 
debate which is to follow, Warnock could hardly have been improved upon” 
(Anonymous1984, 12). 
 Others were critical of the report, such as Lord Denning, who argued to the 
House of Lords that the Warnock Report’s recommendations were “potentially most 
dangerous to our society.”  Denning took issue with the report’s policy recommendations 
regarding embryo research, and speaking in the Lords debate on the Warnock Report 
stated that embryos should be afforded the same rights that all other people have: “that 
the only logical point at which the law could start is the moment of conception” 
(Anonymous 1984, 6). 
 In its letters to the editor section, the Guardian provided space for public 
comments on the report.  The write in section was titled “Why Warnock’s offspring will 
dismay women” (Anonymous 1984, 10).  Accompanying the section was a cartoon 
illustrating a pregnant woman, who had a “strange urge” to eat the “unpalatable” 
Warnock Report: 
Figure 4: 
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Deborah Cameron of London wrote in, contending that the Warnock Report was unfair to 
single women and lesbians who wanted to become mothers:“It remains entirely 
mysterious why this cost-conscious government did not just pick 20 people off the 
streets to write it, since it embodies every kind of irrationality and popular prejudice 
scientists are supposed to be above. […]  What is the evidence that single women and 
lesbians make inadequate mothers?”  Cameron alleged that the Warnock Report 
intended to reaffirm traditional family structures, a “traditional and sentimental stereotype 
of motherhood, taking for granted heterosexuality, marriage, the sexual double standard 
and ‘natural’ maternal instinct” (Anonymous 1984, 10). 
 Joealyn Selson from London also wrote in, expressing her concerns regarding 
sperm donor anonymity.  Little has been discussed, she lamented, about the “‘right’ of 
the child when born to know its true parents.”  Warnock, she argued, was ignoring the 
potential psychological issues that could manifest when donor-conceived individuals are 
denied knowledge of their biological origins.  She drew a parallel to the experiences of 
adopted children, but noted that donor-conceived children might be in a worse 
predicament:  “A group of children seems likely to be created who are going to have 
enormous identity problems, already difficult for those who have been adopted, but they 
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at least have a choice now of being able to find out who their parents are.”  John Ling, 
from Evangelicals for LIFE, also wrote in, and advocated for adoption rather than 
infertility treatment:  “Surely a better way to ‘escape’ infertility is by adoption.  Sad to say, 
our aborting of more than two million unborn children since 1967 has largely meant that 
this way is now virtually a cul-de-sac for infertile couples.  Two wrongs still do not make 
a right” (Anonymous 1984, 10). 
Others, such as the Bishop of Chelmsford, John Trillo, called for immediate 
action upon the Warnock Committee’s recommendations, such as the ban on 
commercial surrogacy: “Womb-leasing” is “unacceptable, and undermines the dignity of 
women and child-bearing and the family.”  In opposition to Trillo’s calls for immediate 
action, Lord Glenarthur, the junior health minister, cautioned against moving too quickly, 
and that it was important to provide space and time for debate:  “The Government had 
published the report without delay, believing a period of consultation to be appropriate.  
There would not be a consensus view on all the more than 60 recommendations, as the 
committee itself was divided on some of them, he said” (Anonymous 1984, 6). 
Calls to Legislate 
Four years after the Warnock Committee’s report, little progress had been made 
in the way of legislation.  Parliamentary progress had been slow in determining whether 
experimentation on embryos should be completely banned or adhere to the fourteen day 
time limitation that the Warnock report had recommended.  Pro-life MP, Bernard Braine, 
advocated for legislation banning all experiments on human embryos, no matter how 
many days old they were.  Bernard stated that he and the pro-life group of MPs he led 
were “determined to protect the human embryo from being used as a guinea pig” (Veitch 
1984, 3). 
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An article titled “Time to Legislate” emerged shortly after the tenth birthday of 
Louise Brown, calling the delays “quite disgraceful,” leaving a number of stakeholders in 
limbo.   
Decisions on Warnock may look to ministers like a low 
priority, fit for the back of the queue, but for others - 
doctors and researchers at the frontiers of medical 
advance, childless couples who feel their time may be 
running out, and people for whom the very thought of 
experiments with embryos is full of horror and repugnance 
– these are matters of very great urgency, far transcending 
the bulk of the legislation which the Government plans for 
next session. (Anonymous 1988, 18) 
 
The urgency of the matter was underscored by alternative bills that were being proposed 
by members of Parliament to “fill the vacuum which Government inaction had created.”  
In the 84-85 session of Parliament, Enoch Powell had introduced a bill banning all 
research on human embryos, and required infertile couples to seek permission from the 
government to move forward with treatment (Anonymous 1988, 18). 
A 1985 editorial in the Guardian pleaded that “Warnock have a hearing.”  It 
argued that Powell and his backers were moving too fast: “But the fact remains that they 
are moving too fast.  The one thing that is clear about public opinion on infertility is that it 
is not clear” (Anonymous 1985, 12). The widespread confusion and conflict on these 
issues should give policymakers pause, argued the article.  It contended that the 
Warnock Report should be given a fair hearing: “Honest and sincere people approaching 
these debates find themselves troubled and torn by the conflicting issues.  And it was 
precisely for that reason that Warnock was asked to take a comprehensive look at the 
whole interface between medical science and human fertility.”  The editorial attributed 
the delay in giving the Warnock Report a full hearing to fundamentalism on all sides of 
the issue – no one group was pleased with the Warnock recommendations because it 
was ultimately a compromise: 
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The Warnock report has been with us only since July.  In 
that time, there has been a period of initial general 
response, a single parliamentary run round the course […].  
It does not add up to the necessary gestation before 
decisive legislative action.  To the fundamentalists on all 
sides this does not seem to matter.  For the, Warnock is a 
Weasel compromise and a moral dereliction.  For many 
church people (mainly, but not exclusively, Catholics), for 
the experiment at-all-costs Frankensteins, and for some 
feminists, Warnock is a sell-out from the start.  The 
churches, being the best organised of these lobbies, have 
got their retaliation in first in the shape of Mr Powell’s bill.  
This selects one part of the report, albeit an important part, 
and lays down rules which will effectively kill off embryo 
research of all kinds. 
 
This is undesirable for several reasons.  For one thing, it 
pre-empts the full discussion of Warnock which we, along 
with the health minister, Mr Kenneth Clarke, have urged 
before any bill comes to parliament.  For another, the very 
strictness of the bill proscribes any effective role for 
research on the fertilised embryo.  And it is this moral 
absolutism which is the deeper charge against both the bill 
and its precipitate introduction.  The Warnock report is a 
morally serious document which still requires considerable 
discussion and reflection from those who approach it from 
certain and uncertain standpoints alike.  It should not be 
subjected to Mr Powell’s legislative abortion. (Anonymous 
1985, 12) 
 
Robert Edwards also criticized Powell’s bill, calling it inhumane, and a violation of human 
rights, stating, “I don’t know of any other government in the world, including 
dictatorships, that has ever imposed such a regulation” (Chorlton 1985, 3). 
 
That is failed to become law had little to do with the merits 
of the case.  Kept alive in its later stages by the procedural 
guile of its authors, it was finally brought down by a 
matching procedural sleight of hand on the part of its 
opponents.  Attempts to resurrect the bill in later sessions 
also collapsed, but for want of time, not for want of support. 
(Chorlton 1985, 3) 
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Powell’s bill failed for another reason.  Members of Parliament had been “begged” to not 
vote for a private bill, having been promised by Minister of Health Kenneth Clarke that 
official government legislation was on the near horizon.  However, the article surmised, it 
was likely that another year would pass without government action, and members of 
Parliament would begin to doubt the government’s promises.  Another private member 
would put forth an alternative bill, the article hypothesized, and it could very well pass, 
given the continued government inaction: “It’s not time but will that is lacking.  The 
Government could act on Warnock if it chose.  It just thinks it more important to privatise 
water” (Toynbee 1986, 10). 
In 1987, speaking to Europe’s top IVF specialists in Cambridge, Mary Warnock 
emphasized the need for government legislation on embryo research.  Although she felt 
the Pope was “wrong to condemn all research on embryos,” legislation was indeed 
needed in order to delineate at what stage in an embryo’s development scientific 
experimentation should stop.  The medical community that Warnock was speaking to 
was fearful that all research on human embryos would be halted, and that infertility 
treatment would be extremely limited.  The medical community was concerned due to 
the strong pro-life lobby and pro-life “backbenchers” across the span of political parties 
(Veitch 1987, 5).  
In 1989, health secretary Kenneth Clarke successfully received support from 
Parliamentary leadership (known as Whips) to introduce a bill that would implement the 
recommendations of the Warnock Report (Hencke 1989, 6). Clarke’s push for a bill was 
welcome, but the tension caused by the government delay was palatable.  The Voluntary 
Licensing Authority that was in place modified its name to the Interim Licensing Authority 
“in protest” of the Government delay (Ballantyne 1989, 28). Writing for the Guardian, 
Aileen Ballantyne announced that “The rights and wrongs of scientific research will 
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shortly be removed from cool analysts in the laboratory to the emotive and prejudiced 
floor of the House of Commons.”  The bill was expected to be announced in the Queen’s 
speech in November 1989, and MPs would have a choice of voting for one of two 
options.  The first option was that all embryo research would become a crime.  The 
second option was for the permitting of research within the existing fourteen-day time 
limit, if regulated by a licensing body such as the one proposed in the Warnock Report 
(Ballantyne 1989, 28). 
Mary Warnock herself expressed her displeasure at the legislative delays, stating 
that it was illogical for the embryo research legislation to be conflated with abortion 
legislation, and that government plans to attach an abortion clause to embryo research 
bill would only serve to further confuse two separate issues: 
The Government plan to attach an abortion clause to a Bill 
concerned with embryos in vitro denies this difference.  It 
presupposes some identity between two different kinds of 
entity, the cells in the test tube and the foetus in the womb, 
and between two kinds of procedure, carried out for quite 
different purposes.  It cannot be in the interests of clarity to 
consider both in one piece of legislation. (Warnock 1989, 
59) 
 
The use of human embryos for ART was a heated topic of political debate in the United 
Kingdom, and the anti-abortion movement strongly objected to ART practices and 
embryo research (Jackson 2001). Towards the beginning of the embryo research 
debates, the anti-research lobby was well-organized and seemingly had both the public 
and Parliament on its side, and if not for delays in Parliament almost all ART and embryo 
research would be illegal. The first Parliamentary debate on the Report was quite 
heated, and a number of Members called for a moratorium on ART research (Blank 
2004, 125).  However, between 1985 and 1990 the pro-research lobby, including 
scientists and medical practitioners, swayed opinion in Parliament (183). The victory of 
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the English pro-research lobby was due to a number of factors (Mulkay 1997).  These 
factors included the creation of a Voluntary Licensing Authority (VLA), which served as 
an example to policymakers that scientists were willing to co-operate with a monitoring 
authority and that embryo research could be regulated by a statutory agency as 
stipulated by the Warnock Report.  Additionally, success of the research lobby could be 
attributed to the images and stories that infertility clinics and scientists presented to the 
media – coupling “moving personal narrative” with “expert scientific testimony.”  The 
unified efforts of the pro-research lobby stood in clear contrast to the anti-research 
lobby, which “relied heavily on constant repetition of the abstract moral arguments taken 
over from the anti-abortion movement” (Mulkay 1997). 
Another factor contributing to the victory of the pro-research movement was the 
successful demarcation of the “pre-embryo” from the embryo proper.  Initially, most 
members of Parliament stated that embryo research was wrong based on moral 
grounds.  Pro-research interests were successful in moving the debate away from moral 
arguments towards one of demarcating an appropriate space and time period for embryo 
research.  Jasanoff (2005)discusses this demarcation.  Embryos that are less than 
fourteen days old are considered “pre-embryos,” and in the eyes of the law, stand apart 
from and are distinctive to the embryo proper.  By demarcating the pre-embryo from the 
embryo, a new research space was created in which research could continue on the pre-
embryo, which was devoid of the human characteristics associated with the term 
“embryo” and its accompanying controversies.  This creation of a new scientific reality 
was only possible with the enlistment of the state as a biopolitical agent:  “The splitting of 
the developing human embryo into two distinctive legal and biosocial entities was 
feasible only with the full mobilization of the state as an agent of biopolitics” (Jasanoff 
2005). 
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The HFE Act and the Establishment of the HFEA 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act brought before Parliament in 1990 
dealt with the issues illuminated in the Warnock Report.  It has been called a “milestone 
in biomedical regulation” and “the first attempt in English law to provide a comprehensive 
framework for making medical science democratically accountable” (Montgomery 1991, 
524-534).  Topics primarily centered around human embryos created outside of the body 
for scientific research.  The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 created a 
regulatory structure for ART and embryo research.  It requires that research and 
practices falling within the act, including the creation, use, handling, and storage of 
human embryos only occur in licensed facilities.  The main component of the Act is the 
establishment of HFEA, a regulatory body that works via committees to license, monitor, 
and inspect facilities, review human embryo research protocols, and “make policy when 
faced with novel issues” (Knowles and Kaebnick 2007).  The HFE Act requires that the 
chairperson of the HFEA be a layperson (someone not from the medical community), 
furthermore, it requires that more than one-third but less than one-half of the HFEA 
members be from the medical community (Anonymous 1990).  The HFEA would be 
tasked with not only adhering to standards issued by Parliament, but it would also 
required to develop standards for appropriate practice as well (Montgomery 1991, 524-
534). A key designation to the HFEA by the 1990 Act was that it keep abreast of new 
innovations and research in the field, so it could provide advice to the government: 
keep under review information about embryos and any 
subsequent development of embryos and about the 
provision of treatment services and activities governed by 
this Act, and advise the Secretary of State, if he asks it to 
do so, about those matters […]( Anonymous 1990) 
 
The 1990 Act also granted the new authority the ability to establish license committees, 
which would carry out the day-to-day and case-by-case approval, varying, or revocation 
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of licenses for research and clinical institutions working with human gametes.  It would 
also license specific forms of treatment, as well (Anonymous 1990). 
 The Act delegated to the authority the directive of creating and updating a code 
of practice that would evolve on an iterative basis.  The purpose of the code of practice 
was to provide guidance on “proper conduct” of work done under the authority’s 
licensing scheme.  It was also to provide guidance to practitioners regarding the “welfare 
of children who may be born as a result of treatment services (including a child’s need 
for a father), and of other children who may be affected by such births.”  The code could 
also provide direction “about the use of any technique” regarding “the placing of sperm 
and eggs in a woman.”  The code was to be reviewed and revised “from time to time.”  If 
licensed entities violated the code of practice, the licensing committee had the power to 
revoke licenses (Anonymous 1990). 
In 2008, the HFE Act was updated to include a ban on sex selection for social 
reasons, removing the requirement that clinics take account of a child’s “need for a 
father,” and allowing same sex partners and unmarried couples to apply to treated as the 
parents of a child born via a surrogate, among other amended items (Anonymous 2008).  
As a regulator, under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Acts of 1990 and 2008, 
the HFEA’s responsibilities include mandates to license and monitor clinics engaging in 
in-vitro fertilization and donor conception practices; to license institutions engaging in 
embryo research; regulate entities that store sperm, eggs, and embryos, and keep a 
registry of all entities licensed for ART practice, research, and gamete storage 
(Anonymous 2008). 
Negotiating Socio-technical Contracts 
What does the narrative of Louise Brown, Warnock, and the HFEA mean, then, 
for furthering our understanding of socio-technical contracts, and of anticipatory 
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governance as a mode through which those socio-technical contracts can be “opened 
up”?  What capacities for negotiating socio-technical contracts emerge in this case?  As 
explored in the first section of this chapter, the British policy community was 
fundamentally under fire from the media and members of the general the public for being 
consistently behind scientific advances, having to race to catch up.  It appeared to be a 
quintessential example of Langdon Winner’s technological somnambulism, in which 
society “sleepwalks” through technological configurations and by the time society wakes 
up or action is taken, it is too late. However, as the latter half of chapter two and the first 
section of this chapter demonstrate, there was a fairly healthy public dialogue about the 
implications of new reproductive technologies, before the technologies themselves even 
existed.  Professional bodies such as the BMA also sought to examine the issues and 
provide voluntary guidelines.  Despite what appeared to be a robust public dialogue and 
the establishment of voluntary guidelines for practitioners, there was little movement on 
the British government’s end until the birth of Louise Brown in 1978.  Was Louise 
Brown’s birth the catalyst that “awoke” the government from its technological 
somnambulism?  
This trajectory, in one sense, suggests that socio-technical contracts are not 
static, and that the British socio-technical contract around ART was built with the notion 
of flexibility and adaptability in mind.  The HFEA’s ongoing and evolving code of practice 
is one example.  That the HFE Act was updated to ban sex selection and remove the 
requirement that a child created through ART have a father is another example of a 
socio-technical contract that is flexible enough to adapt to changing social perspectives, 
new information, and new innovations, without having to be completely renegotiated or 
rebuilt.  The mechanisms present in the HFEA’s structure enable it to proactively engage 
with and keep an eye on advances in reproductive technologies.  The HFEA’s directive 
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to monitor research and advancements in the field, and to either adapt its code of 
practice, or advise the Secretary of State in light of these changes, is also a critical 
foresight mechanism that enables the authority to stay abreast of and adapt policy to 
emerging issues. 
Perhaps the most salient capacity illuminated in this specific narrative is that of 
expert capacities.  The way in which experts are perceived and deployed varies in light 
of a nation’s social, cultural, and historical context (Jasanoff 2005).  In Britain, as 
explored in the above section, trustworthy agents are rooted within historical 
understandings of the aristocracy as possessing wisdom, reputation, and character 
necessary for the pursuit of good judgment.  As the appointment of Mary Warnock as 
chairman of the Committee of Inquiry demonstrates, capacities for judgment, and the 
capacity for negotiating controversial, ethically contentious socio-technical issues, rests, 
in one sense, with Britain’s Great and Good. 
Significant challenges also exist with this model, however, as the “mad cow 
disease” (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) scare in Britain demonstrates.  Due to a 
lack of understanding about the disease, the gap between the lay public and experts 
was diminished, resulting in a “civic dislocation” (Jasanoff 1997).  Public trust in the 
government’s ability to make good decisions vanished, and citizens felt they could no 
longer depend on the government’s experts for advice.  Due to the immense uncertainty 
and lack of knowledge about mad cow disease, Jasanoff (1997) argues that the general, 
non-expert public was in almost on equal footing with government experts in making 
decisions on how to handle with the issue.  British experts “capacity to reassure” 
diminished, and the government fell short as it was not able to engage the public or bring 
lay voices into decision-making in a meaningful way.  The following chapters illuminate 
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the tension and assumed “dichotomy between lay judgment and expert knowledge” 
(Brown 2009), as the HFEA, in some cases, struggled to listen to the voices of lay 
individuals directly affected by its policy, including donor conceived individuals 
petitioning for a right to know their anonymous sperm donor biological father, and 
prospective parents hoping to create a “savior sibling” of a sick existing through 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis and tissue typing techniques.  The role of the courts 
becomes significant in renegotiating the socio-technical contract then, as impacted 
individuals in such cases resorted to the court system in order to give voice to their 
concerns.  
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CHAPTER 4 
GENETIC ORPHANS: RENEGOTIATING THE RIGHTS OF DONOR CONCEIVED 
CHILDREN IN CANADA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM  
Introduction 
The following case studies explore two examples of the reimagination and 
revisitiation of the governance arrangements of one suite of assisted reproductive 
technologies – donor conception technologies, and the legal and cultural shifts in British 
Columbia and the United Kingdom from frameworks of primarily anonymous donation to 
donor identification. With advances in cryopreservation technologies in the early 1970s, 
donor sperm became more readily available, and donor conception became a popular 
option for couples experiencing infertility.  Sperm donors, in both Canada and the United 
Kingdom, donated under the auspices of anonymity.  As a result, thousands of children 
who were conceived through the process have grown up not knowing who their genetic 
fathers are. In the early 2000s, donor offspring plaintiffs claiming rights to identifying 
information on their donor challenged the right to anonymity, via court cases.  
I utilize the Canadian and British contexts to explore the systems change around 
these evolving socio-technical configurations.  The chapter examines how governance 
processes in the two contexts worked over time to renegotiate fundamental ideas about 
families and kinship, rules governing release of information, the “right to an identity,” and 
general approaches to how to think about the roles and relationships of the child, 
parents, and the state in and around the introduction of this technology. As these 
changes have occurred, policies, social understandings, and legal rights have been 
renegotiated and new governance capacities have come into existence.  This chapter 
does four things.  First, it provides a narrative lens into the “right to an identity” versus 
“right of anonymity” debate by chronicling the experiences of two donor conceived 
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individuals, British Joanna Rose and Canadian Olivia Pratten, as they navigated the 
court systems in their respective countries in an effort to renegotiate the socio-technical 
contract around donor conception.  This narrative account is woven and integrated 
throughout the chapter.  Second, the chapter delves into historical practices of secrecy 
and maintaining legitimacy in donor conception and contextualizes these practices within 
the British and Canadian contexts.  Third, the chapter compares the approaches of the 
Canadian Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (often referred to as 
the “Baird Commission,” which produced its advisory report in 1993, and the British 
Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (often referred to as the 
“Warnock Committee”), which produced its report and final policy recommendations in 
1984.  Finally, I reflect on the capacities in each context that enabled reflection on and 
renegotiation of the socio-technical contract around donor conception practices. 
Joanna Rose – United Kingdom 
Joanna Rose was born in Reading, England in 1972.  Conceived through a 
process of donor insemination, her parents told her about her unconventional conception 
when she was eight years old. As Joanna grew up, she involved herself in the donor-
conceived community, going to workshops and conferences for donor conceived people 
and their families.  Not content to sit and listen, Joanna began speaking openly about 
her experiences as a donor-conceived person, emphasizing the role of communication 
and openness in families with donor-conceived children.  She was invited to speak about 
communication within families at a conference on donor insemination, one in which 
donor-conceived people, families, and sperm donors were present (Cronin and Jones 
2000).  
As Joanna was speaking at the conference, she realized, mid-presentation, that 
there was more to being donor-conceived than she had originally believed.  There was 
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another party involved in her conception – the donor.  While Joanna had understood 
from a young age that about half of her genes came from a sperm donor, the idea that 
her biological father was a real person was a new concept to her.  She had an entire 
biological family that she knew nothing about: 
I nearly passed out because I just suddenly realised that 
there was more to this and that that meant that I had a 
biological father and a whole biological family that I’d never 
thought of before and I really thought I was going to pass 
out in front of a few hundred people on a stage (Cronin 
and Jones 2000). 
 
Joanna went back to her seat, with the new realization that her biological father could be 
one of the thousands of men she brushed up against every day in the London 
Underground, or the bus, or the elevator.  As she sat back down, she looked over to a 
donor sitting next to her.  Joanna leaned over and whispered a joke about how he could 
be her father.  Although she was trying to make light of the situation with humor, the 
reality of the joke dawned on both of them. Joanna and the donor almost fell of their 
chairs (Cronin and Jones 2000). 
Olivia Pratten – British Columbia, Canada 
Across the pond in British Columbia, Canada, another little girl was staring at a 
family tree that was only half filled in.  Olivia Pratten looked at her hand-drawn family 
tree, perplexed by the task that her fifth grade teacher had presented to her.  She was 
able complete her mother’s side of the tree in without issue, but when it came time to fill 
in the vacant branches on the other side, the paternal side, Olivia, understanding that 
she was donor-conceived, did not know how to proceed (Skelton 2006).  
Growing up in the verdant, rainy Canadian province of British Columbia, Olivia 
had a loving family.  She was a happy child, but her emotional journey of grappling with 
her donor-conceived status began when she was only five, when she posed the question 
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that parents universally dread:  Where do babies come from?  Olivia’s mother explained 
(as best as she could to the five year old) that the man she knew as her father was not 
biologically related to her.  
Olivia was perplexed by the family tree assignment – her parents had divorced, 
and she felt a sense of emptiness when she realized that, unlike her classmates, who 
could trace their family trees back generations, her tree was only half-full.  Olivia had no 
idea who the inhabitants of the empty half of her tree might be, what they were like, what 
their hobbies or favorite dessert might be.  The empty branches peered back at Oliva, as 
she tried to make sense of the illustration.  The inhabitants of those empty branches 
were ethereal specters to her – she knew they existed, but they were as intangible as 
ghosts (Skelton 2006).  Who were they? 
Joanna’s Search 
The donor at the conference was not Joanna Rose’s biological father, but the 
new perspective she gained at the conference catalyzed her interest in searching for 
him.  Joanna met with a number of men who could have potentially been her father.  
While some donors preferred to remain anonymous, others, such as those Joanna 
spoke with, were intentional in their efforts to connect with their genetic kin.  All of these 
men were sperm donors when they were younger, and although they had donated their 
sperm under the auspices of anonymity, each wanted to connect with his genetic 
offspring.  At one point Joanna thought she had found her biological father, a man who 
had donated at the same clinic she was conceived in.  The man, now a doctor, believed 
that he had fathered between 100 and 200 biological children, and that she could 
potentially be his daughter.  The two had similar health issues, such as arthritis and 
psoriasis.  A test showed that they had the same blood type, but upon further genetic 
testing, it was determined that they were not related (Cronin and Jones 2000).  
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Throughout this process, Joanna felt emotional turmoil, stigma, and stifling uncertainty 
(Rose 2006). 
The notion that she could have anywhere from 100 to 200 half-brothers and 
sisters overwhelmed her.  That hundreds of her half-siblings could be any of the 
anonymous faces she encountered on a daily basis caused Joanna to question the 
intentions of the medical community and the British government.  She did not 
understand how a situation such as hers could be sanctioned by the state.  It seemed as 
if profits were the primary concern, with the well being of the people resulting from the 
procedure (the donor-conceived) coming along as an afterthought.  She was frustrated 
that there were not mechanisms in place to protect “people like [her]” from “people 
making profit.”  Joanna saw herself as the result of a social experiment: “I've always felt 
like a social guinea pig, an experimental guinea pig” (Cronin and Jones 2000). 
At the age of nineteen, Joanna moved to Brisbane, Australia for college.  The 
move was an effort to distance herself from the dissonance she was experiencing.  She 
was determined to “gain the space and time [she] needed to understand [herself] better” 
(Rose 2006). She was grateful for the geographical distance put between herself and 
her parents in the United Kingdom, as she tried to figure out why she was “so 
uncomfortable” with herself and work through her bulimia and depression (Rose 2006). 
Olivia: Trying to Fill the Missing Branches 
   Olivia Pratten, now a Toronto journalist, was born in 1982, conceived through a 
process of donor insemination in Dr. Gerald Korn’s Vancouver clinic.  As she matured 
into an adult, she continued to wonder about her biological father, and what role his 
genes played in developing her identity, both biologically and socially.  Did he also have 
thick, dark hair and porcelain skin?  Was he an American or a Canadian?  Did he ever 
wonder about his biological children resulting from the sperm he donated?  Olivia had 
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the head and heart of a journalist, full of natural inquiry and a passion for finding 
answers to the “tough questions” facing contemporary society.  Did her donor also have 
this zeal for discovery?  Knowing that he existed, and having no means of contacting or 
learning more about him, agonized Olivia (Pratten 2009). 
When Olivia was born, she was born into a world where donors were… donors.  
Their role in the process of conceiving a child was limited to the sperm donation itself.  
Donors never met the people hoping to use their sperm to create a child.  Most of the 
donors at Korn’s clinic had been medical students at the local university, and like all 
donors, they were guaranteed that their names and personal information would not be 
disclosed.  Whether a donor did or did not want to reveal his identity at a later date was 
irrelevant to the guarantee, which promised anonymity, but also prohibited identification 
of donors.   
When Olivia was nineteen, she journeyed back to the clinic where she was 
conceived.  Here, Dr. Korn performed the donor insemination procedure on Olivia’s 
mother, Shirley.  Nervous, palms sweaty with anticipation, but full of hope, Olivia sat in 
the waiting room enveloped in the bright hue of the overhead fluorescent lights, praying 
that Dr. Korn would provide her with the information she needed in order to contact her 
donor (Pratten v. British Columbia 2011; Pratten 2006).  Finally, she might be able to put 
branches on the other half of her tree.  
Secrecy in Context 
 The secrecy surrounding Joanna Rose and Olivia Pratten’s conceptions was not 
a new phenomenon.  Historically, secrecy has been a basic practice in donor 
insemination going back to the 1800s.  With the exception of advances in 
cryopreservation (enabling sperm to be frozen and stored almost indefinitely), the 
technological aspects of assisted insemination have remained fairly unchanging.  Most 
  138 
discussions of the genesis of gamete donation center on a narrative set in 1800s 
Philadelphia.  Although donor insemination practices are rumored to date back as far as 
1700s France, the first recorded case of donor insemination occurred almost a century 
before Joanna and Olivia’s conceptions, in 1884 Philadelphia, when Professor William 
Pancoast used a rubber syringe to inseminate an anesthetized Quaker woman with 
donor sperm from his “best looking” medical student.  The woman was not aware that 
the sperm came from a donor rather than her infertile husband. Nine months after the 
procedure, a healthy male baby was born.  Fearing the mother’s reaction to knowledge 
of being inseminated by sperm other than her husband’s, Pancoast instructed the 
husband to never tell his wife.  One of Pancost’s former students, Addison Hard, 
recorded the secret operation in a 1909 issue of Medical World, an American medical 
journal.  Hard, breaking his “vow of silence” on the matter, writes,  
Neither the man nor the woman knew the nature of what 
had been done at the time, but subsequently the Professor 
repented on his action, and explained the whole matter to 
the husband.  Strange as it may seem, the man was 
delighted with the idea, and conspired with the Professor in 
keeping from the lady the actual way in which her 
impregnation was brought about […] (Horn 1997, 147) 
 
Hard had also traveled to New York to meet the son of the Quaker couple, who was now 
a young businessman, and shake his hand.  It has been widely speculated that Hard 
was the sperm donor (Daniels 1998, 78).  Either consciously or unwittingly, Professor 
Pancoast, Addison Hard, and Pancoast’s other students set in motion a practice of 
secrecy and non-disclosure that would continue for the next century.  If Hard really was 
the sperm donor, though, his desire to meet the young man conceived from his sperm 
throws an interesting light onto the narrative – despite the intentional secrecy of the 
entire endeavor, secrecy that Hard was complicit in and supportive of, he still met with 
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the boy.  What his intentions were in wanting to meet his genetic offspring, despite his 
commitment to secrecy, we can never be certain of. 
Debates around Donor Insemination, Adultery, and Secrecy in the Twentieth Century 
Secrecy remained common practice throughout the 1900s, and perhaps not 
surprisingly so, given the continuing public debates over whether the practice of donor 
insemination consisted of adultery.  Debates on both the spiritual and legal legitimacy of 
the practice came to life in the experiences of couples such as Scottish Ronald 
MacLennan and his wife Margaret.  A 1958 Time Magazine article reports that the 
couple separated in 1954.  Margaret moved to the United States and Ronald stayed in 
Scotland.  Ronald filed for divorce, believing that Margaret committed adultery, since she 
gave birth to a baby over a year after he had last seen her.  Margaret said that the baby 
was born as a result of donor insemination; therefore she had not committed adultery.  
Ronald’s lawyer argued, “[T]he essence of adultery is not how it is accomplished, but 
‘the surrender of a woman’s reproductive organs to another man.’”  Lord Wheatley, the 
Scottish judge hearing the case, ruled that Margaret’s actions were not “‘adultery in its 
legal meaning,’” noting that a person cannot “have intercourse with only one person 
present” (Time 1958). 
Following the ruling, British theologians, both from the Catholic community and 
from the Church of England, issued public critiques of donor insemination.  Responding 
to Wheatley’s ruling, Roman Catholic spokesman Father Paul Crane retorted that 
artificial insemination puts humans on the same level as animals: “‘Human beings are 
not cattle to be bred by test tubes.  Only a pagan world would treat them as such’” (Time 
1958). Representatives from the Church of England also made their thoughts known.  
The Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher, stated that donor insemination is a 
violation of the marriage compact, and is rooted in deception.  A few years prior to the 
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MacLennan case, Fisher headed a church inquiry that recommended that the practice 
be criminalized.  The report, entitled Artificial Human Insemination, concluded that while 
assisted insemination practices using the husband’s sperm was morally permissible, use 
of the sperm of another man entailed adultery for both the woman and the sperm donor 
(Creighton 2009, 64). 
Canadian theological inquiries reacted more favorably to the practice.  In 1977, 
the Anglican Church of Canada issued a report on the ethics of donor insemination, 
Artificial Insemination by Donor: a Study of Ethics, Medicine, and Law in Our 
Technological Society.  The fifteen-member task force concluded that donor 
insemination was morally permissible when used within the confines of marriage.  Phyllis 
Creighton, author of the report, recounts that the majority of members in the task force 
felt that donor insemination was  
a humane, moral response of marital love faithful to God’s 
will, the desire and need legitimate, children a blessing for 
the couple and society, and, where responsibly undertaken 
by the pair, the donation of sperm humane and 
responsible. (Creighton 2009, 65) 
 
A minority of the ACC task force expressed reservations, believing that viewing donor 
insemination as a technological remedy to infertility ignores the “human dimensions” – 
“the anonymous biological father and the partial genetic otherness of the child.” The 
Task Force also grappled with the implications of donor anonymity, drawing parallels to 
the adoption experience, and citing the research of adoption experts regarding the 
damaging effects of secrecy and the importance of adopted children in learning about 
their genetic origins (Creighton 2009, 66).  These early dialogues drawing parallels to 
the adoption experience would continue to permeate contemporary Canadian ethical 
and legal debates over the issue of genetic identity and anonymity.   
An Aura of Secrecy: Legitimacy 
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As use of donor sperm became more prevalent in the 1970s, as it could now be 
cryopreserved, it was common practice for British parents undergoing donor conception 
to be told by their clinician to forget about the procedure, that “no-one ever need know” 
that they underwent gamete donation (House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee 2005, 42) and that they “don’t need to tell anybody” (Warnock 2002, 65).  
The birth of Louise Brown in 1978 caused a resurgence of interest in 
reproductive technologies, with the practice of donor insemination (two decades after the 
MacLennan case) making its way back to the forefront of the debate.  As one British 
scientist noted, renewed interest in the potential implications of new reproductive 
technologies began after British scientists Patrick Steptoe and Bob Edwards “begat 
Louise Brown – with a little help from Mr and Mrs Brown” (McLaren 1990, 209). The role 
of individuals other than Mom and Dad in the process of babymaking was seen as novel, 
and a new scientific venture that gave rise to new kinds of people – IVF babies. 
In 1984, one hundred years after Pancoast’s successful donor insemination 
experiment, and four years after the birth of Louise Brown, the British Committee of 
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology generated the Report of the Committee 
of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology.  The report provided 
recommendations regarding the governance of fertility treatments and research involving 
the manipulation of human gametes (for full detail and history of the Warnock 
Committee, please see the previous chapter).  While donor insemination was a not a 
new technological phenomenon the committee dedicated a significant portion of the 
report to researching and providing recommendations on next steps.  Since donor 
insemination had been practiced for decades in Britain, predominately under the 
auspices of anonymity and secrecy, the committee had the challenge of evaluating those 
practices in light of both legal and social contexts.  On one hand, the MacLennan case 
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made it clear in 1958 that donor insemination does not comprise adultery in the legal 
sense, and on the other, British social and political order was rooted within a context that 
historically, placed a great deal of emphasis on producing legitimate heirs.  Therefore, 
the committee had to navigate those two contexts, and ultimately, renegotiate the notion 
of familial legitimacy in contemporary Britain.     
The Warnock Report was explicit in its discussions around the notion of 
legitimacy.  The committee grappled with the issue of legitimacy under the law, and 
legitimacy within the family and society.  The report noted that while assisted 
insemination is not unlawful, whether the sperm is from the mother’s husband or a 
donor, there exists a question of legitimacy when the sperm comes from a donor, while 
the child conceived via donor semen is considered “illegitimate,” which is considered a 
“disadvantage[d] status”:    
A child born to a married couple as a result of AIH is the 
legitimate child of that couple. A child born as a result of 
AID, on the other hand, is illegitimate, and so is liable to 
suffer all the disadvantages associated with that status. In 
theory the husband of the woman who bears an AID child 
has no parental rights and duties in law with regard to that 
child; these in principle lie with the donor, who could be 
made liable to pay maintenance, and who could apply to a 
court for access or custody. (Department of Health and 
Social Security 1984, 20) 
 
The emphasis on legitimacy and ensuring that donor-conceived children were viewed as 
legitimate was embedded within a broader historical dialogue surrounding legitimacy of 
birth, where sons and daughters are heirs as much as they are individuals.  This 
preoccupation with heirs is particularly apparent in the context of the British monarchy, 
where the blood linkages from father to son have served as the means by which order 
has been restored to British political society.  Legitimate heirs are essential in 
maintaining legitimate political power within family lines.   
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Family ties, and the ability to trace those ties, served as an important facet of 
British political order.  Historically, British society has been maintained by aristocracy. 
Edmund Burke praised the British aristocracy as embodying public virtue, a virtue that 
the Marquess of Curzon noted to the House of Lords was “genetically transmitted” 
(James 2010, 2).  Burke noted that the deep connection of the members of the 
aristocracy to past, present, and future generations – the dead, the living, and still-to-be-
born family members – was the essence of aristocracy.  The family was the “most 
fundamental unit of upper class existence” (Cannadine 1994, 1).  Thus, maintaining the 
appearance of legitimacy, of genetic lineage, within the British family, particularly the 
aristocratic class, was of the utmost importance. Given this context, there is the sense 
that British children are heirs to part of a larger society by virtue of their birth, of their 
genetic linkages.  To be illegitimate is to be disadvantaged, and to lack the social 
advantages that one would otherwise have, if one was legitimate.    
 Warnock, in her reflections on the work of the Committee, reflected that a common 
social view of families created with the help of a third party (i.e. a donor) is that such 
families are “artificial,” implying that these families are not legitimate or not real, as 
opposed to “wholly beneficial” treatments that only involved the gametes of the husband 
and wife: 
The general public, and members of the Committee, began 
to have moral hesitations when participation of a third 
party, not one of the infertile couple, is involved in the 
remedy for infertility, as is the case with artificial 
insemination by donor (AID), egg donation, and surrogacy 
of the form most usually considered where the mother who 
carries the child is its genetic mother. […]Some people are 
prepared to argue that such remedies for infertility are 
intrinsically wrong, since the family ought to consist of 
mother, father, and the genetically related children, and 
that deliberate deviation from this pattern is contrary to the 
moral law. Such arguments would make AID and 
surrogacy into forms of adultery. But even short of so 
extreme a view, many people feel doubts about the status 
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of the child in such "artificial" families, within which the 
relation of parents to child is asymetrical, and where the 
child is often brought up deceived about his true origins. 
His position is bound to be ambiguous, both emotionally 
and legally. So it is argued. (Warnock 1985, 507) 
 
 The language that frames families created with the help of donor gametes as 
“artificial” families puts such families in opposition to other families – families comprised 
of real genetic ties.  One can imagine that the introduction of a third party into the 
process of babymaking would be especially disruptive in a society that views its children 
as heirs. This concern is evident in how the Warnock report framed the sperm donor – a 
third party who can suddenly appear and demand custody, a third party who is the 
legitimate father under the law.  The very presence of a third person in the British 
historical memory creates a disaster in thinking about inheritance.  One only needs to 
take a quick glance at British history to see that monarchies are contested, primarily on 
questions of biological legitimacy.  
Co-Production: Using Legitimate Treatments to Create Social Legitimacy 
 The introduction of the third party, the donor, presented a fundamental challenge 
to the Warnock Committee to reconcile legitimacy with traditional cultural understandings 
of the British family. The committee noted that the donor could potentially be a threat to 
a couple’s relationship, since the wife would be carrying another man’s genetic offspring.  
And it could even be viewed as adulterous:  
it is also seen as a threat to the relationship and to the 
family which is based on it. The threat arises because the 
child would be biologically the wife's and the donor's, and 
the husband would have played no physical part in its 
procreation. Some go so far as to suggest that the 
introduction of a third party into the marriage means that 
AID is in fact comparable to adultery, in that it violates the 
exclusive physical union of man and wife, and represents a 
break in the marriage vows. (Department of Health and 
Social Security 1984, 20)  
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While acknowledging why, socially, a child conceived through donor gametes might be 
viewed as illegitimate, or “artificial,” the committee made extensive effort in trying to 
show that donor conception is distinct from other unconventional forms of family-
building.  This technology and the use of donor gametes do not comprise adultery, 
contended the report – indeed, use of donor insemination can actually make a couple’s 
relationship stronger:   
However, in law AID does not constitute adultery and in 
practice there are several distinctions. AID involves no 
personal relationship between the mother and the donor at 
all, and the identity of the true father of the AID child will 
normally be unknown to the mother, and unascertainable 
by her. In most cases it can be assumed that the mother's 
husband is willing from the start to treat any resulting child 
as his own and not merely as an accepted "child of the 
family".3 It will often be true that AID with the consent of the 
husband is a mark of stability in a marriage while an act of 
adultery may well be the opposite. (Department of Health 
and Social Services 1984, 20)  
 
The committee noted that if children discovered that they were conceived via donor 
insemination, there could be harmful psychological implications, but the impact would be 
equally harmful if they accidentally learned that they were illegitimate or adopted.  
“However, while we agree that it is wrong to deceive children about their origins, we 
regard this as an argument against current attitudes, not against AID in itself” (Ibid, 21).  
 Donor insemination enables a couple to bring up a child “as their own,” with the 
child at least being “biologically the wife’s” (Ibid, 22). Indeed, unlike adoption, the 
committee stated that the couple is able to “share the experience of pregnancy, in the 
same way as any other couple does” – this in turn “may strengthen their relationships as 
joint parents” (Ibid, 23).  The committee then affirmed its view that donor insemination is 
                                                
3 This phrase was traditionally used in England and Whales for a child that is not 
biologically related to one or both of a couple.  Stepchildren could be considered children 
of the family. 
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a “legitimate form of treatment” for infertile couples, and should “be available as a 
treatment for the alleviation of infertility.”  Furthermore, it recommended that the husband 
be listed on the birth certificate as the father of the child conceived through donor 
insemination.   
As matters stand at present there is a temptation for the 
couple to conceal the true situation when a child is 
conceived as a result of AID, in order to hide the fact that 
the husband is infertile and to avoid unfavourable reactions 
among relatives and friends. Therefore the couple may, in 
registering the birth, state that the husband is the father, 
thus committing an offence. Where the mother is married 
and the husband consents to AID (4.17) we recommend 
that the law should be ch[a]nged so as to permit the 
husband to be registered as the father. 
 
The committee noted that it could be criticized for “legislating a fiction”: 
We are fully aware that this can be criticised as legislating 
for a fiction since the husband of a woman who has 
conceived by AID will not be the genetic father of the child 
and the register of births has always been envisaged as a 
true genetic record. Nevertheless it would in our view be 
consistent with the husband's assuming all parental rights 
and duties with regard to the child. (Department of Health 
and Social Security 1984, 26)  
 
While the 1984 report of the committee states that detailed information about a donor 
should not be released, in order to discourage parents from seeking to give birth to a 
“particular type of child” (Ibid, 24) (e.g. a child with brown hair and brown eyes, or a child 
with blonde hair and blue eyes), the committee recommended that donor-offspring be 
able to access more detailed information on their donors upon turning eighteen, such as 
the donor’s ethnic background and health record.  The report noted, however, that such 
legislation “should not be retrospective,” so any donor-conceived individuals born before 
the legislation went into effect would not be able to access any information on their 
donor (Ibid, 26). 
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 A second concern relates to the role of the donor as a third party, an identifiable 
real person, and the potential emotional impact such information could have on families, 
in addition to what the interjection of a third parent might have on the identity 
development on donor-conceived children.  Despite recommending that donor conceived 
individuals have some access to limited information on their donor-parent, the Warnock 
Committee was reluctant to expand access to specific identifying information.  The report 
argues for the “absolute anonymity of the donor” based on fears that a known donor 
could potentially be an “inva[sive]… third party” to a familial situation.   
The other fear of the Commission was that a system in which donors were not 
anonymous would dissuade people from donating out of fear of being asked to take 
monetary or other responsibility for any resulting offspring.  The report reads: 
Without anonymity, men would, it is argued, be less likely 
to become donors in view of the risk that they might 
subsequently be identified and forced to accept parental 
responsibility for an AID child, by payment of maintenance  
or otherwise. Clearly in view of our recommendation (4.17) 
that the AID child should for all purposes be treated as the 
legitimate child of the couple who have benefited from 
successful treatment, the donor should have no 
responsibilities towards the child. We therefore 
recommend a change in the law so that the semen 
donor will have no parental rights or duties in relation 
to the child. We recognise that one consequence of this 
provision would be that AID children, even if informed 
about the circumstances of their conception would never 
be entitled to know the identity of their genetic fathers. 
(Ibid, 25)4  
 
Despite acknowledging the consequences of such a recommendation, that 
donor-conceived individuals would have no right to know the identity of their donor-
parents, the committee ultimately felt that a steady sperm supply would be put in 
jeopardy if a scenario in which donor-anonymity was abolished were to come to fruition.  
Although the committee mentioned little else regarding the need to maintain anonymity 
                                                
4 Corrected for spelling errors. 
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for the sake of maintaining a supply of donors, that it cited this problem as a reason for 
keeping anonymity is significant.  Why the committee argued that abolishment of 
anonymity would lead to a drop in donors, and why such drop would be unacceptable, 
can be viewed a few different ways.   
I argue that one could view it as an issue maintaining the health of the British 
population.  If there is not a supply of sperm to meet the demand of infertile couples, it 
would be more difficult to serve the health of those couples.  It could also potentially be 
interpreted in light of a British need for population growth, as the Warnock report was 
generated shortly after what is known as the “years of zero growth,” when, in the 1970s, 
dropping birthrates began to demand public notice.  In this decade, the population only 
increased by .03 percent.  With a population that was getting older, and not reproducing, 
“plans for schools, roads, jobs, hospitals, early retirement, and social services would 
have to be reevaluated, and, in many cases, scrapped” (Soloway 1995, 358). Another 
interpretation of the committee’s preoccupation with the sperm supply goes back to the 
conceptualization of the British family in terms of parents and heirs.  Giving birth to an 
heir would be a culturally meaningful event.  Having a supply of sperm would then 
ensure that infertile couples could produce an heir.  
New Routes to Legitimacy 
By creating legal fictions, the Warnock committee established a new route to 
legitimacy. It renegotiated tacit social contracts so that legitimacy is no longer just 
biological.  The committee acknowledged that it could be perceived as creating a legal 
fiction, where a child who might be perceived as illegitimate, through the construction of 
legal regimes, is converted into a legitimate child. This was done by eliminating the 
donor, an “invasive third party,” out of the family dynamics.  By legally obscuring the 
donor, and listing the mother’s husband as the legal father, a normal couple and their 
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baby is all that is left.  Note that the child resulting from donor conception is, throughout 
the report, explicitly labeled as an “AID child,” although the family is never referred to as 
an “AID family.”  The committee sets out to renegotiate these different categories, or 
“kinds” of people, and normalize them (see Hacking 1999, 36). In Britain, there is no 
such thing as an “AID family.”  Thus, the committee fits what might have been an unruly 
social kind, the AID child, back into traditional institutions of social and political life, and 
the British are ultimately left with only one kind of family – a legitimate family.  
Canadian Dynamics 
The approach of the Canadian government was contextualized by a different set 
of dynamics, largely leaving the medical community to regulate itself, with the private 
market dictating payments for donors, and each clinic crafting its own forms and 
verbiage regarding guarantees of anonymity (Pratten v. British Columbia 2011, 71). 
While the birth of Louise Brown in Manchester, UK had become deeply seated within 
British consciousness, the Canadian context did not parallel the British experience, 
particularly in relation to Britain’s rapid response to establishing an inquiry and creating a 
policy framework.  The fervor following the birth of the first IVF baby was widespread 
and longstanding in Britain, while the impact on the Canadian public consciousness is 
more debatable.  The different levels of national coverage help illustrate the varying 
levels of national awareness, and why Britain might move quickly in addressing policy 
around reproductive technologies.    
In an overview of news articles on “Louise Brown” and “IVF,” in the Canadian 
Toronto Star and the British Guardian, the terms appear in three articles in the Toronto 
Star between 2006 and 2010, whereas in the Guardian, there are fifty articles 
mentioning the terms between 1985 and 2011.  When a search is conducted for just the 
term “IVF,” the Toronto Star generates a total of 201 news articles between 1986 and 
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2011, with eighteen articles in the period of 1986 and 1989.  A search of the Guardian, 
on the other hand, generates a total of 1000 news articles on IVF between 1984 and 
2011, with 73 articles falling within the 1984 and 1989 time periods.  The levels of 
newspaper coverage of Louise Brown’s birth and of IVF technologies in Canada and 
Britain demonstrates that while there was a peak in coverage in both nations, the peak in 
Britain was spread out over time, as opposed to in Canada, where coverage was less 
prevalent and died off after the 1980s.  The dynamics and timetables of governance in 
Canada are different from the British response to the technologies.  Such dynamics are 
embedded in ongoing Canadian national identity formation – of what it means to be a 
Canadian, the tensions of a federal state navigating the relationship between the 
national government and the provinces, and the role of the state in relation to the 
concerns of its citizens (Brooks 1996, 40-50).5 
In the absence of federal regulation and frameworks for reproductive 
technologies, small groups of Canadian citizens comprised of activists and academics 
began petitioning the government to explore the potential implications of the 
technologies. The Canadian approach to governing reproductive technologies is situated 
within a number of influencing factors, including an inherent tension between the 
provincial and federal governments, and also with a powerful configuration of citizen 
lobbyists, who brought a “particular feminist discourse” to the national stage (Mavis and 
Salter 2010, 421). Throughout the 1980s, the vocal feminist lobby was led by lawyer 
                                                
5 These tensions, in part, can be tied back to the notions of court and country, concepts 
that illustrate the historical Canadian dilemma of the state and its power as it relates to the 
various societal groups that make up the citizenry. The court perspective represents a 
“powerful legislature, centralized political power, strong executive, and traditional 
prerogatives of the crown.”  Country, on the other hand, was and is a perspective opposed 
to strong executive power, favoring a powerful legislature more in tune with social needs 
and individual liberties, one that emphasizes individual liberties and a check on the 
powers of the executive (Brooks 1996, 52). 
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Maureen McTeer and educator Margrit Eichler (Gray 1991, 1371). The feminist lobby 
was primarily concerned with issues related to the commoditization of the human body 
and payment for tissues such as sperm and eggs (Jones and Salter 2010, 321). In 1987, 
the lobbyists officially established themselves as the Canadian Coalition for a Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies.      
The dialogue around rights, reproductive technologies and their role in society 
emerged alongside the Constitution Act of 1982, a year after Olivia Pratten was 
conceived, which provided a formal amendment process for the Canadian Constitution.  
Up until this point, the Canadian Constitution did not incorporate notions of civil 
rights/liberties.  Prior to the Act, civil rights had not been formally protected by the 
Constitution, rather, an evolving patchwork of statutes served as the primary reference 
to Canadian civil liberties.  Indeed, the groundwork for debates in the late 1980s had 
been laid years earlier, when Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau catalyzed what 
was deemed the Homecoming of the Canadian Constitution (i.e. patriation of the 
Canadian Constitution from Britain) (Jones and Salter 2010, 424). Patriation would 
provide for an amendment process for the Canadian Constitution, absolving British 
Parliament of any responsibility in stewarding the Canadian Constitution, which was, 
until 1982 a component of British law and could only be amended by an act of British 
Parliament.  Debates over patriation from the 1960s onward primarily focused on 
“virtually all attempts to achieve recognition and equality within Canadian society.  
Aboriginal peoples, multicultural communities, women’s groups, the disabled, the gay 
community, low-income Canadians, unions, and others all sought express mention 
within the constitution, and when successful (and even when not), tried to vindicate their 
rights before the courts” (Webber 1994, 92). Following patriation in 1982, which included 
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a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the provinces were given a three-year period to 
conform to the new provisions.   
During this time, a group of primarily female lawyers led a campaign to focused 
on equality rights in Section 15 of the Charter.  They wanted guaranteed equality rights 
that could not be overridden by any other section of the charter. “They were successful; 
rights to protection of the law free from discrimination based on “race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability” are enshrined in the 
Charter as it stands today, and guaranteed by the “notwithstanding clause,” Section 28 
(Government of Canada, Department of Justice, 2004). These events had far-reaching 
effects which began to emerge throughout the remainder of the 1980s” (Jones and 
Salter 2010, 423). 
The Baird Commission: Medicalization and the Women’s Movement 
The Baird Commission was established in 1989 and generated its report 
“Proceed With Care” in 1993.  Two ideas emerged from the Baird Commission’s work on 
donor insemination that diverged from the writings of the Warnock Committee.  The first 
is the idea of the child and his or her welfare as an independent entity apart from the 
family.  The second is the focus on the psychological constitution of the family as 
opposed to patrilineal constitution.  In its emphasis on the psychological aspects of 
familial constitution, the Baird Commission viewed the family as a functioning social unit 
that has the potential to have healthy or unhealthy dynamics.  
In its investigation of assisted insemination and donor insemination, the 
commission stated that the technology and its accompanying social implications 
deserved more attention than had been paid to it previously (Baird 2003, 425).  Although 
many clinics kept records on patients undergoing donor insemination beyond the 
minimal requirements set forth by provincial law, there was no guarantee to patients that 
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the records would continue to be preserved.  The Commission noted that assisted 
insemination practices had primarily been self-regulated by the medical community, 
ranging from issues related to access, confidentiality, and record keeping: 
[T]he medicalization of AI has also created a situation in 
which medical practitioners are the gatekeepers of DI in 
particular, enforcing what they perceive to be community 
standards about family formation by establishing access 
criteria to it. There were also concerns that despite being 
viewed as within the medical sphere, some aspects of DI 
are in fact under-controlled and not monitored, so that the 
procedure is not as safe as it should be. (Baird 1993, 430)  
 
While professional guidelines were established for assisted insemination practices, they 
were entirely voluntary, and originated from the medical community itself.  A number of 
Canadian medical organizations published voluntary guidelines for “every step of the 
process,” with the first guidelines published by Health and Welfare Canada in 1981, but 
these guidelines continued to be completely voluntary, “not uniformly adhered to,” with 
some clinicians “not even aware of them” (Baird 1993, 431). 
The Commission declared that the lack of consistent record keeping and 
monitoring of the practice would make it “impossible to [meet the] future needs of AI 
children and their families for information.”  Families created with the help of donor 
sperm were characterized as living in a “legal vacuum” in most Canadian provinces, 
given the “haphazard” means of recording DI births, and patient and donor information 
(Baird 2003, 441).  
 The language of the Baird Commission around the “gatekeeping” role of the 
medical community mirrors broader dialogues around the women’s movement in the 
United States and Canada, which argued that health is “about much more than particular 
reproductive organs and secondary sex characteristics,” rather, it is embedded within 
social, environmental, and psychological contexts, and is therefore “a social issue and a 
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social contract rather than simply a medical and technical problem to be addressed by 
experts” (Morrow et. al. 2007, 36). Alongside the women’s health movement in Canada, 
national policy frameworks were being developed that integrated broader social contexts 
into the health sphere, “recogniz[ing] the role of social justice and equity as prerequisites 
for health.”  This perspective became formalized in the 1986 Ottawa Charter for Health 
Promotion, which defines health as embedded within broader social contexts, not just 
the medical community itself: 
Health promotion is the process of enabling people to 
increase control over, and to improve, their health. […] 
Health is a positive concept emphasizing social and 
personal resources, as well as physical capacities.  
Therefore, health promotion is not just the responsibility of 
the health sector, but goes beyond healthy lifestyles to 
well-being. (World Health Organization 1986, 1) 
 
Concerns about the moral and social implications of the medicalization of infertility in 
relation to emerging reproductive technologies shaped the women’s movement of the 
1980s.  With a self-regulating medical community, doctors ultimately became the 
gatekeepers to fertility treatments, including treatments such as artificial insemination.  
Access to these treatments for non-traditional families, such as lesbian couples and 
single women, was solely the discretion of individual medical practitioners (Morrow et. al. 
2007, 44). 
The Baird Commission’s extensive report spends seventy pages exclusively 
dealing with the topic of assisted and donor insemination and its impact on families and 
children.  Language focusing around the implications of assisted and donor insemination 
on “offspring and families” is prevalent throughout the chapter.  The commission, in its 
introduction on the topic, states that  
the lack of enforceable regulation and inadequate 
monitoring of the practice of AI have the potential to 
endanger the health of AI recipients, their partners, and 
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their children; […] inadequate record keeping is making it 
impossible to meet the current and future needs of AI 
children and their families for information; […] families 
formed through assisted insemination exist in a legal 
vacuum in most provinces, with the potential for conflict 
and distress if disputes over a child’s parentage, custody, 
or inheritance arise. (Baird 2003, 425) 
 
The commission’s concerns about custody and other legal issues around the use of 
reproductive technologies in Canada coincides with the new challenges around custody 
that American courts were forced to grapple with.  Jasanoff (1995, 176-178) highlights 
the complexities that arose in the late 1980s when donor insemination was coupled with 
surrogate motherhood.  The story of “Baby M,” where a custody battle raged over 
whether the surrogate mother had legal parental rights to the child, illustrates one such 
complexity.  That the Baird Commission identified a “legal vacuum” in this area is not an 
accident.    
The report emphasized the negative implications of secrecy on both individual 
families and broader Canadian society.  It stressed the importance of counseling in 
helping families deal with “the strong psychosocial implications of DI.”  “People need the 
opportunity to discuss and weigh their options with a qualified counsellor” (Baird 1993, 
461). Although “not everyone wants counselling […] perhaps to help maintain secrecy 
about their involvement and appear as close to a ‘normal’ family as possible,” the 
Commission advocated that “patients would benefit significantly from counselling before, 
during, and after treatment, and from discussing their situation and the options before 
them” (Baird 1993, 462). 
Secrecy in Canada 
 “New social dilemmas” emerge from the complexities of donor insemination, 
noted the Commission, both at the individual and societal levels.  Secrecy at the 
individual level can lead to conflicts within the “DI family,” and at the broader social level, 
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secrecy can lead to “gaps in relevant research, legal direction, and record keeping,” 
therefore leaving it difficult to address the needs of DI families via law and policy (Baird 
1993, 463). Secrecy, additionally, implies that there is “something to be ashamed of,” 
which is reinforced when practitioners suggest to patients that they keep the DI 
procedure secret, “even from the child, to preserve the appearance that the family does 
not differ from most other families.”  
The Baird Commission’s proposition that secrecy suggests something to be 
ashamed of runs counter to the understandings of secrecy found in the Warnock 
Committee’s report.  In the Warnock Report, secrecy is not an implication that there is 
nothing to be ashamed of, but a strategy of ensuring that there is nothing to be ashamed 
of.   Indeed, in having a “government obsessed by secrecy” and even an Official Secrets 
Act, there is nothing contrary to British values in holding secrets (Knightley 1987). 
Shapin notes that there was even such a concept as “virtuous” secrecy, with British 
writers encouraging gentlemen to be wary of being too open about private matters: 
“Precisely because certain things that a person knew could decisively tip the balance of 
advantage in social transactions, one’s statements in those transactions had carefully to 
be gauged according to the complex calculations of interest, trust, and the principles of 
virtuous action” (Shapin 1994, 105). The Baird Commission, conversely, maintained that 
secrecy contradicts Canadian social values, noting that “our society values honesty and 
openness in personal relationships,” (Baird 1993, 463) although parents are encouraged 
to keep the procedure a secret by Canadian laws and medical institutions (Baird 1993, 
464). Secrecy, although it might seem “easy to maintain […] on the surface,” it “places 
great strains on families.”  Mothers and fathers must “always be on guard” to not give 
away the secret (Baird 1993, 464).  
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Further diverging from the Warnock Committee, the Baird Commission did not 
downplay the role of the donor, rather the Commission recognized the donor as a key 
actor – an actor that has psychological and emotional needs that had largely been 
ignored.  The commission acknowledged the role of the donor by stating that donor 
insemination “begins with the donor,” yet donors have been largely absent from studies 
on donor insemination (Baird 1993, 441). The donor’s interests and role should not be 
ignored, wrote the Commission, because the donor, anonymity, and the practices of 
clinics “have implications for the donor’s health and psychological well-being, as well as 
that of the recipient and her child” (Ibid). Here again, we can observe the focus on the 
health and well-being of the parties involved in the donor insemination process.  
Learning from the Adoption Experience: DI Families and DI Children 
 The Commission argued that the DI family was, in some legal areas, not fully 
covered by existing family law, and, given the special nature of how these families were 
created, required special policy to remedy the gaps: “Reforms in Canadian family law 
are needed to define the roles and responsibilities of DI participants and to avoid further 
confusion in this area” (Baird 1993, 466). Unlike the Warnock Committee, which goes to 
great lengths to “legislate a fiction” so that donor conceived children and their families 
are viewed as no different from any other British family, the Baird Commission sets 
donor conceived children and their families apart as a separate kind of child and family 
that need to be acknowledged as different from conventional families, so their emotional 
and psychological well being can be accounted for.  DI families and children need 
additional measures to ensure their well being, such as improved recordkeeping 
measures.  The “haphazard” or lack of record keeping on DI practices could be a threat 
to the “psychological needs” of DI children and their families (Baird 1993, 469). Improved 
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recordkeeping practices would afford “peace of mind” to DI participants (Baird 1993, 
470). 
 While DI families and adoptive families “are different,” the Commission noted that 
the adoption experience can shed light and guidance in developing a framework for DI 
policy, particularly in relation to disclosure of donor information (Baird 1993, 468). Here, 
the Baird Commission diverges from the approach of the Warnock Committee again.  
While the Warnock approach views the adoption experience as fundamentally different 
from donor insemination (noting that unlike adoption, parents can share in the 
experience of pregnancy and forge stronger parental bonds as a result), the Baird 
Commission views the adoption and donor conception experiences as having some 
underlying similarities.  The report described the adoption recordkeeping framework as 
being based on the “best interests of the child,” and noted that DI practices “should have 
similar goals,” particularly in caring for the emotional well being of the child: 
All jurisdictions have some means of providing for the 
release of non-identifying information about birth parents to 
adoptive families, in recognition of its importance to the 
emotional well-being of adoptees. (Baird 1993, 470)  
 
The commission considered three different options regarding information 
disclosure to donor-offspring.  The first option was full disclosure.  With full disclosure, 
donors would be informed that their donation would not be anonymous and that patients 
and the resulting children would have access to the donor’s identifying information.  The 
commission asserted that the issue is not as “straightforward” as it might first seem, and 
full disclosure might actually work against the interests of the resulting child by impeding 
on and “threatening” the development of family bonds, could “encourage secrecy” and 
discourage parents from disclosing a child’s true origins to them (Baird 1993, 443-444).  
Here, the divergent viewpoints between the Baird Commission and the Warnock 
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Committee can be observed.  The Baird Commission frames the issue of full disclosure 
as being an issue of the well being of the child – full disclosure could actually harm the 
well being of the child.  The Warnock Committee, on the other hand, frames full 
disclosure as potentially harmful in that it opens the door to an “invasive third party” (the 
donor) to interrupt what is otherwise a legitimate family. 
An additional justification for rejecting the option of full disclosure is that donor-
offspring are not the only Canadians who might not know who their father is:   
It has been estimated that the birth certificates of between 
6 and 10 percent of children born in Canada do not contain 
an entry for the father.  Even in Cases where paternity is 
presumed, children born as a result of extra-marital affairs 
or relationships that broke up before the current union are 
often raised thinking they are biologically linked to both 
their parents – society does not demand disclosure in 
these instances. (Baird 1993, 443) 
 
This perspective would become a major arguing point in the resulting British Columbia 
court case that Olivia Pratten would bring forth, decades later.  The committee’s final 
reason for rejecting full disclosure was the fear that it would lead to a drop in donors.  
The report cites 1985 Sweden as a case study, where after abolishing anonymity, the 
country saw a drop in donors. 
 The commission also considered a “dual system” in which donors could choose 
whether they wanted to have identifying information, including their name, released or to 
remain anonymous.  Patients could then choose an anonymous or identifiable donor, as 
is the case in situations of adoption in some provinces.  The offspring could then access 
the identifying information when reaching eighteen.  The commission re-emphasized that 
it understood “DI families” to be different from families that adopt, since in adoption, 
neither adopted parent is genetically related to the child, and in DI families, one parent is 
genetically related to the child.  Additionally, adoption occurs when the biological parents 
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are unable to care for the child, and donor-conception is deliberate, with “the intent of 
nurturing and raising [the child].”  Such a system would also create two classes of 
individuals, one group of people who would have information on their donors, and one 
group who would not have access.  Finally, the commission argued that a donor might 
not feel the same way about disclosure in eighteen years, when the offspring would 
access the information: “it is unrealistic to believe that a donor’s feelings and beliefs 
about his role are unchanging” (Baird 1993, 445).   
 The final option that the Commission considered, and ultimately endorsed, was 
disclosure of non-identifying information.  It recommended the practice of collecting of 
identifying information (by a national authority) that would be stored for 100 years after 
the last child was born from a donor’s sperm.  In extreme, “extraordinary,” medical 
circumstances, the authority would have the power to disclose identifying information.  In 
all other circumstances, families and offspring would be able to access non-identifying 
genetic, social, and health information on their donor.  The committee asserted that this 
system was the most balanced and respectful of the needs of donors, children, and 
families:  
It is a system that acknowledges the need of individuals for 
social, genetic, and medical information about their 
biological parent, but it also acknowledges the need for DI 
families to flourish and form a strong unit if the best 
interests of the child are to be served. (Baird 1993, 445)  
 
The Commission concluded that its recommendations would help “protect the integrity of 
families” formed by the technology (Baird 1993, 489). Although the Baird Commission 
ultimately rejected full disclosure, by drawing parallels to the adoption experience and 
focusing on the well being of the child, it was laying the groundwork for an argument to 
be made in favor of it.   
Canada – a Culture of Recognition 
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The Baird Commission’s report does not shy away from viewing (and embracing) 
donor conceived children and their families as different (alternating between referring to 
them as “AI” children and families and “DI” children and families).  Such a perspective is 
consistent with broader Canadian governmental policies and social understandings.  In 
1947 Canadians were left to forge their own national identity with the Citizenship Act, 
which legally made British subjects residing in Canada into Canadian citizens 
(Government of Canada 2009). Canadian identity was no longer explicitly tied to British 
citizenship, and Canadians had to now articulate what it meant to be Canadian.  Canada 
is a country that is built and sustained on difference.  In line with Canadian 
multiculturalism policies, people with different backgrounds are “seen as assets rather 
than burdens, as crucial contributors to Canada-building rather than a national liability, 
and as fully fledged members rather than outsiders in need of control or return” (Fleras 
2009, 190). Differences are celebrated, rather than homogenized.    
Joanna Rose: Legitimacy Versus the Right to Know 
In the year 2000, British-born Joanna Rose entered the legal arena.  In 2000, 
Joanna brought her case to the English High Court, arguing that the lack of access to 
information on her donor violated her rights in the 1950 European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, specifically Article 8, which “guarantees respect for 
private and family life, including the right to form a personal identity” (Mail Online).  The 
European Convention was proposed after World War II, an era that served as a catalyst 
in raising questions regarding the most basic rights of individuals.  Eighteen months prior 
to the hearing of the cases, the European Convention was integrated into English law as 
the Human Rights Act, with Article 8 serving as a major cornerstone of the document 
(Davis 2003, 22). The integration of the Act brought about new questions regarding the 
rights of donor offspring to know their genetic heritage.  How would the very meaning of 
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“identity” change in light of the Human Rights Act?  What new spheres of rights would be 
constructed regarding genetic identity and access to information regarding one’s genetic 
ties, in light of the exceptional suite of circumstances that gamete donation gives rise to?  
At the time of the court case, the identity of donors was completely anonymous, 
although upon turning eighteen, donor-conceived individuals could access limited 
information on their donor if they were born after 1991, when the HFEA was established.  
Joanna Rose, twenty-nine at the time, was not able to access any information about her 
donor, since she was born before the 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 
which states that donor-conceived individuals can access basic information about their 
donor once they turn eighteen, including race, hair color, eye color, and height.  Rose 
and an anonymous donor-conceived child, “EM” (represented by her mother), sought 
judicial review of the Secretary of State’s denial of Rose’s request for information about 
her donor, review of the denial of EM’s family’s request for non-identifying information 
about EM’s donor, in addition to the creation of a donor contact register. The Barrister for 
the case, Monica Carss-Frisk, said that EM’s parents sought to get as much information 
possible about her donor prior to her turning eighteen, so they would be able to answer 
the inevitable questions their daughter would have as she turned older (BBC News 
2002). Rose was specifically challenging the Department of Health’s decision to not 
provide any non-identifying donor information to people born before 1991.  After 1991, 
the HFEA collected donor information from clinics, who were obligated to provide such 
information.  The cases were supported by Liberty, a civil rights group.  Liberty 
emphasized that the ultimate aim of the cases was not to identify the donors, but to 
make more non-identifying donor information available to donor-conceived offspring and 
to have the HFEA gather and preserve pre-1991 donor information.  The cases also 
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sought to establish a voluntary registry where willing donors and offspring could get in 
touch with each other (Dyer 2002). 
The Secretary of State denied Joanna and EM’s requests, but did say that there 
would be a government consultation regarding the issues associated with donor 
anonymity (Med. Law Review 2003, 139). 
Joanna suffered a major emotional blow when she discovered that her records 
had been destroyed, but wanted to continue with the case based on principle, to “give 
others more rights than she had.”  
The United Kingdom: A shift from “unnecessary intrusion” to welfare of the child  
In the early 2000s, accompanying integration of the Human Rights Act, there was 
a clear shift in British legal and policy dialogues about door anonymity.  In the past, 
claimants such as Joanna Rose lacked legal footing, as the unwritten British constitution 
provided no guarantees of a right to an identity, however, broader legal shifts in 
facilitating Britain’s integration into the European Union created space for new dialogues 
around donor conception.  Paralleling the changing legal dynamics was a shift in the 
thinking of Baroness Warnock herself. In 2002, shortly after the integration of the Human 
Rights Act, Warnock stated that she was absolutely convinced that the law regarding 
donor anonymity needed to be changed, arguing that “It is undermining to any 
relationship between two people if one knows a salient fact about the other which is not 
divulged” (Warnock 2002, 65-66).  Members of the British media have deemed 
Warnock’s change of opinion as a “complete reversal” of her former mindset (BBC News 
2002). Warnock called it “absolutely deplorable” that donor-conceived children not “know 
what other children know” (BBC News 2002), and that “such deception is evil” (Warnock 
2002, 66).  Although the common practice in 1984 was that parents not tell their children 
that they were donor-conceived, Warnock stated that such children were being raised in 
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a “cloud of deceit,” and if they discovered their genetic origins, it tended to be in “a rather 
brutal way” (BBC News 2002).  Warnock warned against the use of the 1984 report as 
justification for the status quo, noting that the argument was two decades old (BBC 
News 2002). 
With the integration of the Human Rights Act, new court cases on DNA testing 
and paternity began to emerge that decided in favor of the rights and wellbeing of the 
child.  Joanna looked to an earlier High Court case where a mother’s objections to a 
DNA test to determine her seven-year-old-boy’s true paternity were overrode based on 
Article 8.  The judge stated that the boy had a right to access his “true roots and identity” 
(Dyer 2002). Although the judge stated that he was “sympathetic” to the mother’s 
perspective, in which she wanted to preserve the fiction that her husband was the boy’s 
biological father, he concluded that, when considering the boy and balancing his mother 
and her husband’s interests, DNA testing “ought to take place” (Re: T Approved 
Judgment 2001). After considering English domestic law and Article 8 of the Human 
Rights Act, the judge felt “entirely satisfied” after balancing the interests and rights of the 
adults and child, that the child’s rights were “weightiest,” and “that he should have the 
possibility of knowing, perhaps with certainty, his true roots and identity […] a knowledge 
which would accompany him throughout his life” (Ibid). The 2001 case is significant, 
because rather than going the historically traditional route of preserving the “legitimacy” 
of the family structure by keeping the boy’s true paternity a secret, the court instead 
“interpret[ed] the rights of the child as a need to know” (Dyer 2001). 
In addition to arguing that Article 8 was applicable to Rose and EM’s case, the 
legal team also invoked Article 14 of the Human Rights Act.  Article 14 is concerned with 
freedom from discrimination: 
[…] the current system is discriminatory vis-à-vis DI 
offspring and adoptees; and between DI offspring such as 
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JR (born before the current system came under force 
under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology act 1990) 
and those born thereafter, such as EM. 
 
The plaintiffs claimed that the state had an obligation to collect, protect, and make 
available to DI offspring and their parents.  They also argued for the establishment of a 
voluntary contact register, much like the adoption register (Med. Law Review 2003, 139).  
In 2002, Justice Scott-Baker of the High Court judge determined that donor-offspring 
were entitled, under new the Human Rights Act, to ask the courts for more information 
about their biological fathers.  The Human Rights Act integrated the European 
convention on human rights into English law in October 2002.  Scott-Baker ruled that 
Article 8 served as a basis for donor-conceived offspring to request access to their 
donor-parents’ non-identifying information.  The ruling stated, “an AID child is entitled to 
establish a picture of his identity as much as anyone else” (Med. Law Review 2003, 
141). 
Joanna expressed her relief at the outcome of the case and stated that it served 
as a “legal foothold” towards establishing donor-conceived individuals’ “rights and 
identities”:  “This is an important and heartening event on a long road to recognition of us 
as people – just like everyone else, with social and genetic roots – rather than as 
products” (Liberty 2002). 
An Act of Parliament and New HFEA Policy 
On April 1st, 2005, under new HFEA regulations established by a 2004 Act of 
Parliament, gamete donors in the UK could no longer donate anonymously.  With the 
change in law, donor offspring, upon turning eighteen years of age, can request their 
donor’s identifying information.  This rule is not retrospective, however, so individuals 
conceived via gamete donation prior to the law going into effect (such as Joanna Rose) 
will not have the opportunity to access identifying information.  In the place of an official 
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government system for these individuals to contact their donors, more informal, 
voluntary networks (supported in part by government funds) have arisen, such as the UK 
DonorLink Initiative.  The UK DonorLink Initiative is a voluntary register funded by a 
2003 Department of Health grant.  It is based off of an organization experienced in post-
adoption consultation, After Adoption Yorkshire.  The registry is specifically for people 
who were conceived via donor sperm or were donors in the UK before the Human 
Fertilization and Embryology Act became law.   
BRITTONS: WE WANT YOUR SPERM 
At the time of the law’s enactment, many commentators feared that it would 
increase reproductive tourism to other countries where the laws about gamete donation 
are not as strict or that individuals seeking a child would go to unregulated “backstreet 
clinics” in an effort to become pregnant (BBC News 2005). However, after the 
implementation of the 2005 law, there were no permanent drops in the number of 
donors.  A BBC report stated that sperm donations were actually on the rise, up six 
percent.  In the twelve months following the new law, 265 new sperm donors registered 
with the HFEA (Henderson 2007). These numbers were actually higher than the year 
before the law came into effect, with only 250 new registrations the year prior.  However, 
regardless of the anonymity law, sperm donations have been falling since the 1990s, 
when donors peaked at 459 (BBC News 2007). The HFEA has noted that overall 
demand has also decreased, however, as new fertility treatments offer other options to 
couples experiencing infertility (Curtis 2006). The six percent rise was surprising to 
many, since most fertility doctors expected the law to seriously impact the number of 
men willing to donate sperm, however the figures indicate that the change did “not 
adversely affect[…] the number of men prepared to donate sperm” (Henderson 2007). 
However, the change has led to a major shift in who is actually willing to donate sperm.  
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One of the major sources of donations in the past, “students keen to earn cash[…] all but 
disappeared,” with older donors, with what some consider more altruistic motivations, 
taking their place (Curtis 2006).  
Since these changes have taken effect, the British National Gamete Donation 
Trust, a government-funded charity, has undertaken a campaign to recruit more sperm 
donors (giveatoss.com). The “Give a Toss”6 campaign frames sperm donation as an act 
of serving one’s country.  The young blonde woman on the front page of the campaign’s 
website strikes an “Uncle Sam” pose, pointing her finger at potential donors visiting the 
sight. Her tight white t-shirt proclaims “WE WANT YOUR SPERM” in blue capital letters.  
The red text beside the picture reads, “BRITONS: WE WANT YOUR SPERM.”  While 
the website uses humor to its advantage (for example, the loading page reads “We’re 
coming as fast as we can!”), the underlying tone is also one of patriotism and civic duty.       
Olivia Pratten 
Despite the work of the Baird Commission in laying a record-keeping framework 
for future donor-conceived individuals, donor-conceived Canadian Olivia Pratten still felt 
like she was stuck in the metaphorical “legal vacuum.”  Doctor Gerald Korn, the doctor 
who performed the donor insemination procedure on Olivia’s mother, would only reveal 
to Olivia her biological father’s height, hair color, eye color, blood type, and that he was a 
“healthy” Caucasian medical student (Arvay 2008, 3).  Doctor Korn refused to reveal the 
donor’s identity because, he asserted, the donor had the expectation that he would 
remain anonymous.  Although Korn still had the gamete donor records in his possession, 
he would not provide Olivia with any guarantee that he would preserve them, as the 
College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, (under Rule 13 of the Medical 
Practitioners Act, R.S.B.C 1996, c. 285), only required that the records be preserved for 
                                                
6 According to urbandictionary.com, in the UK, to “give a toss” is slang for masturbation.  
It also can mean to care about something or “give a hoot.” 
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six years.  The rule does not specifically address donor conception and any issues that 
might be related to it; rather, it is a general rule regarding the handling of all patient 
records in the province.  Donor-conceptions and the resulting records were not afforded 
any special status or specificity.  Clinicians, such as Dr. Korn, discussed the anonymous 
nature of the procedure both in verbal conversations between the doctor and his patient, 
and also provided a written form articulating anonymity.  The format and specific wording 
changed over the years, but the expectation of anonymity remained the same (Pratten v. 
British Columbia 2011, 53).  
When a teenage Olivia wrote to the College requesting that her records be 
protected, she was informed that after the six-year time “retention period,” the records 
could be incinerated (Arvay 2008, 3).  Although Olivia petitioned the College to take 
custody of Korn’s records, it refused to do so, since the six-year retention period was 
long since past.   
Olivia had hope, though.  She was aware that the Baird Commission had 
recommended that the records be preserved and protected for 100 years.  Olivia and her 
mother were under the impression that once formed, the long-awaited agency would 
handle the collection of all donor records and would be able to seize and protect past 
records.  During the time that the AHR legislation was being developed, many 
conferences were occurring, hosted by various groups, ranging from Infertility Network to 
Health Canada.  In one conference, a patient advocate spoke about the donor records, 
stating that they could not set up a new system for the future without taking care of the 
past.  A spokesperson from Health Canada assured the donor-offspring advocates that 
the new agency would be able to deal with the issue.  The advocates later discovered 
that the agency legally could not handle the issue of past donor records, and when the 
national AHR legislation was finally approved, a mandate for Assisted Human 
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Reproduction Canada to collect past donor conception records was absent. In 2008, four 
years after the AHR legislation became law, Olivia was told that AHRC had no legal 
jurisdiction to protect past donor records (Pratten 2009).  With their other options 
exhausted, Olivia and her mother decided to go through the legal system in hopes of 
learning her father’s identity and changing the way that gamete-donation records are 
handled in British Columbia.  Patients have noted that even if AHRC were to 
immediately begin collecting donor information and if donor anonymity was immediately 
abolished, it would not be just, because past donor records could still be destroyed.  
Olivia is the first donor-conceived person in Canada to file a case seeking the identity of 
her donor parent (CBC News 2008). The Prattens viewed the lawsuit as a “last resort.”  
A source close to Olivia stated that “you can’t put it right only for the future [individuals 
who might be affected].  Citing the example of asbestos, she said, “You can’t ignore the 
past.  You can’t just say sorry, your records will be destroyed.” 
Olivia’s lawyers, based out of the Arvay Finley law firm located in Vancouver, had 
a reputation for being the “bulldogs” of the Canadian legal world, willing to take on 
complex, controversial cases that other lawyers shy away from. The Prattens 
approached Joe Arvay, a specialist in human rights and constitutional law who was 
instrumental in the Canadian gay rights movement, when they felt that they had 
exhausted all other options.  They believed they had done everything possible and the 
issue “wasn’t moving.”  From the Prattens’ perspective, the human rights of donor-
conceived offspring were being sacrificed.  Although the Prattens had approached the 
situation focused on human rights, the legal team decided that approaching the issue 
from an equal rights approach, versus a human rights approach, would be the best way 
to attack the issue, since Arvay could then argue that donor-conceived individuals were 
being denied rights to access records that adopted individuals have.   
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While the Baird Commission drew parallels between the experiences of donor 
conceived and adopted individuals, but stopped short of saying that both groups should 
have the same access to information, Arvay took the argument one step further and 
argued that since adoption and gamete donation are both activities regulated by the 
province, individuals conceived through donor gametes should have the same access to 
their biological parents’ identities as adopted children do.  Adoption policies in British 
Columbia ensure that information relating to the social and medical history of an 
adoptee’s biological parents is recorded and preserved.  This information is available if 
needed for medical reasons, and is provided to the adoptee when they turn 19 years of 
age.  Additionally, the identities of the biological parents are preserved, and are provided 
upon request to the adoptee, in which case they can make contact with their biological 
parents if they so choose.  Adopted individuals also have the right to access their 
biological parent’s identities to verify that they are not related to a potential sexual 
partner (Arvay 2008, 4).  Under the equality provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (section fifteen), Pratten’s attorneys argued that the denial of access to 
donor-conceived individuals’ records is discrimination by mode of conception, and 
denying donor-conceived individuals access to their medical history has been argued to 
be a violation of the right to personal security in section seven of the charter.  The 
inconsistency between preservation and access to adoption records versus gamete 
donor records was the fulcrum upon which Pratten’s case was based.  The filing of the 
lawsuit against the Attorney General of British Columbia and the College of Physicians 
and Surgeons of British Columbia and on October 24, 2008 was the “ultimate 
empowerment” for Olivia, who had up until then felt as if she was powerless, that “her 
self-worth had been negated by the government and medical profession” (Pratten 2009). 
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On October 28, 2008, Chief Justice Donald Brenner of the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia approved an interim interlocutory injunction, ordering that all gamete 
donor records be preserved; including documents regarding the donor’s medical history, 
social history, and identity, in addition to documents identifying DI patients and any 
resulting children.  The injunction prohibited the “destruction, disposal, redaction or 
transfer out of British Columbia of Gamete Donor Records” (Gerow 2008, 2).  Although it 
had been served, there was no representative of the College of Physicians and 
Surgeons at the hearing.  The order instructed that the College inform all of its member 
clinics of the requirements of the mandatory injunction.  
In May 2011, Madam Justice Elaine Adair, writing for the B.C. Supreme Court, 
ruled in favor of Olivia Pratten.  Justice Adair found that British Columbia’s adoption laws 
were discriminatory toward donor-conceived individuals.  Adair agreed with the Baird 
Commission that  
there is much to learn from the adoption experience in 
considering the needs, circumstances, and best interests 
of donor offspring, that there are many points of similarity 
between the two groups, that donor offspring share with 
adoptees many of the same social, psychological and 
medical needs for information about biological parents, 
and that, even if well intentioned, serious harm can be 
caused by cutting off a child from his or her biological 
roots. (Pratten v. British Columbia 2011, 71) 
 
The Court also concluded that the adoption experience can teach “valuable lessons […] 
with a goal […] of creating and preserving records in the best interests of the child” 
(Pratten v. British Columbia 2011, 71). The Court also found that because parts of the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, such as the sections regarding donor offspring, had 
not yet come into force, donor conceived people were “no better off.”  The Court also 
noted that the actions of the private sector alone were not enough to protect the interests 
of donor conceived people, that the market “cannot provide an adequate substitute for 
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government protection and regulation” (Pratten v. British Columbia 2011, 72). Based on 
the evidence collected, the Court determined that “assisted reproduction using an 
anonymous gamete donor is harmful to the child, and it is not in the best interests of 
donor offspring” (Pratten v. British Columbia 2011, 73). 
 The judge found that the Adoption Act and Adoption Regulation create a 
distinction between people who were adopted versus those who were donor conceived: 
In my view, excluding donor offspring from the benefits and 
protections of the Adoption Act and Adoption 
Regulation creates a distinction between adoptees and 
donor offspring.  Furthermore, the distinction is based on 
an analogous ground, namely manner of conception, and, 
specifically, conception by anonymous gamete donation.  
Like race, this is a personal characteristic that is 
immutable. (Pratten v. British Columbia 2011, 78) 
  
The Attorney General of British Columbia argued that adopted and donor conceived 
people are different because adopted people do not know their biological origins at all, 
whereas donor-conceived people have access to half of their genetic ties (having one 
known biological parent).  However, the Court found that whether a person knew only 
one, or neither, of their biological parents, the situation could be equally harmful. 
The evidence in this case, including the evidence of 
current practices that are designed to avoid cutting off 
donor offspring from their roots, compels me to the 
conclusion that cutting off a child from half of his or her 
biological origins is not in that child’s best interests. 
(Pratten v. British Columbia 2011, 86)  
 
 Having concluded that the omission of donor offspring from the Adoption Act and 
Adoption Regulation discriminated against donor offspring and violated Section 15 of the 
Charter, the Court ordered the province to “draft and enact” new legislation to bridge the 
gap between adopted and donor conceived individuals (Pratten v. British Columbia 
2011, 107). 
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 Shortly following the decision, the Attorney General filed an appeal with the 
federal Supreme Court.  However, if the decision is upheld on the federal level, all 
Canadian provinces “will be compelled to prohibit donor anonymity” (Blyth 2011). 
Conclusion: Renegotiating Socio-Technical Contracts 
The processes by which reconsiderations of the governance frameworks 
surrounding donor anonymity took place in the Canadian and British contexts are both 
similar and different. One issue that spans both contexts focuses on the idea of donor-
conceived versus adoptee rights, and the notion that donor-conceived babies ought to 
be understood in the same way that adoptees are.  That if the state is regulating 
adoption practices and providing means for adopted persons to access information 
regarding their genetic origins, then the state, which also regulates donor conception, 
should provide means for donor-conceived persons to access the same information.  
Both the Rose and Pratten cases highlight the similar wishes of donor-conceived 
individuals to know information relevant to their genetic health and also their personal 
identity.   
While Rose and Pratten might have resulted in similar outcomes, they are 
different in terms of temporality and context.  In the Canadian case, there is a national 
constitution that has to be upheld, but it is the responsibility of the provinces to do so.  In 
the United Kingdom, there is no constitutional guarantee to a right to an identity, 
however, renegotiations occurred because the United Kingdom is part of an emerging 
transnational governance context, and with the integration of the Human Rights Act into 
British law, new legal spaces for deliberation and renegotiation provided a foothold for 
Joanna Rose to move her case forward.  
 The discourses around donor conception within the United Kingdom and Canada 
were also specific to each context.  The Warnock Committee’s report established new 
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routes to legitimacy other than that of biological legitimacy.  It created “legal fictions” in 
order to renegotiate traditional notions of what it means to be legitimate versus 
illegitimate.  The “AID child” was folded back into traditional British family institutions.  
Canadian discourses were distinctly different in this regard.  Rather than attempting to fit 
donor-conceived individuals and their families into existing frameworks, the Canadian 
experience took a different route.  The Baird Commission’s report recognizes donor-
conceived children and families as unique and different, therefore requiring special 
policies and treatment in order to establish and promote the emotional well-being of 
donor conceived children and their families. 
 The responsibility assumed by the state is also unique to both contexts.  On one 
hand, the British experience highlights a context in which the state assumed 
responsibility for the regulation of the practices of assisted reproductive technologies 
almost from the very beginning, with the establishment of the Warnock Committee and 
the rapid implementation of the Warnock Committee’s recommendations.  Clinics were 
tightly controlled by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, and information 
and data was maintained by the government.  In Canada, the government was relatively 
slow to act, with regulation and practices largely being left to the private sector.  When 
Assisted Human Reproduction Canada was finally established, it was immediately 
contested by the province of Quebec on issues of constitutionality, thus leaving donor-
conceived regulation and practices in a continued state of limbo.  
The Canadian experience demonstrates that capacities for renegotiation can 
occur within the private sector itself, specifically in regards to evolving ideas around 
“known ID” patients, where clinics provide families with the option to select a known 
donor.  However, capacities are also lodged within democratically constituted Canadian 
officials (such as judges).  It is the democratic office (as opposed to any one individual) 
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that has certain rights and responsibilities to respond to what is going on in the market.  
For example, Canadian Judge Adair goes to pains to observe that even though the 
private sector was beginning to move forward with a remedy, it was not enough.  There 
was a constitutional issue that the government had to remedy. Whereas in the United 
Kingdom, the capacity of rethinking and the locus of where ideas evolve is more 
centered in the government, and in particular within “great and good” individuals with 
embodied expertise where it can actually make a difference.  Expertise is embodied in 
individuals, as opposed to governmental offices (Jasanoff 2005).  In the United Kingdom, 
the fact that Baroness Warnock changes her mind on the issue of donor-conception 
matters. One of the places that the capacity for rethinking and reimagination is 
embedded in people like the Baroness.  This also signifies, within the British context, 
that when decisions are made, they are not necessarily forever.  Those with embodied 
expertise observe, potentially change their minds, and muddle through.  
The renegotiation of governance practices around donor conception practices 
highlight important bottom-up governance capacities at the level of individual 
experiences and families.  In each case, individuals and their families utilized the 
governance tools at their disposal (specifically the court systems) in an attempt to open 
up a space for renegotiation of socio-technical contracts that had become static decades 
prior.  However, in each context, the courts have different roles.  In Canada, the role of 
the courts is potentially much more significant in renegotiation and reimagination 
precisely because there is a founding constitutional document that makes it possible to 
declare things that the government has done as unconstitutional.  In the United 
Kingdom, on the other hand, with its uncodified constitution, the Rose case was not a 
constitutional claim, rather, it was about two laws in conflict.  This again signifies that 
while there might have been similar outcomes in terms of moving towards governance 
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schemes that focus on banning anonymous donation, the process by which such socio-
technical contracts have been renegotiated is contingent upon specific national and 
cultural contexts that consist of a multiplicity of capacities at various levels, ranging from 
individuals and their families, to government commissions, to the private sector, to 
government commissions.   
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CHAPTER 5 
DELIBERATIVE CAPACITIES: THE GOVERNANCE OF PRE-IMPLANTATION 
GENETIC DIAGNOSIS TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM FROM 1993-20017 
PGD and Socio-technical Contracts  
This chapter explores the deliberative capacities within the United Kingdom that 
gave shape to British approaches to pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), and the 
tensions between the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), which is 
the body responsible for regulating PGD, and the various British publics that attempt to 
engage and shape PGD policy.  
The governance of the ethically nebulous suite of pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis technologies in the United Kingdom serves as an exploratory lens into British 
approaches to anticipatory governance.  PGD technology enables prospective parents to 
select for (or against) certain genetic traits in an embryo created in-vitro.  PGD has a 
“distinctive historical profile” in the various countries in which it is used (Franklin and 
Roberts 2006, 73).  Its historical and social deployment is intertwined with the modes by 
which it is governed.  Its controversial and evolving nature and sensationalized 
appearances in the media make it a useful case study for exploring the negotiation and 
renegotiation of socio-technical contracts as they have evolved over time, in tandem with 
developing technological capacities.  
 As genetic analysis technology continues to evolve, societies are posed with the 
question of what PGD should be permitted for – by what standards should governance 
processes allow or disallow regulation?  Should the severity of a particular disorder be 
the measure by which testing is permitted or prohibited?  At what point in the 
development of the technology is it appropriate to intervene, and in what ways?  It is in 
                                                
7 The majority of this chapter was originally submitted as a chapter for the Yearbook of 
Nanotechnology in Society: Nanotechnology and Democracy 
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these blurred regulatory boundaries that robust capacities for navigating socio-technical 
contracts become essential. 
How do societies navigate the complex governance issues accompanying PGD 
and other emerging technologies in an anticipatory way? How are socio-technical 
contracts negotiated amongst a multiplicity of stakeholders and competing societal 
values? The national regulation of PGD provides an empirical lens by which fundamental 
negotiations around what kinds of people should be born can be examined in light of 
emerging technological capacities that were previously non-existent.8 The United 
Kingdom’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) is the body tasked 
with providing guidance and governance around assisted reproductive technologies, 
including PGD technologies.   
As illustrations of the socio-technical contract concept, I focus on the role that the 
HFEA and other formal and informal societal institutions played in negotiating the 
ongoing socio-technical contract that emerged alongside the evolving suite of PGD 
technologies in the seven-year period from 1993-2001.  While even today, PGD still 
resonates with many as a “new” technology, the HFEA began consulting with the British 
public on PGD twenty years ago, in 1993, when the technology was still in its nascent 
stages.  However, it is a mistake to think about anticipatory governance as something 
that only resides within the HFEA.  The chapter also illuminates other anticipatory 
capacities, fairly traditional elements of democratic society that struggle to make sense 
of and negotiate around the emerging technology, such as the role of the media, 
community groups, and other formal and informal institutions.  These multiple societal 
elements, elements that a healthy democracy is dependent upon (Brown 2009), when 
                                                
8 In “Confessions of a Bioterrorist,” Charis Thompson (1999) presents a fascinating 
fictional narrative grappling with the idea of human-animal hybrid pregnancies.  Within 
this account, she too delves into the question of “what kinds of people should be born?” 
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observed as a functioning whole, serve as a window into the societal deliberations 
around PGD.  In providing an overview of the role that lay participants, advisory bodies, 
citizen activists, and citizen engagement efforts played in the governance of PGD from 
1993-2001, the chapter aims to illuminate these elements as important deliberative 
capacities for anticipatory governance.    
A “Brave New World Society”? Reopening the Socio-technical Contract 
 Following the 1978 birth of Louise Brown, the first baby conceived via in-vitro 
fertilization, the British government established an advisory committee chaired by 
philosopher Mary Warnock. The “Warnock Committee,” as it became known, convened 
in 1982 and was tasked with grappling with the implications of the evolving suite of new 
assisted reproductive technologies, and providing advice for responsibly governing the 
new area.   The 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act was based on 
recommendations from the Warnock Committee’s report, and provided the framework for 
the establishment of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), the 
statutory body responsible for the regulation of assisted reproductive technologies and 
embryo research.  The HFEA’s tenure as independent regulator officially began in July 
1991. 
Although the capacity for analyzing the genetic traits of human embryos was 
virtually nonexistent at the time of the Warnock Report, published in 1984, it discussed, 
in a few small sections, the possible issues associated with future genetic analysis 
technologies and the accompanying societal concerns regarding social and ethical 
impacts.  One section of the report specifically focused on the use of assisted 
reproductive technologies in preventing genetic defects, and although PGD on human 
embryos was not yet a reality, the report did allude to the possibility of creating “normal” 
embryos by technological means:    
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12.15 If it should become possible to identify at a very 
early stage of embryonic development certain genetic 
defects; and to insert a replacement gene which will 
remedy the defect, a genetically normal embryo could be 
created. It is argued that this would provide the means to 
prevent certain genetic diseases.  
 
The report tied the issue of “normal” embryo creation to historically embedded societal 
fears around the issue of eugenics and selective breeding. 
 
12.16 Public anxiety about these techniques centres, not 
so much on their possible therapeutic use, but on the idea 
of the deliberate creation of human beings with specific 
characteristics. This has overtones of selective breeding. 
We regard such techniques as purely speculative but 
believe that any developments in these fields are 
precluded by the controls we have already recommended. 
We would however go further. We recommend that the 
proposed licensing body promulgates guidance on 
what types of research, apart from those precluded by 
law, would be unlikely to be considered ethically 
acceptable in any circumstances and therefore would 
not be licensed. We envisage this guidance being 
reviewed from time to time to take account of both 
changes in scientific knowledge and changes in public 
attitudes. (Warnock 1985, 74) 
 
The 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (the act of the British Parliament 
establishing the HFEA) also does not directly address the regulation of pre-implantation 
genetic diagnosis or prenatal diagnosis.  However, dating back to as early as 1993, the 
HFEA has held public consultations in an effort to gauge patient, public, clinical, and 
scientific sentiment and to provide guidance on the issue, as originally advised in the 
Warnock Report.  In 1993, PGD would make its way into the British public 
consciousness on the waves of concern accompanying a much older  issue – the desire 
of parents to have a baby of a specific sex.     
 In January 1993, The Guardian announced that the HFEA was calling for a public 
debate “over whether Britain wants a Brave New World Society in which people can 
choose the sex of their babies” (Mihill 1993). The HFEA debates were in part ignited by 
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and coincided with the activities of two doctors, offering sex selection for £650 a time, 
catalyzed the British debates around PGD for social sex selection.  Doctor Alan Rose, a 
chemical pathologist, aged sixty-six and retired from the National Health Service, and 
Doctor Pete Liu, a thirty-nine-year-old biochemist from Imperial College, opened the 
London Gender Clinic in North London.  The doctors stated that they were providing a 
service that gave couples “a choice they should be allowed to make.”  While their stated 
goal was to help couples “balance” their families, Rose and Liu did admit that about two-
thirds of the 200 women they had treated up to that point were Asian and expressed a 
desire for male babies.  Most of the other couples they treated expressed a preference 
for a girl (Mihill 1993).   
 Fearing that Rose and Liu’s work could lead to babies being “sold like 
hamburgers,” Members of Parliament called for a ban on clinics that were providing sex 
selection services.  Conservative MP for Harlow, Jerry Hayes, stated that Rose and Liu 
were operating off of a “principle whereby you’re franchising babies.” Tory MP for 
Basildon, David Amess, said that it was “arrogant beyond belief” for scientists to “play 
God,” further noting that “Commercial exploitation of the desire of parents to have a child 
of a particular sex is grubby beyond belief” (Mihill 1994a). 
 At a press conference, Rose stated that his clinic had already interviewed 
approximately 500 couples for treatment.  The Guardian reported that telephones had 
been ringing “continually” at the clinic, as more couples expressed interest in bringing 
“‘balance’” to their family (Mihill 1994a). 
 The newspaper accounts made it clear: the desire for sex selection was not 
isolated to one or two couples.  Hundreds of couples were interested in pursuing the 
treatment, and with the issue’s increasing notoriety in the media, even more people were 
outreaching to Rose and Liu for their assistance in balancing their family.  Coupled with 
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the concerns voiced by Members of Parliament, the new statutory body was at a 
significant crossroads.  Was the two-year-old HFEA prepared to confront the task of 
navigating public fears and crafting public policy in light of the concerns illuminated by 
Rose and Liu’s practices?  Did the young HFEA have the capacity to navigate the social 
and political transition from the present governance framework into a future one? 
The HFEA Consultation on Sex Selection 
 The HFEA did not have power to regulate Rose and Liu’s sex selection practice, 
since they were only using the sperm of the male partner, and were not using donated 
sperm.  The HFEA would only have remit to regulate if Rose and Liu were using donated 
sperm.  However, in response to Rose and Liu’s new center, Colin Campbell, then 
chairman of the HFEA, stated, “This is a matter of serious public concern which should 
be fully debated before decisions are made.”  The HFEA had already been working on a 
consultation document regarding the ethics of PGD sex selection technology, and, 
following the opening of the London Gender Clinic, brought the document forward for 
consultation with the public (Mihill 1993). 
 The HFEA’s 1993 consultation grappled with the issue of limits and the responsible 
use of increasing technological capacities around PGD and provided overviews of pro 
and con arguments around the social, ethical, and medical implications of its use, 
specifically in relation to sex selection. PGD for sex selection was the primary focus of 
the consultation, as only one inherited disease, cystic fibrosis, could be “unequivocally 
identified” via PGD at the time (HFEA 1993, 7).  The public response to the consultation 
document also came out “strongly against” social sex selection, with sixty-seven percent 
of public respondents opposed.  One major concern expressed by public respondents 
regarded “reinforcing sexual stereotypes to the disadvantage of women,” and “lead[ing] 
to a widespread preference for male children.”  Another prominent theme in public 
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feedback focused around fears of “the start of a ‘slippery slope’ towards selecting the 
‘perfect child.’”  Public responses also indicated concerns regarding the impact of social 
sex selection on the family, such as psychological effects on the child.  Other concerns 
centered around the disparate impact on certain ethnic communities, and that social sex 
selection was “not a proper use of medical resources, skills, and time.” 
The HFEA, in sharing its views with the Department of Health, recommended 
that PGD for sex selection “in principle” be allowed for medical reasons when there is a 
risk of a “life threatening sex-linked disease.”  The Authority did not recommend 
techniques such as sperm sorting be used for medical reasons, due to limited data 
regarding successful outcomes.  The HFEA emphasized that the public supported its 
views: “Accordingly, while the arguments on this issue are complex, the view of the 
Authority on sex selection for social reasons is strongly supported by the public who 
responded to our consultation exercise.”  
The outcome of the 1993 consultation resulted in the 5th edition of the HFEA’s 
Code of Practice being updated to not license social sex selection of embryos, but it 
would license PGD for sex selection on medical grounds.   The HFEA recognized that 
the issue was not a stagnant one, and would likely be subject to ongoing review in light 
of changing scientific and social developments.  The socio-technical contract would need 
to stay flexible and open for renegotiation given the evolving and rapidly changing nature 
of the technology:  
This may be an issue which we shall need to return to in 
the future.  Technological advances are constantly being 
made.  We shall, therefore, be keeping the matter under 
review in the light of any new information or changes in 
public opinion.” (Appendix B, Outcome of the 1993 
Consultation – Letter to the Undersecretary of State).  
 
  184 
The HFEA’s 1993 consultation indicates a reopening of the socio-technical contract 
around reproductive technologies in Britain.  While the Warnock Report originally 
discussed genetic analysis technologies and their implications to a limited extent, the 
1993 consultation served as the first major engagement of the British public regarding 
the governance of PGD technologies. 
The 1993 consultation illustrates the role of the HFEA as being both backward-
looking and forward-looking, backward looking in that it is responsible for taking account 
of and managing the current state of scientific development in the realm of reproductive 
technologies (e.g. the licensing of clinics performing PGD and the enforcement of the 
law as it currently stands), but it is also a forward-looking entity in that has made efforts 
to actively engage the British public around issues of genetics, reproduction, and 
technology in an ongoing way through public consultations, advisory committees, and a 
code of practice that evolves in light of feedback from engagement exercises and 
evolving technological capacities. Here, we can observe an administrative agency 
attempting to look forward in an anticipatory way as it navigates, negotiates, and 
renegotiates fundamental policy issues centered around the earliest stages of human 
life.  
1999 Consultation: The Disability Community Emerges as a Vocal Critic 
The HFEA kept the issue of PGD under review, and six years after its original 
consultation on sex-selection, it again took the issue to the public in 1999, a move that 
signified that the “gene screening debate [went] public” in the UK (BBC 1999).  It was 
now possible to accurately test for other genetic conditions, beyond those that were sex-
specific.  With these new capacities came a new set of considerations for British society. 
The HFEA “anticipat[ed] a future where much more will be possible in genetic screening 
and there will be increasing demand for it.  There are difficult ethical issues to be tackled 
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before it becomes more widespread” (Boseley 1999). While the HFEA had been 
reviewing and consulting the public on issues of PGD since 1993, increasing knowledge 
of and capacity to test for genetic conditions at the embryonic stage gave it reason to 
bring the issues to the public sphere via another public consultation.  Ruth Deech, then 
chairman of the HFEA felt that it was “time the public had a say,” stating that “New 
scientific and medical advances, especially in the field of genetics, often cause public 
unease and present us with complex social, ethical and regulatory questions” (Boseley 
1999). 
The HFEA in conjunction with the Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing 
(ACGT) (later subsumed by the Human Genetics Commission) established a joint 
working party (JWP) in order to review the HFEA’s interim PGD licensing guidelines 
(HFEA 2001, 9).  The JWP conducted a public consultation and integrated the feedback 
garnered from the consultation in providing its final recommendations, and while overall 
it felt that the licensing structure was effective, recommended “developments in a 
number of areas” based on public response.  Recommendations included: expanding 
the array of peer reviewers consulted in the licensing application process to include 
“clinical geneticists, molecular geneticists, cytogeneticists, and genetic counsellors” 
(HFEA 2001, 2); that clinics should provide a paragraph “describing in lay terms” the 
condition as well as the experiences and impact on individuals affected with the 
condition (HFEA 2001, 3); that there be a multidisciplinary team in place to provide 
service to patients at all licensed clinics, including “reproductive specialists, 
embryologists, clinical geneticists, genetic counsellors, cytogeneticists, and molecular 
biologists” (HFEA 2001, 3).  
The JWP also indicated in its recommendations that the perception of the 
seriousness/risk level of a condition by the prospective parents seeking PGD should also 
  186 
be considered in the decision-making process.  As advocated for by respondents in the 
consultation, in order to assist patients in making an informed decision, the JWP 
recommended that the information provided should include information “provided by 
disabled people and their families about their experiences living with disability” (HFEA 
2001, 7). While the 1999 consultation did provide the opportunity for various segments of 
the public to respond, some groups felt that disabled communities were not being 
properly integrated into the process.  Some felt that it was simply too little too late, and 
others believed that any use of PGD equaled to discrimination against disabled people.  
For example, the anti-abortion group, Life, rallied against use of PGD, contending that 
new capacities for detecting genetic defects would only push the country towards a 
culture of greater discriminatory practices (BBC 1999).  Angela Corless, the 
spokeswoman for Life, stated that genetic testing, in concert with other reproductive 
technologies, is “done in order to search out and destroy less than able babies and so it 
is discrimination against disabled people before birth” (BBC 1999). 
When the HFEA consulted the public about embryo screening in 1999, members 
of the disabled community asserted that the “real experts” – disabled persons – were not 
being consulted by the HFEA about the use and regulation of PGD technology.  Tom 
Shakespeare, a member of the disabled community, argued against Juliet Tizzard, then 
the director of the Progress Educational Trust (Shakespeare and Tizzard 1999).  
Shakespeare and Tizzard engaged in a debate, via letters that they had written to each 
other, that were published in the Guardian as an illustration to the public of the 
perspectives of advocates and critics of PGD.  
Shakespeare stated that the HFEA consultation was a waste of time, and that 
consultation of the public at this policy juncture “seem[ed] rather tokenistic.”  
Shakespeare noted that there appeared to be a widespread perception that disability 
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was synonymous with tragedy: “Society in general – and doctors in particular – tend to 
think that disability invariably equals tragedy.  But many of us lead happy and successful 
lives.”  
Shakespeare commented that the part of the issue was one of framing: 
At face value, we seem to be asking the public whether the 
technique should be used to help couples with serious 
genetic disorders have healthy babies.  Few are going to 
disagree with this proposition.  But if you asked people ‘Do 
you think we should take another step towards designer 
babies?” they might give a different answer. 
   
Tizzard critiqued Shakespeare, stating that the issue was one of definition and use of the 
term “designer baby,” arguing that Shakespeare does not “explain what this mythical 
‘designer baby’ is” or how PGD is further enabling its creation: “Embryo screening has 
been with us for nearly a decade: can you point to anyone who has used it frivolously?”  
Tizzard argued that reproductive technologies have been subject to democratic scrutiny 
since 1989, when they were being debated in Parliament.  “Ethics and regulation are not 
lagging behind genetic science.  They’re very much ahead of the game.”  PGD is already 
subject to “strict controls,” argued Tizzard, and with the consultation and subsequent 
licensing framework processes, it will be even further regulated.  “The process is already 
subject to strict controls.”  “But I don’t believe they should decide who gets PGD and 
who doesn’t.  We are all quite responsible enough to make our own reproductive 
decisions.  The trouble starts not when we have reproductive choice, but when 
politicians and regulators stop trusting us to exercise it responsibly.” 
Shakespeare challenged Tizzard’s view that the decision to use PGD should be 
a solely individual choice within a “reproductive free market,” and that PGD could be 
used to prevent “severe disability”: 
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Who decides what “severe disability” is? Why don't we 
listen to those who live with impairment, and often have 
very successful lives despite it? Public fear and ignorance 
about disability offers an alibi to those who seek to 
intervene in pregnancy. The best solution to the problem of 
disability would be to remove discrimination and prejudice, 
not to remove disabled people. Where do we draw the 
line? What about behavioural traits? And will screening be 
offered only to families already affected by genetic 
conditions, or are all people who use IVF going to be 
offered it? […] PS What if someone like me, with restricted 
growth – or someone who was deaf – wanted to use 
screening to have a baby who shared their condition?  
Would support for parental choice go this far? 
 
 Shakespeare argued that it seemed as if medical experts have dominated the 
discussion and the public was not being involved in the way it should be.  “Many don’t 
have that trust [of medical experts], and don’t see these developments as progress.”  
Shakespeare felt that the current path of permissiveness was leading society to a dark 
place: “What can be done has been done” in reproductive medicine up to the present.  
“This is the road that leads to genetic cleansing.” 
 Tizzard responded that her perspective was realistic.  PGD provides a resource 
for people “who feel they can’t leave things to chance anymore,” because of family 
history, genetic disease, multiple abortions, and risk of serious impairment.  Accessibility 
to PGD technology is not the road to genetic cleansing, she argued, rather, “This is the 
road that leads to them having what the rest of us take for granted: a healthy child.” 
The issue of designer babies and whether society was enabling their creation did 
not wane in the public eye following the 1999 consultation and Shakespeare and 
Tizzard’s debate.  The issue continued to grab headlines, and newspapers were 
peppered with sensational headlines such as the February 2000 headline: “Who Would 
Deny Us This? Embryo Screening has Sparked a Furious Ethical Debate” (Atkins 2000).  
This particular article chronicled the experiences of a couple, Susie and Kevin Duce, 
seeking to have a baby free of spinal muscular atrophy (SMA), a disorder that they both 
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carried the recessive gene for.  Susie commented that “PGD is only about having a 
‘designer baby’ if ‘designer’ means one that lives.” 
The article argued that PGD was not about creating designer babies, rather, 
bringing healthy babies into the world when there is a high chance they will inherit a 
serious genetic condition: 
Concern about genetic manipulation is understandable.  A 
couple of years ago we were panicking about cloned 
sheep and posthumous fathering.  Last week, there was 
the furore over the news that women’s eggs can now 
legally be frozen then defrosted for use years later.  But 
PGD isn’t about creating a blue-eyed super race.  It is 
currently only used – in Britain, at least – to screen out 
specific, highly disabling (and usually lethal) disorders like 
SMA, cystic fibrosis and haemophilia. 
 
While some people will never agree with embryo screening, such as those who believe 
that life begins at conception, or those who disagree with it for ethical reasons, “those 
who fear future abuse of these advances probably needn’t worry” because the HFEA 
had already prohibited non-medical uses. “Furthermore, HFEA is currently circulating a 
document to ask us – the public – what we think of PGD” (Atkins 2000). 
In her reflections on embryo screening in The Guardian, PDG patient Leah Wild 
contended that debates around designer babies are ultimately a debate of who society 
does and does not want to be born, of what disabilities and diseases society is prepared 
to allow screening for, versus those it is not (Wild 2000). From Wild’s perspective, 
“designer babies” are a good thing, but also something that will have major implications 
for society, as the technology provides the capacity to determine who we do and do not 
want to be born (Wild 2000).  Wild had a condition known as a “balanced translocation,” 
in which fragments from two of her chromosomes broke off and traded places.  While the 
condition had no implications for Wild’s health, the chances were very high that her 
  190 
resulting child would inherit the translocations, leading either to a miscarriage or early 
death.   
I am hoping to have a designer baby.  Any offspring of 
mine will not be God’s gift: I fully intend to exploit the latest 
medical advances to ensure my child is as perfect as 
possible.  This involves selecting some embryos and 
eliminating others.  He or she will be chosen according to 
how good their genes are. 
 
That same week, it had been announced that the sequencing of the human genome was 
near completion.  Wild acknowledged that the progress with the human genome will 
make PGD easier and more accessible.  “For despite Bill Clinton’s claim that ‘our 
children’s children will know the term cancer only as a constellation of stars’, human 
genetic engineering is not, in the short term, at least, about preventing and curing 
disease.  It’s about whom we want to be born” (Wild 2000).  
 Wild labeled herself, and others in similar shoes, ‘genetically disadvantaged,’ 
noting that her choices are different from others of normal reproductive health. “I either 
make this genetic selection, or risk further multiple miscarriages and accept infertility.  I 
would prefer not to have to.  No one in her right mind would opt for the procedure of 
PGD instead of what is quaintly called ‘the old fashioned method.’”  
Wild posed the question of limits.  What sorts of limits should there be “in this 
brave new world of human genome sequencing”?  What sorts of conditions should be 
tested for?  When should they be tested for and under what circumstances?    
From where I’m lying – feet up in stirrups – this is not an 
abstract philosophical debate.  Nor is it a merely a matter 
of enabling people to benefit from medical advances.  As 
with the choices being made about testing for Down’s 
syndrome, these are not medical but political matters.  It is 
up to us, with the knowledge given to us by the scientists, 
to decide. 
 
We must begin to vigorously debate the limits of 
acceptable genomicide.  To pretend that the human 
genome is all about saving, rather than destroying, lives is 
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to be blind to the brutal truth about our very human, flawed 
condition (Wild 2000). 
   
Even with many serious conditions, those that Wild calls “genetically disadvantaged” can 
live fulfilled lives with preventative treatment (take for example the BRCA 1 and 2 breast 
cancer mutations – just because someone has the mutation does not make having it a 
“death sentence”).  Thus, what is an acceptably severe condition that PGD would then 
be permitted for?  Who decides? 
The perspectives illuminated in Shakespeare and Tizzard’s debate, and Wild’s 
article, indicate a “democratized public sphere” in which multiple minority viewpoints 
come to the table where British negotiations around the use of PGD technologies are 
shaped (Chambers 204, 2000).  They represent the deliberative nature of negotiations 
around PGD in the United Kingdom, and what Chambers (204, 2000) calls the “talk-
centric” approach to governance (in contrast to a voting-centric approach) – where the 
focus shifts from the voting booth and majority-rules as the primary means of expression 
of public preferences, to an expansion of the public sphere, where multiple perspectives, 
especially minority viewpoints, such as the viewpoints of the disability community, or of 
PGD patients such as Wild, can be voiced and give shape to broader social 
deliberations on decision-making.  It signifies a capacity for multiple voices, including 
marginalized groups, to “participate in shaping, influencing, and criticizing public opinion” 
(Chambers 204, 2000).  
The question of what kind of society do we want to live in thus becomes much 
more complex than the one originally confronted by the HFEA.  The perspectives voiced 
by other aspects of society brought up additional complexities but also indicate robust 
deliberative capacities in negotiations around PGD.  Dryzek defines deliberative capacity 
as “the extent to which a political system possesses structures to host deliberation that is 
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authentic, inclusive, and consequential” (Dryzek 2009, 1382). The disability community 
played a significant role in critiquing majority views on PGD and added a unique 
perspective into the public deliberations on the subject.  The critique, as Shakespeare’s 
comments suggest, highlighted that the ramifications of PGD might be larger than many 
might perceive.  That while it might seem relatively straightforward that social selection 
sex is wrong, and that the medical field ought to alleviate genetic diseases, the critique 
points out that the issue is more complicated, and that the established framework might 
not integrate disabled voices in the way that it should. Instead, the critique indicates that 
the perception that the disabled community is bad off is a fiction that society has 
manufactured.  That idea that society might want to eliminate babies that might be born 
disabled, would be as offensive as the idea that society might want to eliminate people 
of a certain race.  To the disability community, the idea was equivalent.  The question of 
what kind of future society wants to deal with then becomes a radically different one. 
Are Socio-technical Contracts People-driven or Institution-driven? 
Other voices advocated that the HFEA take a much more individualized and 
flexible approach to licensing, even in terms of selecting embryos for social reasons.  
Alan and Louise Masterton had four sons, and wanted to use PGD to have a girl.  They 
had tried to have a girl for fifteen years, and were finally successful, in producing a 
daughter, Nicole.  Nicole was three years old when she died from a bonfire accident.  
She had suffered 90% burns over her body and died shortly after.  Louise Masterton had 
a tubal ligation performed years prior, so IVF would be the only way she would be able 
to produce another child.   
The Mastertons wrote a letter to the HFEA, asking that the licensing body allow 
them to move forward with PGD for sex selection.  They included a picture of Nicole, 
stating, “This is our precious daughter Nicole. The joy and happiness she brought into 
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our lives, her spirit and her place in our family and our hearts are the driving force behind 
[t]his appeal” (Wilkinson 375, 2008)  The HFEA’s licensing framework strictly ruled out 
social sex selection, only allowing it for sex-linked genetic conditions.  Given the HFEA’s 
policy on the matter, the Mastertons considered launching a court case against the 
Authority under the European Convention on Human Rights, which “guarantees a fair 
hearing from public authorities” (Scott 2000). 
 The couple stated that they were not seeking to replace their daughter who had 
died, “but had a deep psychological need for a girl in the family.”  In order for the HFEA 
to even consider the Masterton’s case, they needed to submit an application through a 
British IVF clinic.  They stated that they were turned down each time, due to the clinics 
not wanting to go against HFEA policy (Scott 2000). 
Simon Fishall, the director of the Centre for Assisted Reproduction at the Park 
Hospital in Nottingham, “painted a Kafkaesque picture of the plight of the Mastertons, 
caught in a maze of buck-passing ethical bodies” (Meek 2000).  Fishall’s statements 
illustrated the “growing dissatisfaction” amongst clinicians at “the caution and long 
decisionmaking processes at the HFEA” and that the HFEA was receiving pressure from 
“several fronts” (Meek 2000). 
 A former HFEA board member, Richard Holloway (the Bishop of Edinburgh), 
stated that the case should be considered: “I think, in this case, [the HFEA] probably 
ought to look hard at it because, while you could probably make a case for a general 
regulation that sex selection is a bad thing, there must be exceptional circumstances.  I 
would think this one probably was, and I hope they can get a centre to send an 
application to the HFEA.”  Others disagreed with the Bishop.  Ken Mason, a professor at 
Edinburgh University felt that the case crossed boundaries, and that it teetered on the 
“point of absurdity” and would open the door to other sorts of social selection, and was 
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opening up Pandora’s box (Scott 2000).  Ultimately the Mastertons decided to 
circumvent HFEA policy and went to Italy in order receive the PGD sex-selection 
procedure, however, they were unable to produce a female embryo.  The Mastertons 
chose to “give away” the male embryo they produced while undergoing the IVF and PGD 
procedure in Italy.  They placed it in cold storage in a Rome clinic, until a “suitable 
recipient” could be found. While the Masterton case did not lead to any direct changes in 
policy, it did bring about a revisitation of the sex selection issue in the public sphere, and 
also, within the HFEA.  Following the case, in 2001, the British government requested 
that the HFEA revisit its stance on sex selection (HFEA 1, n.d.). 
The Masterton case illustrates a significant question in relation to the socio-
technical contract concept, that is, are socio-technical contracts primarily institution-
driven or people-driven?  In the case of PGD is the HFEA the primary crafter of the 
socio-technical contract, or are individual stakeholders (such as the Mastertons and 
Wild) and communities (such as the disability community) equally present in the ongoing 
negotiations around the issue?  The tensions that arise between the HFEA and the 
multiple communities engaging both the HFEA and the broader public on the issue 
suggest that the HFEA is not the only platform for engaging the British socio-technical 
contract around PGD – that socio-technical negotiations emerge as a result of the 
interplay of formal institutions such as the HFEA with other elements of society, such as 
the narratives, metaphors, and motifs explored in chapter two.  The Masterton case also 
illustrates the non-static nature of this particular socio-technical contract.  While it 
appeared as if the issue of sex selection had been settled as a result of the 1993 
consultation and policy framework, the high-profile Masterton case brought the issue 
back to the to the forefront of debates around reproductive technologies – so much so 
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that the government requested that the HFEA revisit sex selection six years after its 
original consultation on the topic. 
Conclusions: Societal Capacities 
 The HFEA, then, in conjunction with the various publics that critique and engage 
with it, is tasked with negotiating the transition; one in which it must craft a governance 
framework that adequately transitions the present society into the future one in light of 
ongoing societal deliberations around the issue of PGD and what it represents more 
broadly in terms of the new socio-technical orders that are being created.  It must assess 
the present state of PGD technologies, as well as grapple with what the technology 
could be doing in the future, in addition to having to evaluate whether the technology is 
being used responsibly.  The entrance of voices such as the disability community and 
the Mastertons into the debate reiterated the notion that despite the seemingly 
“objective” realities that science provides regarding the physical world, such as the 
detection of cancer genes in an embryo, or the use of donated sperm or eggs to achieve 
pregnancy, society is often left with more questions than answers, such as: Should 
parents have the right to choose the genetic traits of their child?  Who decides?  Lori 
Andrews (2004, 106) notes that “Twelve percent of potential parents, for example, say 
that they would abort a fetus with a genetic propensity toward obesity.” Broader and 
more complex questions continue to emerge as technological capacity increases.  For 
example, if embryos with obesity genes can be eliminated, why would an entity such as 
the National Health Service pay for people suffering from issues related to obesity?  The 
same goes for those with breast cancer (BRCA) mutations, and so on.  
 Thus, as technological capacities continue to increase, and social and ethical 
issues emerge, it becomes increasingly important that societies be equipped with the 
tools to grapple with the potential complexities that emerging technologies such as PGD 
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might present.  The issue is not simply about who is going to be parents that is at stake, 
but it is about what kind of parental rights one has, and in particular, what kinds of 
parental complaints justify medical intervention in the resulting child, whether the 
intervention is PGD, in-vitro fertilization, etc.  In a sense, the matter evolves into one of 
parental consent, in tandem with policies crafted by bodies such as the HFEA and 
critiques voiced by advocates, activists, and proponents.  It becomes a complex 
negotiation of the unbinding and rebinding of traditional sensibilities of how babies and 
children come to be in the world.   
When the concept of capacities is meditated upon in these terms, the question at 
hand becomes what kind of future do we want to live in, and how well equipped is 
society for grappling with these questions?  What kinds of debates are emerging versus 
the kinds that an anticipatory governance approach would demand?  What might 
suggest that societal capacities are robust, and that a society is managing transitions 
into new socio-technical arrangements well? Some indications might be the particular 
kinds of issues that get discussed, also, whether they get a full hearing and by whom, 
and the degree to which social processes make judgments that enable socio-technical 
contracts to be held in place.   
In the case of PGD, is the HFEA ahead of the game or behind the curb in helping 
judge what kinds of PGD should be permitted?  It is clear that the HFEA struggles with 
an inability to control what happens in genetics research laboratories outside of its remit 
of regulation.  It cannot, in a sense, fix the socio-technical contract because laboratories 
are constantly bringing about new possibilities for what is possible and what can be done 
in terms of genetic analysis.  The HFEA has not been able to stabilize a particular 
framework in grappling with PGD. It started developing a framework in 1993 with the 
notion that social sex selection should be banned, however as new cases arose, the 
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boundary broke down to what comprises social selection versus medical.  The question 
becomes one of severity, and it the question of what conditions are severe enough to 
permit PGD for remains in flux.  In part, the question remains due to the strength of the 
“talk-centric” public sphere, where a diversity of viewpoints on the issue juxtapose 
against each other, from the advocacy and critique from members of the disability 
community, such as Shakespeare, to the patient advocates, such as Wild, who just want 
to have a “normal baby.”  Thus what might seem like incapability on the HFEA’s part to 
stabilize a particular framework might also be due to its attempt to continually reevaluate 
and revisit the socio-technical contract. 
PGD presents a classic case of a technology that can fundamentally transform 
the nature of society.  The cases explored in this chapter represent the negotiation of a 
principal question in light of an emerging and transformative technology, that is, what 
kind of society do we want to live in? What kinds of people will society permit to be born?  
Therefore, the question of what kinds of capacities we might want to create or further 
support in regards to anticipatory governance is an important one, as societies continue 
to grapple with the complexities presented by new and emerging technologies as they 
navigate from the present to future society.  With technologies such as PGD, that have a 
potential for deep social transformation, the renegotiation of the socio-technical contract 
is likely to be lengthy and intense, as evidenced by the examples presented in this 
chapter.  While the HFEA attempted to do the best that it could in terms of managing the 
negotiation of this socio-technical contract, as explored in the next chapter, it would 
again be challenged to engage stakeholders, re-interpret policy, and make sensitive, 
difficult decisions as a new technology entered the PGD arena – HLA tissue typing, 
which enabled clinics to create a perfectly matched “savior sibling” from an in vitro 
embryo, in order to help cure a sick relative. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE PERFECT EMBRYO: NAVIGATING THE POLICY DISCOURSE OF PRE-
IMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 9 
Introduction: Socio-Technical Contracts and Savior Siblings 
This chapter further explores and develops the socio-technical contract concept 
and applies it as a lens to an empirical case study of the “savior sibling” controversies in 
early 2000s Britain.  The paper seeks to do three things: provide an overview of the 
socio-technical contract concept and illustrate its utility in the study of historical 
governance efforts of emerging technologies, apply it to the negotiations that arose 
around the application of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) technology for 
creating a “perfectly matched” donor sibling for an existing older sick sibling, and analyze 
the modes in which the “welfare of the child” policy language was deployed in 
negotiating boundaries around acceptable and unacceptable uses of the technology.  
The governance of PGD provides a salient case study for illuminating the socio-
technical contract concept.  The dynamic tensions of PGD set it apart from other 
technologies, due to its perceived eugenic capacities.  The capacities of the technology 
to select for genetic traits in embryos, coupled with the wariness of traveling down a path 
that some critics contend will lead back to Nazi Germany, present unique governance 
issues for contemporary nation-states.  Debates on the moral and ethical implications of 
PGD continue to rage as states grapple with the moral dichotomies of the technologies.  
On one hand, the technologies are promoted as being a medical revolution, a force of 
good for families struggling with devastating genetic diseases.  PGD is framed as a 
technology that can bring hope, health, and a future to those families.  On the other 
hand, critics contend that the technology poses too many moral dangers to be permitted.  
                                                
9 Most of this chapter was originally submitted as a manuscript to Medical History. 
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They argue that no matter the good intentions of reproductive scientists, it is a slippery 
slope to a new eugenics.  Popular dystopian narratives, such as A Brave New World and 
Gattaca speak to societal fears regarding the capacity of reproductive technologies that 
enable scientists to “play God.” 
In the early 2000s, with advances made in tissue typing technology, a new and 
highly controversial dynamic entered the embryo screening arena, that of the “savior 
sibling.”  Utilizing tissue typing technology, along with PGD and IVF, it was now possible 
to create a “perfectly matched” donor sibling for children suffering from certain life 
threatening diseases, such as some forms of leukemia and anemia.  Stem cells from the 
resulting sibling’s umbilical cord could be transplanted into the sick older sibling, 
providing the possibility for a much better quality of life and a potential cure. Jodi 
Picoult’s 2003 fictional novel, My Sister’s Keeper, was inspired by and grapples with 
these issues.  In the novel, a thirteen-year-old American donor sibling (who was selected 
as an embryo) sues her parents for rights to her own body.   
A number of stakeholders and groups took issue with the controversial 
application of tissue typing technology, ranging from pro-life campaigners to Lord 
Winston, an eminent British scientist who pioneered and perfected PGD technology in 
humans.  Fears centered around a multiplicity of issues, primarily focused around 
commoditization of human life – with the primary purpose of the donor sibling serving as 
a medical product.  Another concern was whether the donor sibling would be forced into 
continuing to provide donations if the original transplant did not work.  On one hand, how 
can one blame desperate parents for seeking out any sort of cure possible?  On the 
other hand, what about the welfare of the resulting child?  Given its controversial and 
highly publicized nature, PGD, or “savior sibling,” technology provides a useful case 
study for analyzing the negotiation and renegotiation of socio-technical contracts. 
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 The paper explores how the concept of the welfare of the child served as both a 
guiding principle for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority and as a means 
by which policy boundaries and the limits of acceptable medical practice can be 
renegotiated in light of new technological capacities and medical applications.  The 
HFEA is the British agency established in 1990 charged with managing and writing 
policy regarding the use of human eggs and sperm in medical clinics and scientific 
laboratories.  The use of the welfare of the child language signifies more than a debate 
over terminology and regulatory language; it also provided a space in which the 
epistemological and imaginative aspects of the debate could be deliberated and 
renegotiated.  The HFEA utilized the principle of the welfare of the child in an effort to 
grapple with and negotiate boundaries around controversial applications that were 
previously non-existent, and even unfathomable (such as tissue typing embryos to 
create a donor sibling).   The welfare of the child language originates from the 1990 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (the Act of Parliament establishing the HFEA), 
which states that the welfare of the resulting child must be accounted for as a primary 
consideration when licensing treatment: 
Section 13 (5): A woman shall not be provided with 
treatment services unless account has been taken of the 
welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the 
treatment (including the need of that child for supportive 
parenting), and of any other child who may be affected by 
the birth. 
Section 2 (1) … “treatment services” means medical, 
surgical or obstetric services provided to the public or a 
section of the public for the purpose of assisting women to 
carry children. (italics added) 
 The welfare of the child became particularly important as a framing device and guide as 
the HFEA received license requests for HLA tissue typing in order to create a “savior 
  201 
sibling” for an ill older brother or sister who needed a perfectly matched tissue donor.  
Whose welfare should be considered?  That of the existing sick child? That of the donor 
sibling-to-be?  The HFEA had to negotiate these difficult issues as it determined what 
was acceptable versus non-acceptable use of tissue typing technology in the cases of 
the Hashmi and Whitaker families.      
A Brief History of PGD  
While the cases in this article focus on the renegotiation of the socio-technical 
contract around PGD and its application to humans, PGD research originated from 
experimentation on farm animals.  The first known PGD was performed by Edwards and 
Gardner in 1968, who demonstrated that it was possible to determine the sex of rabbit 
embryos in vitro when they biopsied and sexed rabbit embryos at the blastocyst stage 
(Harper et al. 2001) and checked for the presence or absence of sex chromatin 
(Edwards 2005, xiii). The embryos were subsequently placed into adult female rabbits 
and were carried to term.  The resulting sex of the offspring corresponded with the initial 
sexing in Edwards and Gardners’ analysis (Gardner and Edwards 1968, 346-348). After 
successful application to rabbits, PGD was next applied to cattle and sheep.  The use of 
PGD in farm animals, particularly cattle, was considered valuable because it provided 
commercial advantage, specifically in controlling the numbers of male and female cattle 
produced (Theodosiou and Johnson 2011). The Edwards-Gardner method was 
attempted, and failed, on human embryos three years later in 1971.  Robert Edwards 
would later go on to collaborate with Patrick Steptoe and develop the in-vitro fertilization 
technique in which an embryo could be fertilized outside of the human body.  The 
Steptoe and Edwards IVF technique became successful in 1978, and resulted in the 
birth of Louise Joy Brown, the first “test tube baby.”   
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In 1985, scientists began discussing the potential of biopsying a single cell from a 
human embryo.  At this point, it was thought that the genetics of an embryo could not be 
analyzed with a solitary cell, and that the single cell would have to be cultured to have 
enough material to analyze (Harper 2009). PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction) 
technique, developed in 1983, provided new avenues for researchers to pursue.  PCR 
enables the “copying and pasting” of segments of DNA, versus the “cutting and pasting” 
method of traditional recombinant DNA engineering.  PCR requires very little genetic 
material to work, as little as one molecule of DNA, and is an essential component in 
virtually any “DNA analysis” performed today.  While PCR has revolutionized areas such 
as the forensic investigation of crime scenes, in which there is typically very little genetic 
material to work with, it also had far reaching impact in propelling PGD into a tangible 
reality. 
Little attention was allotted to PGD in the 1984 Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, a report authored by the Warnock 
Committee, a group convened by the British Government and chaired by Oxford 
philosopher Mary Warnock. The Warnock Committee was tasked with assessing the 
current state of reproductive technologies, the potential present and future social and 
ethical implications, and providing recommendations to the government regarding their 
governance.  The Warnock Committee’s recommendations included the establishment 
of a regulatory body.  The framework of the regulatory body would be established in the 
1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act.  The potential societal implications 
of PGD were discussed in only two parts of the Warnock Report, and was not directly 
mentioned in the subsequent 1990 HFE Act.  One of the sections focused on the use of 
reproductive technologies as a means of preventing genetic defects in embryos and 
creating “normal” embryos through technology:  
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12.15 If it should become possible to identify at a very 
early stage of embryonic development certain genetic 
defects; and to insert a replacement gene which will 
remedy the defect, a genetically normal embryo could be 
created. It is argued that this would provide the means to 
prevent certain genetic diseases.  
 
The report noted that the genetic analysis of embryos ties into public anxiety regarding 
concerns around selective breeding and eugenics.  However, the report stated that such 
techniques were “purely speculative” at the time of its writing, and that the issue would 
need to be reviewed in light of new advances, and subsequent recommendations and 
policy would need to be crafted in light of new developments:   
 
12.16 Public anxiety about these techniques centres, not 
so much on their possible therapeutic use, but on the idea 
of the deliberate creation of human beings with specific 
characteristics. This has overtones of selective breeding. 
We regard such techniques as purely speculative but 
believe that any developments in these fields are 
precluded by the controls we have already recommended. 
We would however go further. We recommend that the 
proposed licensing body promulgates guidance on 
what types of research, apart from those precluded by 
law, would be unlikely to be considered ethically 
acceptable in any circumstances and therefore would 
not be licensed. We envisage this guidance being 
reviewed from time to time to take account of both 
changes in scientific knowledge and changes in public 
attitudes. 
 
In 1990, the same year that the HFEA was established, over two decades after it 
was first applied to farm animals, PGD was used in a clinical setting on human patients 
(Theodosiou and Johnson 2011). Initially, PGD was only applied to “pre-existing 
Mendelian diseases,” including cystic fibrosis, but was not widely applied until 1993-
1994, when it was coupled with fluorescence in situ hybridization (FISH) analysis 
(Edwards 2005, ix).  The first use of PGD in a clinical setting is attributed to Handyside 
et al., who diagnosed the sex of embryos in couples who were at risk to transmit 
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recessive X chromosome linked diseases.  By using PCR to amplify a sequence on the 
Y chromosome, the researchers were able to determine the sex of the embryo 
depending on the presence or absence of the “Y-specific band” on a gel (Harper et al. 
2001, 195). 
In 2000, HLA (human leucocyte antigen) tissue typing was introduced as an 
option in the PGD process.  HLA, when coupled with PGD, offered “a new method for 
treating (older) siblings with congenital or acquired bone marrow diseases.”  This 
process is colloquially referred to as creating a “savior sibling” for an older affected 
brother or sister.  In cases where a donor sibling was born, cord blood would be 
collected at delivery, which was utilized in stem cell transplantation for the older sibling 
(Edwards 2005, x). 
The Age of the Savior Sibling 
 Before delving into the Hashmi and Whitaker cases, it is important to understand 
their context by reviewing their American precursor, the case of Adam Nash, which 
presented an unprecedented case that now needed to be considered within the 
emerging British regulatory system around PGD and tissue typing technologies. 
American baby Adam Nash was born into a web of controversy.  Adam’s parents, Lisa 
and Jack, underwent IVF and PGD in order to select the embryo that could serve as a 
perfect match for his sister, Molly, who suffered from Fanconi anemia, a genetic 
condition that typically leads to acute myelogenous leukemia and early death.  That 
embryo would eventually become Adam, who would be free from Fanconi anemia 
himself, and whose tissue was matched to his sister’s so that his umbilical cord blood 
would provide the stem cells necessary for her bone marrow transplant.  With the 
transplant, doctors predicted that six-year-old Molly’s chances of recovery would 
increase to 85-90% (BBC 2000). When news of the Nash case was unveiled at a 
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scientific conference earlier that summer, “the hall echoed with the sound of stunned 
scientists gasping” (Browne and McKie 2000). 
 Across the pond, concerns were immediately raised about how the HFEA would 
handle such a case.  Vivienne Nathanson, head of ethics and policy for the British 
Medical Association, stated that the technique would likely not be allowed in the UK 
because the child would be seen as a “medical product.”  “You obviously have sympathy 
with the family,” Nathanson commented in a BBC interview, “but we have to have 
concern about the second child.  We would have very serious concerns that he is a 
commodity rather than a person” (BBC 2000). 
 Sarah Nathan, a member of the HFEA’s ethics committee posed the question of 
whether it was “ever ethical to use one child to save another, and more especially to 
create one child to help another” (Nathan 2000).  Nathan found it difficult to see the 
negatives in the Nash’s specific case, noting that “It saves a life, relieves suffering and is 
not likely to make baby Adam less loved and appreciated than he would have had he 
been randomly, naturally conceived.”  Thus, Nathan felt that it would be hard to 
condemn the Nash parents and the doctors involved for what they did.  
 She noted that the issue, however, of the slippery slope continues.  Will these 
techniques lead to designer babies, “genetically manipulated at the parents’ whim to be 
taller, blonder, cleverer or more athletic than their peers”?  The slippery slope argument 
was debatable, because PGD is not a walk in the park, contended Nathan.  “It is 
certainly not something you would undertake lightly, or for trivial reasons […] you need a 
good, compelling reason such as infertility to undergo all that.”  At the time Nathan was 
writing, no one had approached the HFEA wanting to do a procedure like the Nash 
family had done (Nathan 2000). 
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 The “touching” photos showing the Nash family and their new addition “prompted 
not delight but panic,” reported The Guardian.  In an editorial entitled “Grave Moral 
Dilemmas: Nash case shows the need for pragmatism,” The Guardian explored public 
concern over the technologies, reflecting that a great deal of the alarm around the Nash 
case relates to the slippery slope argument.  
This response is about fear of the future and the 
uncontrollability of this technology.  It is not about the 
moral dilemmas thrown up by the Nash story, none of 
which are in fact new.  The fear is that Adam Nash will be 
followed by a generation of genetically selected, athletic, 
six-foot blond haired blue-eyed ‘Genrich’.  These are 
issues for concern, not panic.  In reality it is unlikely that 
we will ever be able to identify accurately the genes for 
intelligence and beauty.  Furthermore, the expense of 
genetic selection and the scarcity of donor eggs will limit 
access to the procedure.  Besides, guidelines can be used 
to regulate genetic selection just as the HFEA has 
regulated embryology. (The Guardian 2000) 
 
Accompanying these fears, commented The Guardian, is a desire for “an era of moral 
certainties.”  A time when institutions (church, state, community) provided black and 
white guidance as to what was moral and what was not.   
The moral maps with which many of us were raised are ill-
equipped to negotiate the kinds of dilemmas thrown up by 
dramatic developments in medical technology.  Many of 
our oldest philosophical concepts – like what fate means in 
an age of genetic selection – are redundant.  Philosophy 
should be on the curriculum; today’s children will need its 
reasoning skills.  We also need a system similar to that in 
the Netherlands where local panels draw on legal, medical, 
ethical and lay opinion to help the morally bewildered and 
lay opinion to help the morally bewildered and take the 
case-by-case approach required.  Blanket principles in this 
brave new world of contemporary medicine will be of no 
help. The worst option is that these decisions end up in an 
adversarial courts system determined by narrow legal 
definitions as we witnessed in the case of the conjoined 
twins last month. 
 
 One week after news of the Nash case hit national headlines, the October 2000 
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announcement that a British doctor, Paul Serbal, intended to perform the first PGD in 
Britain to eradicate a specific cancer from a family line “could not have come at a more 
inflammatory time” (Browne and McKie 2000). Writing for The Observer in an article 
entitled “We’ll Have That One – It’s Perfect,” Anthony Browne and Robin McKie reported 
that Serbal was using PGD to eliminate familial polyposis, a bowel cancer, from a family 
that had suffered from it for generations.  Critics argued that familial polyposis is not 
necessarily a death sentence, and that doctors were crossing the line of what was 
ethical:  “We are plunging into a brave new world of designer babies, said the pundits.  
We have created a realm, they claimed, in which parents can use the slightest excuse to 
discard ‘tainted’ embryos or have children genetically selected as organ factories for 
other family members.”  Eliminating embryos with the faulty gene was not necessary, 
argued Serbal’s critics.  If caught early, those with the mutation can “simply have their 
colons removed before the disease has a chance to manifest itself.”  Serbal was not 
persuaded by his critics, however, and argued that he was helping parents have a 
healthy child and “peace of mind.”  “All I am doing is ensuring the birth of a child that will 
be unaffected by cancer in 40 years and will not need major surgery.  I am giving 
parents, and their offspring, peace of mind.” 
The question on the minds of those following the US Nash case, and the 
subsequent ongoing dynamics in the UK, was, “So what will happen when it arrives in 
Britain?  Will there be an even greater outcry?”  Answers to these questions were not 
easily found, and the questions continued to compound as new cases and ethical 
dilemmas emerged, such as when the individual in need of a transplant is not a sibling, 
but a parent.  “Will people have a baby to cure themselves?” asked Brown and McKie.  
Serbal announced plans to perform PGD for the inherited blood disorder thalassemia, in 
which the baby would be born free of the disease and the umbilical cord blood would be 
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used to help the father.  Serbal did not “see a problem,” rather, he argued, “It is just an 
added bonus to having a healthy child.”  Others, such as Alastair Kent, representing the 
Genetic Interest Group, agreed with Serbal, seeing it as a humane solution that would 
help both the resulting child and his or her family (Browne and McKie 2000). 
As PGD is used more frequently for an increasing array of diverse conditions, 
Browne and McKie imagined that it could become a routine part of the process of having 
a genetically healthy baby, “just as it is routine now to test newborn babies for certain 
conditions.”  Sarah Nathan (of the HFEA’s ethics committee) disagreed, remarking that 
she did not think that women would routinely screen for genetic disorders via PGD in the 
future.  However the recent PGD cases might pan out, as scientific frontiers continue to 
expand, Browne and McKie commented that “as we enter this brave new world” ethical 
frameworks will not remain stagnant, and are “likely to evolve.”  “What seems shocking 
now may seem ethical in the future.” 
The UK’s “First Designer Baby Lab” 
In December 2001, news emerged that the “UK’s first designer baby lab [was] 
under way” (Blackstock 2001).  Egyptian-born Mohammad Taranissi was establishing 
the laboratory in London in order to help families with ill children the opportunity to 
“select genetically designed embryos.”  Taranissi said he was going to go ahead with the 
laboratory even if the HFEA refused to permit it.  Taranissi, one of the UK’s top fertility 
experts, with the best IVF success record in the country, was not a stranger to 
controversy, having bumped heads with the HFEA in court multiple times. 
The news of Taranissi’s laboratory elicited feedback from critics such as Lord 
Winston, one of the scientists who invented embryo screening techniques.  Winston, in 
an interview with BBC’s Newsnight, stated that a line needed to be drawn: “It really 
troubles me that some of my colleagues are prepared to consider a child as a 
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commodity … I think that’s fundamentally wrong and I think it’s fundamentally 
dangerous.  There is a principle at stake here.”  The issue, Winston, argued, is that 
children are being treated as commodities.  “Just as we do not allow these techniques 
for the choosing of the sex of a child because that child might be a commodity for the 
same reason we should not be choosing its genetics as a commodity because that is 
truly the beginning of a slippery slope and I hope the HFEA recognizes that and do not 
go down that route” (Blackstock 2001). 
Taranissi, who wanted to use the Nash technique for a British mother and her 
son, who had the same condition as Molly Nash, disagreed with Winston, arguing that 
the baby would not be a commodity and that it would be “loved and cherished on its own 
merit.”  It would not be simply “produced as a spare part” and “once we have taken the 
cord blood it’s not going to be killed or dumped somewhere.”  Peter Millis, the HFEA’s 
policy manager, told Newsnight that the Nash procedure had never been used before in 
the UK, and that the “huge ethical issues” that emerge “vary from case to case” 
(Blackstock 2001). 
The Case of Zain Hashmi: Negotiating Acceptable Uses 
 A few short months after the announcement of Taranassi’s impending “designer 
baby lab,” in February 2001, the HFEA announced that it was prepared to allow certain 
savior sibling PGD techniques, “subject to the merits of each case.”  The HFEA’s 
decision was “triggered” by a Nottinghamshire fertility clinic, which submitted an 
application for Shahana and Raj Hashmi, a Leeds couple, to carry out PGD for 
thalassemia as well as tissue typing, to ensure that the baby would be able to provide 
umbilical cord blood for a “perfectly matched bone marrow transplant” for his or her 
brother, two-year-old Zain Hashmi, who was suffering from the blood disorder and would 
  210 
die without the transplant.  The Hashmis saw the procedure as their only option.  Neither 
parent and none of their other five children were a match for Zain (Boseley 2003b). 
 Discussing the decision to approve the license request, the Chair of the HFEA, 
Ruth Deech, stated that the authority had considered the issues and “implications of this 
treatment very carefully indeed.”  In cases in which PGD was already being undergone 
to prevent a new child from inheriting a genetic disease, the HFEA could “see how the 
use of tissue typing to save the life of a sibling could be justified.”  Deech noted that this 
sort of situation would happen in the rarest of circumstances.  While the HFEA allowed 
the harvesting of umbilical cord blood cells for transplant into Zain, it would not allow for 
doctors to take the new baby’s bone marrow for transplant if the umbilical cord blood did 
not work (Boseley 2003b).  Zain’s brother or sister-to-be was called the “first officially 
sanctioned ‘designer baby’ in British history” (Meek 2002).  
 The week previously, a baby girl who had been selected as an embryo to be a 
match for her brother, suffering from leukemia, was born in a British hospital.  The 
anonymous family had completed the genetic screening in the United States, and 
therefore was not subject to HFEA policy.  Peter Garrett, representing Life, asked 
whether it was appropriate to create a child for such purposes: “Should we allow a child 
to be manufactured in order to serve the medical needs of an older brother?  Whilst the 
term ‘designer baby’ is often overused, it is all too appropriate in this case.”  The 
Hashmis and the anonymous family stated that they were not “designing.”  Speaking 
with ITV, Mrs. Hashmi said that they were only asking for a “helping hand by the 
scientists. […] This baby is going to be given to us by nature, but all the scientists are 
doing is making sure we get the one we want.  They’re not going to design anything 
(Meek 2002).” 
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A few months later, in the summer of 2001, Zain’s parents had produced fourteen 
IVF embryos, but none of them had been a match for him.  At that same time, in a report 
on the regulation of genetics and embryology, Members of Parliament from the House of 
Commons select committee on science and technology criticized the HFEA for its 
decision in the Hashmi case, with a main criticism being that the HFEA had failed to 
consult the public.  The committee argued that the 1990 Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act should be rewritten in order to “reconnect the act with modern science.” 
The committee was particularly inflamed by a comment made by Ruth Deech (Chair of 
the HFEA until that past April), who had stated that by making decisions such as the 
Hashmi case, the HFEA “protects members of parliament from direct involvement in that 
sort of thing.”  The committee, in its report, stated that “Parliament does not need 
protecting and democracy is not served by unelected quangos taking decisions on 
behalf of parliament.”  Maureen Dalziel, Chief Executive of the HFEA agreed that the law 
needed to change: “New, clearer legislation is desperately needed that takes into 
account the massive scientific advances that have taken place since the last act.  […The 
HFEA must also change]  to keep pace with scientific and medical advances, make its 
operating procedures easier and quicker” (Boseley 2003b). 
The Case of Charlie Whitaker: Negotiating Limits 
In July 2002 the HFEA rejected a license application for embryonic tissue typing.  
Working with Dr. Taranissi, Michelle and Jayson Whitaker submitted an application in 
hopes of saving their three-year-old son Charlie, who suffered from Diamond Blackfan 
anemia (DBA), an extremely rare blood condition.  A bone marrow transplant from a 
perfectly matched donor would potentially give Charlie a chance at long-term survival.   
Charlie’s condition required that he participate in constant medical procedures, such as 
“day-long blood transfusions and daily injections of life-saving drugs” (Allison 2002).  
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The HFEA ruled that it would be unable to accept the Whitaker’s application 
because the resulting child would not be at risk of inheriting the disease, as opposed to a 
case like the Hashmi’s, through which PGD would ensure the resulting child would be 
born free of the disease.  If the Whitakers were to have another child naturally, chances 
were that the resulting child would not have DBA, in fact it would be almost impossible, 
as Charlie’s condition was non-hereditary. Charlie’s future brother or sister “was at no 
extra risk of contracting the disease Charlie had by virtue of being his sibling” (Dodd and 
al Yafal 2002).  Therefore, embryos matching Charlie’s tissue type would be selected 
over other healthy embryos that did not.  An HFEA spokeswoman stated, “Every 
member of the authority on the committee had enormous sympathy for Charlie Whitaker 
and his parents, but they were unable to approve the licence” (Allison 2002). 
The Whitakers said that they were “absolutely devastated” by the HFEA decision, 
and it was reported that they were making plans to travel to the US for treatment.  They 
argued that they were not trying to create a designer baby, “as they are not choosing the 
baby’s sex, intelligence, or skin colour.”  Taranissi said that he was unsurprised by the 
HFEA’s decision, but felt that it was “unfair,” and was “not a decision based on the 
ethics.”  He argued that there was a “political element” to the outcome.  Taranissi stated 
that it was impossible to create a designer baby, and the public’s perception was 
incorrect.  “There is no such thing” as a designer baby, he said.  “We do not have the 
technology to change embryos in the lab.  All we do is test the embryo for specific 
problems” (Allison 2002). 
While the HFEA, scientists and clinicians, and the impacted families had served 
as the primary voices in the renegotiation of the socio-technical contract, some were 
now calling for the issue to be subjected to democratic Parliamentary debate.  In 
response to the HFEA’s decision the health spokesperson for the Liberal Democrats 
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stated that the twelve-year-old authority was “creaking under the strain of new medical 
developments”: 
From the patient’s point of view it is difficult to justify a 
distinction between the use of embryo screening to save 
the life of a child with an inherited disease, as with the 
Hashmis, but not save the life of an equally sick child like 
Charlie Whitaker simply because the condition is not 
hereditary.  It’s high time the government allowed 
parliament to address these issues. (Allison 2002) 
 
Tom Shakespeare, a promient disability rights advocate, disagreed with the HFEA’s 
decision, commenting that he felt that “the HFEA are being too tough in this case.”  To 
Shakespeare, the distinction between the Hashmis and the Whitakers did not seem 
significant enough to give one license approval, and deny the other one.  “In the Hashmi 
case the family would have used PGD anyway, in this case they wouldn’t.  It sounds like 
they are quibbling over a minor distinction.”  Others criticized the HFEA for its heavy 
bureaucracy, blaming the issue on bureaucratic red tape rather than actual ethical 
issues (Dodd and al Yafal 2002). 
 The pro-life community praised the HFEA’s decision, however.  The Society for 
the Protection of the Unborn Child said that it found itself in the surprising and 
“unfamiliar” position of agreeing with the HFEA, noting that “Usually we think they are 
doing the wrong thing.”  The Human Genetics Alert also supported the decision, stating 
that embryo screening “turns embryos and children into tools, as a means to an end” 
(Dodd and al Yafal 2002). 
Renegotiating the Scope of HFEA Powers: the Courts Step In 
 Four days before Christmas 2002, High Court Justice Maurice Kay ruled that the 
HFEA did not have legal power to authorize the Hashmis’ treatment.  Kay said that the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act was “tightly drawn” to “restrict the potential for 
misuse of science and technology.”  Pro-life advocate Josephine Quintavalle, a member 
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of the pressure group Comment on Reproductive Ethics (CORE), brought forth the case 
in an effort to put a halt to the “ethically objectionable” practice of screening embryos for 
the purpose of creating a perfect donor match for an ill family member (Dyer and 
Boseley 2002).  In the one-day hearing on the issue, Quintavalle stated that allowing it 
would open the door to “designer babies” (The Telegraph 2002).  “With social sex 
selection around the corner and innumerable other designer baby possibilities on the 
horizon, today’s judgment is particularly timely.  These vital issues involve the very 
essence of what it is to be human.”  Quintavalle stated that the ruling was a “victory for 
the supremacy of parliament… We are adamant that it is not for the HFEA, a small 
unelected quango, to make these decisions” (Boseley 2003a). 
 Despite the High Court ruling, Suzi Leather, Chair of the HFEA, felt that the 
HFEA had made the right decision in approving the Hashmis’ license application: “It is 
important to recognise that what is at stake is not only the future of these families, but 
many other families that suffer from serious genetic conditions” (Boseley 2003a).  
 Clare Dyer reflected that “technology and ethics [were] collid[ing], and that 
debates over the ethical use of embryos would begin seeping into the court system in 
increasing numbers.  The defiant Taranissi stated that in his mind, the HFEA did not 
have power to regulate embryo screening.  Because of the HFEA ruling on the Whitaker 
case, he had to circumvent HFEA policy by collaborating with a Chicago clinic in order to 
conduct testing of the Whitaker embryos.  At the time of the High Court ruling, Michelle 
Whitaker was ten weeks pregnant.    
 Because of the court ruling, the Hashmis spent £25,000 on testing in the United 
States.  After two attempts in the US, they were still unsuccessful in producing a match 
for Zain, and began a fundraising campaign in order to raise money to attempt a third 
round.  They had also made the decision to terminate a naturally conceived pregnancy 
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at fifteen weeks because tests had shown that the fetus had the same disease as Zain 
(Dyer 2003).  Zain’s father, Raj Hashmi said that the decision to terminate was “heart-
breaking.” “We had to take the heart-breaking decision to terminate the pregnancy.  We 
are against abortion.  It is the most heart-rending decision we have ever made in our 
lives” (Boseley 2003a). 
The Hashmis’ British embryologist, Simon Fishel, painted a dire picture for Zain if 
he were to continue without transplant treatment. “He might live til he’s 40 with a very 
difficult quality of life.  He might die next year.  It can all change overnight.  It’s a stark 
contrast between a normal quality of life and a miserable quality of life with an unknown 
demise at any stage.”  Fishel contrasted embryo screening against couples attempting to 
conceive naturally in an attempt to have a child that would be a tissue match.  A likely 
outcome would be termination of pregnancy, having additional children with the 
condition, or having “lots more children and never reaching the tissue type they want” 
(Dyer 2003).  
While the Hashmis were seeking out other screening avenues in the United 
States, their case was also moving towards the appeals court.  Zain’s mother Shahana 
stated that his case would not be “fought in vain.”  We’ll take it to the highest level.  We 
should never had to go along this road to where we are today.  We should have been 
given the treatment to make sure his suffering is ended” (Boseley 2003a).  She begged 
the public to understand that they were not trying to make a designer baby, that the 
donor cells would be coming from the umbilical cord, not the new baby itself.  “We are 
not designing, we are not cloning, we are making use of waste.”  The cells from the 
umbilical cord would have been discarded, otherwise.  “We will love this baby just as 
much.  At the end of the day all we wanted to do was save our son from this horrible 
fate” (Dyer 2003).  
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 The Hashmi’s hopes were answered in January 2003, when the appeals court 
overturned Justice Kay’s decision that the HFEA’s regulatory powers were “limited to 
helping women with fertility problems bear children.”  The justices gave the Hashmi’s 
permission to move forward immediately with their medical efforts.  The “ecstatic” 
Hashmis were thrilled with the outcome.  Shahana Hashmi commented that the couple 
had done everything within their power in an effort to save their son’s life.  “Now we all 
have new hope,” she said.  Zain’s father, Raj, said when he got home from work after 
hearing the news, “the main thing was Zain running towards me and giving me a 
massive hug and saying: ‘Dad, dad, well done!  You’ve done it.  I can get better now.’”  
 The Chair of the HFEA, Suzi Leather, expressed her approval of the judgment, 
noting that “clearly clinicians cannot always prevent diseases but if they are able to and 
also save the life of a sibling, then this is a legitimate use of these new techniques” 
(emphasis added) (Dyer and Wainwright 2003). 
James Whitaker is Born 
 In June 2003, newspapers announced that Britain’s “first designer baby” was 
born.  The Whitaker’s travels to undergo IVF and tissue typing in Chicago had paid off, in 
the birth of their son Jamie (James Harry) in a Sheffield hospital.  Jamie was called “the 
first baby born in the UK to be genetically matched while still an IVF embryo.”  Mr. 
Whitaker emphasized that Jamie was not selected for social reasons: “All we did was 
change the odds from a one-in-four chance of a tissue match to a 98% chance.  There 
was no selection on the basis of colour of eyes or hair or sex” (Blackstock 2003).  
 Jamie’s arrival brought forth waves of both praise and criticism.  Vivienne 
Nathanson, head of ethics with the British Medical Association, supported the Whitakers 
in their decision: “As doctors we believe that where technology exists that could help a 
dying or seriously ill child, without involving major risks for others, then it can only be 
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right that it is used for this purpose […] The welfare of the child born as a result of the 
treatment is of crucial importance.  But in our view this is not incompatible with allowing 
selection of embryos on the basis of tissue type.  We would like to wish the Whitakers 
well.”  Others still felt that the HFEA’s original decision to not approve the Whitaker’s 
license application was wrong.  Dr. Taranissi said the decision was illogical.  Others, 
however, were not so elated with Jamie’s birth and the reasons that he was brought into 
the world.  Lord Winston expressed concern over the development, noting that Jamie, as 
a baby would not be able to provide informed consent:  “Can you think of any other 
medical treatment which you would expect anybody to undergo without informed 
consent for somebody else’s benefit? […] This child has the spectre of being born for 
somebody else’s benefit throughout his whole life.  I find it incredible that the law might 
be changed.”  What would happen if the transplant didn’t work? Lord Winston asked.  
Would Jamie then be expected to provide additional donations?  What about later in life?  
What if Charlie needed a kidney?  Would he be expected to give a kidney? (Boseley 
2003b). 
 Others called for a review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 
arguing that the science was outpacing policy efforts, and that the Act was outdated: 
“Clinical advances are overtaking the initial principles on which the HFEA was set up 13 
years ago.  It is time the Act was independently reviewed” (The Guardian 2003).  Still 
others said that genetics had “outgrown” the legislative framework meant to reign in and 
place limits around it, but that ultimately, fears of creating “designer babies” was 
preventing “humanitarian” uses of it, and policy was becoming a hindrance rather than a 
help:   
New techniques offer great hopes but also raise ethical 
dilemmas, particularly in the emotive field of fertility.  Is it 
right to bring a child into the world with a predetermined 
genetic make-up to offer hope of a lifesaving cure for an 
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existing child?  And if so, is it also right for would-be-
parents to choose characteristics –blue eyes, say – of an 
unborn child; the so-called ‘designer’ baby?  
Commonsense makes us welcome the first but oppose the 
second.  Yet a fear of appearing to sanction ‘designer 
babies’ is preventing a humanitarian answer to families 
desperate to save their children. 
 
The HFEA has served us well till now, earning respect for 
its application of principle and logic to difficult ethical 
questions.  But it should not give in to the ‘slipperly slope’ 
argument.  There is all the difference in the world between 
selecting an embryo to save a child and trying to 
predetermine hair or eye colour.  We must not be 
frightened to proceed rationally, case by case. 
 
No parents should have to nurse a dying infant knowing a 
technique exists to save their child. (The Observer 2003) 
 
Concluding Remarks: The Contours of the Contract  
 
While the Hashmis were not able to produce a successful match for Zain, their 
case paved the way for other families seeking treatment in the UK.  The Hashmi and 
Whitaker cases provide an example of the negotiation of a socio-technical contract, one 
in which questions around who ought to be born, and for what reasons, were grappled 
with by the HFEA, the courts, families, doctors, and the public.  The Hashmi and 
Whitaker cases illuminate a key question embedded within the socio-technical contract 
concept, that is, who are the actors that are actually participating in and shaping the 
renegotiation of socio-technical contracts?  While traditional policy studies might focus 
on the regulatory institution itself as the primary actor in shaping the “rules of the road” 
around a certain technology, the cases discussed in this paper illuminate the role that 
other actors might also play in shaping socio-technical contracts.  As explored in the 
Hashmi and Whitaker examples, parents and families served as both advocates and 
spokespeople for the licensing of PGD and tissue typing technology to create a matched 
sibling.  They brought the issue to the media, and also into the court system, where 
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debates about the appropriateness of the savior sibling technique took place far beyond 
the walls of the HFEA.      
The idea of the “welfare of the child,” and which child’s welfare should be taken 
into account, served as an important boundary-negotiating tool through which the lines 
of acceptable versus non-acceptable uses of the “savior sibling” technique were drawn.  
The term “designer baby” served as another boundary-negotiating tool around the 
ethical and non-ethical use of PGD and tissue typing technology.  While the term 
“designer babies” was a contested concept, it also served as a constant throughout 
debates on embryo screening.  For example, there are a number of “first designer 
babies” and “first designer baby clinics” in the history of assisted reproductive 
technologies.  Does one create a designer baby when selecting for certain phenotypical 
traits? In the case of the Hashmis and the Whitakers, the debate was more about 
process than intention.  Both families were very explicit in their intention to not select the 
sex, height, eye color, and other physical features of their child.  But they were also 
adamant in finding the “perfect match” in order to help their older child.  These cases 
transcend the issue of eugenics, or trying to create a superior race, and struggle with the 
moral entanglements of the law and the limitations of medicine and healing.  That the 
term has continued to be used but has also been redefined and renegotiated in light of 
new technologies indicates its fluidity as contexts change and time passes. 
 The idea of love is also being negotiated in these cases.  The families and their 
doctors were adamant that the physical trait of perfectly matched umbilical cord stem 
cells would not be a factor in how love was given to the resulting child.  However, as one 
can observe in the Hashmi case, despite the rhetoric of loving a second child no matter 
what, the Hashmi parents did terminate a pregnancy when the fetus was not a match for 
Zain, and also had the same disease.  Despite the emphasis on love, the overarching 
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goal was to not just create any child to love, but to create a perfect child for an imperfect 
first child.  
Finally, the notion of consent is also being negotiated.  The socio-technical 
contract concept engages the notion of consent, and illuminates the tacit and explicit 
terms that society and individuals are consenting to upon entering socio-technical 
arrangements.  These arrangements and the very meaning of consent becomes 
increasingly complex in the world of assisted reproductive technologies, where the 
welfare of parents, existing children, sperm and egg donors becomes juxtaposed against 
the welfare of those who are not yet born.  Whose welfare comes first?  What happens 
when the welfare of the potential child does not align with the interests of parents and 
existing siblings?    
The Hashmi and Whitaker cases highlight the complex and ever-evolving nature 
of the governance of assisted reproductive technologies, and illuminate questions that 
governance arrangements struggle to answer, such as, should parents have the right to 
choose the genetic traits of their child?  Who decides?  Is it ever acceptable to select a 
“perfect” embryo in order to save an ill family member?  It is in this complex and gray 
terrain that robust governance capacities for negotiating socio-technical contracts 
becomes essential.  
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CHAPTER 7 
ASSESSING RESPONSIVE CAPACITY: NEGOTIATING SOCIO-TECHNICAL 
CONTRACTS AT THE MIDSTREAM 
Introduction 
 This final chapter draws upon my research as an “embedded humanist” in 
genetics laboratories in British Columbia and Oxford.  In this chapter, I argue that that 
integration exercises can serve a vital role in rendering socio-technical contracts within 
the midstream more visible to participants and in opening them up to reflection.  A key 
theme within each of the previous chapters in this project has been unearthing existing 
capacities for engaging in anticipatory governance.  This chapter also explores 
capacities for negotiating socio-technical contracts, but on the level of the laboratory, or 
in the “midstream” of technological development activity, when research mandates, 
funding, and policies have already been established, but before research products enter 
the market or results are published (Fisher 2007).  Specifically, rather than exploring 
existing and historical capacities for engaging in anticipatory governance, this chapter 
takes a different angle on the idea of capacity building, and drawing from the integration 
sphere of anticipatory governance, delves into the ways in which capacities for 
anticipatory governance are currently being built within the R&D sphere. 
 Before jumping into the case studies, it is important to define capacity for 
renegotiating socio-technical contracts within the laboratory context.  Fisher (2007) 
explains the “capacity of laboratory decisions,” or more broadly “the responsive capacity” 
of scientists and their practices to respond to the societal needs, values, and concerns 
related to their work.  Furthermore, responsive capacity also concerns “the conditions for 
negotiations [in scientific work] to arise and open up in the first place” (Fisher 2008, 5).  
A key component of integration studies, in assessing responsive capacity, also includes 
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assessment of “the extent to which human and social scientists can participate in the 
processes of framing and closure that they chronicle” (Fisher 2008, 5).   
This chapter delves into how socio-technical contracts were renegotiated within 
the laboratories during the duration of the studies.  First, in order to provide a broader 
context of the external policy mandates on the laboratories, I will provide an overview of 
policy dialogues around “responsible innovation” in Canada and the United Kingdom.  I 
follow this by providing an overview and definition of socio-technical integration.  Then, I 
will provide an overview of three key areas that enabled my participation in the 
renegotiation of socio-technical contracts and assessment of responsive capacity within 
the laboratory setting.  These areas include: the price of integration, participating in 
material practices, and responsible innovation.  Then, I utilize these three areas to 
structure discussion of my case studies.  Over the span of these two studies in the 
spring/summer and fall/winter of 2009, I participated in structured and unstructured 
interactions with my geneticist collaborators on topics ranging from research decision-
making to responsible innovation. Throughout the course of the collaborations, I 
transitioned from a laboratory outsider to a valued team member, assisting with and 
performing my own experiments, transferring laboratory techniques, and stimulating 
changes in laboratory patient engagement practices.   
The Policy Language of Responsible Innovation 
In his January 2001 response to the Speech from the Throne, Canadian Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien remarked that, “In the 21st century, our economic and social 
goals must be pursued hand-in-hand. Let the world see in Canada a society marked by 
innovation and inclusion, by excellence and justice” (Government of Canada 2001a).  
This theme of social and innovation goals and values as intertwined entities was echoed 
in the Canadian government’s 2001 Innovation Strategy: “Achieving Excellence.”  The 
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report emphasized the importance of fostering an “innovation environment” in which 
“public […] confidence challenges are addressed before they develop” (Government of 
Canada 2001b, 11).  Issues of science and technology permeate the social discourse, 
noted the report: 
There are few areas of policy where science and 
technology do not play a role either as a source of public 
concern or as a potential solution to pressing problems.  
Innovation extends our capabilities and allows us to do 
things we have never been able to do before.  Ensuring 
that we use these capabilities wisely, safely, and equitably 
is the role of good stewardship (2001b, 64). 
 
Canadian commentators have highlighted the apparent contradiction between the 
democratization of science and the specialized expert knowledge that accompanies the 
practice of science, posing the question, “how do you democratize expertise?  Is it not a 
contradiction in terms to make special knowledge everyone’s business?” (Saner 2009).  
Policy discourse around innovation in Britain has followed similar language, 
focusing on the connections between innovation, economic growth, and “societal 
wellbeing” (Excellence with Impact 2012).  In Britain, the life sciences employ 165,000 
people and brings in £50 ($77) billion a year, making it one of the leading industries in 
the country (Moran 2012, 125).  The focus on the broader impacts of scientific research 
can be observed in British funding bodies such as Research Councils UK, which 
comprise over eighty percent of the British science budget, and the expectations it sets 
out for its grantees (United Kingdom 2006, 23), in which it expects researchers to 
“demonstrate an awareness of the wider environment and context” of their research, 
“demonstrate an awareness of the social and ethical implications of their research, 
beyond usual research conduct considerations, and take account of public attitudes 
towards those issues,” and “identify potential benefits and beneficiaries from the outset, 
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and through the full life cycle of the project” (Statement of Expectation on Economic and 
Societal Impact 2012). 
The United Kingdom’s Science and Innovation Investment Framework 
highlighted the importance of fostering public trust in science by considering the potential 
implications of technologies early on, rather than when new developments are about to 
be disseminated into society: 
In pushing forward the boundaries of science and breaking 
new ground in technological progress, the public needs to 
have confidence in the ethical and regulatory framework 
within which these advancements are being made […] the 
Government promotes public understanding of and 
engagement with the science base and stresses the need 
for regulatory and ethical issues to be considered at the 
emerging stages of new science, when action can be 
taken to address them head on” (United Kingdom 2004, 
15).   
 
Similarly, the Government Office for Science published the Universal Ethical Code for 
Scientists (United Kingdom 2007), which seeks to foster a “continually renewed 
relationship between scientists and society” by encouraging scientists to actively reflect 
“on the implications and impacts of the work,” and to “seek to discuss the issues that 
science raises for society.” 
Developing a capacity to render “expert” scientific practices more responsive to 
social goals and values may seem paradoxical, and yet it is a central task if nations such 
as Canada and the United Kingdom are to live up to their commitments for responsible 
innovation.  Integration activities between social and natural scientists represent one 
effort to build such a capacity.  Collaborations between social scientists and geneticists 
are already ongoing in the province of British Columbia in projects such as Genome BC, 
a large scale endeavor that seeks to make British Columbia a leader in “selected ethical, 
legal and societal issues related to genomics” (Mission and Objectives, Genome BC).  
One aspect of Genome BC employs the work of social scientists, who observe the 
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activities of scientists to see if they correspond with social goals.  Genome BC is 
primarily funded by the province of British Columbia and the Canadian government.    
The goal of integration is to feed back insights from public engagement, critical 
reflections and anticipatory exercises into R&D processes themselves with the purpose 
of engaging such processes in the social implications of scientific research.  Integration 
activities are located within the “mid-stream” of scientific research, after public research 
goals and mandates have been set, but before research results are published and 
products enter the market (Fisher 2007).  In the sprit of the ongoing Canadian and 
British dialogues and activities calling for increased reflection on the implications of 
scientific research, integration activities emphasize collaborations between social and 
natural scientists and engineers with the goal of increasing responsive capacity, the 
ability to link and engage with social and technical issues “in tandem,” within the sphere 
of R&D activities (Fisher and Lightner 2009).  These capacities were explored by Fisher 
(2007) in a collaborative three-year engagement with a nanotechnology research 
laboratory at University of Colorado Boulder.  The results of this initial study indicate that 
collaborations between social and natural scientists have value both in exploring the 
science-society interface in a hands-on manner and in increasing reflexive capacity 
within laboratory decision-making processes.   
In order to fully immerse themselves in the laboratory environment, embedded 
researchers building on Fisher’s work utilize ethnographic sensibilities, but also engage 
in an “extended” form of ethnography, via weekly interviews with scientific researchers, 
using a decisionmaking protocol that explores the various considerations that scientific 
researchers currently integrate and could integrate into their research.  Such 
considerations can range from material considerations, social considerations, to legal 
considerations.  The weekly interviews serve as a venue for the social scientist to 
  226 
provide constant feedback to researchers, focusing on researchers’ decisions and how 
the considerations taken into account for material, social, and political practices might be 
broadened and productively re-shaped.  Interviews using the decision protocol serve as 
a unique opportunity for social scientists and natural scientists to engage about 
decisionmaking, as it should be noted that the social scientist does not tell the natural 
scientist to think about social, legal, or ethical considerations, rather the social scientist 
seeks to serve as a reflexive tool for thinking deeper about such issues. 
Fisher’s intervention-oriented work provides the basis for the ethnographic 
assessment of reflexive capacity in two genetics laboratories.  One laboratory is located 
in Vancouver, British Columbia, the other is located in Oxford, United Kingdom. The 
Canadian portion of the study spanned May through August 2009, and the British 
segment spanned October through December 2009.  The remainder of this chapter 
explores three broad themes that emanated from the laboratory engagement project.   
The first theme focuses on the price of integration in the project’s attempt to 
bridge the “two cultures” of the social and natural sciences.  As I experienced firsthand 
as an embedded social scientist, integration is two-way, and there was a toll (emotional 
and mental) in opening myself and my own (intellectual and national) culture to the 
cultures of the laboratories. Culture, in the sense of the social scientist/natural scientist 
dichotomy, and also of the American/Canadian and American/British dichotomy.  
Through this process, the social and natural scientists step outside of their comfort 
zones in order to learn each other’s “languages” and establish trading zones.   
Paying the price of integration was an important, and perhaps essential, 
component in establishing the relationships necessary to engage in the next theme, 
participating in material practices.  In both laboratories, I was invited to participate in the 
material culture of the laboratory by performing my own experiments and assisting my 
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collaborators with their work.  I was also able to transfer a material practice from the 
Vancouver laboratory to the Oxford laboratory.  Stepping into the shoes of my 
collaborators and donning a lab coat enabled new modes of engaging in dialogue and 
establishing trading zones at the laboratory bench itself.   
The new perspective afforded by participating in the material culture of the 
laboratory provided a space in which laboratory members and I grappled with the third 
theme, the meaning of responsible innovation.  This theme is situated in dialogue around 
responsible research practices, and resulted in two distinct outcomes.  In Vancouver, 
dialogues around responsible innovation resulted in laboratory changes in patient 
engagement practices.  In the United Kingdom, the micro-level bench-side dialogues 
that I engaged in with a laboratory post-doc equipped me with the necessary insight to 
actively participate and provide critical feedback to senior scientists and policymakers at 
a policy workshop on preimplantation genetic diagnosis licensing schemes.  
The Laboratories 
The Canadian period of the study (May-August 2009) occurred in a genetics 
laboratory in Vancouver, at the University of British Columbia.  The laboratory director, 
Alice Williamson,10 focused primarily on reproductive genetics, with her laboratory staff 
tackling a number of different projects, including novel prenatal diagnosis techniques, 
genetic causes of premature infertility, and research on chromosomal abnormalities, 
epigenetic changes, and disorders that are linked to the placenta.  The laboratory is 
adjacent to a research hospital from which the laboratory receives many of its samples.  
Although patients who donate the samples are in close proximity, there is little 
interaction between patients and laboratory members.  In addition to Alice, the laboratory 
had two PhD students, one post-doctoral researcher, one lab manager, one lab tech, 
                                                
10 All names have been changed to protect the identity of the participants. 
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one masters student, an undergrad, and a research coordinator.  In total, there were 
three males in lab, and the other six are female. 
The British portion of the study (October 2009 – December 2009) took place in a 
genetics laboratory at a research institute based at the University of Oxford.  Directed by 
Edward Jones, the laboratory’s research focused on researching the genetic causes of 
cranio-facial malformations, the connection between genetically based diseases and 
increased paternal age linked to tumors in testes, and research exploring genetic 
mutations potentially implicated in autism disorder.  Edward Jones spent a great deal 
time (sometimes up to half his work-week) with patients in the clinic at the adjacent 
hospital as part of an interdisciplinary team comprised of clinicians and geneticists.  In 
addition to Edward, the laboratory had two doctoral (DPhil) students, four post-doctoral 
researchers (two relatively new, two at 10+ years), and one lab tech.  The laboratory had 
five males and three female staff members at the time of the project. 
The Price of Integration 
The Two Cultures 
On the first day of the Vancouver laboratory engagement in May 2009, I met with 
the laboratory’s director, Alice Williamson.  Alice, who is an established and well-
regarded researcher in fertility and genetics, provided an overview of the laboratory and 
briefly introduced me to her management style.  Having conducted a small ethnography 
herself in high school, Alice understood the basics of the project, such as regularly 
spending time in the laboratory, making observations, and talking with researchers.  
Despite her understanding of the mechanics of ethnographies and other social science 
activities, her wariness of the social sciences was evident.  “It’s like we’re talking two 
different languages,” she immediately stated.  She had collaborated with a psychology 
student in the past, utilizing surveys in order to garner perspectives on fertility issues.  
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The collaboration provided some useful insights for presentations, “but,” she added, 
“ultimately that is soft science.  It’s good because you can point to it [as evidence].  It 
[social science] was fun, but not something I would want to do again.”  This comment 
was at once disorienting and intimidating, causing me to question whether collaboration 
would even be possible in such a context.  Clear allusions to the two cultures were not 
something that I expected to encounter in the first meeting, however, there was a distinct 
parallel between Alice’s comments on speaking two different languages, and my 
discussion with Oxford laboratory director Edward Jones.     
After arriving in Oxford in October 2009, Edward and I met at least an hour, and 
discussed the overall laboratory format, Edward’s leadership style, and his take on each 
laboratory member and how they fit into the larger picture.  Compared to the tightlipped 
and quiet nature of the overall culture of the Jones’ laboratory, Edward was forthcoming 
and candid in expressing his opinions. At one point, he bluntly commented (although in 
good humor) that he understood about “one tenth” of what I “actually do,” although he 
was willing and ready to learn, and stated that he would be interested in me emailing him 
some of my papers.  “We come from two different cultures, two different worlds,” Edward 
stated. 
Although, in Edward’s words, he only understood “one tenth” of my work, he 
hoped that I could help translate the laboratory’s work for a broader audience.  Edward 
gave me a task, stating that it was my “first job” as the laboratory’s visiting social 
scientist.  The task was to review a media release written by the Wellcome Trust 
regarding the laboratory’s most recent Nature Genetics piece.  Edward felt that the 
release needed to be reworked from both a technical and readability standpoint.  While 
he would be editing and rewriting most of the piece himself, he wanted a “new pair of 
eyes” to review it and provide recommendations on how the article could be less jargon-
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heavy, and more tangible for a broader public audience, of scientists and non-scientists 
alike.  
Alexi, one of the Jones laboratory’s senior post-docs, voiced a similar sentiment 
– that social scientists and natural scientists speak “different languages,” and it was 
“unclear” to her what a social scientist could bring to a functioning laboratory that already 
has a “steady dynamic,” unless there was “a situation of crisis” that needed to be 
addressed.   
I have no idea what you could bring in.  I’m sure there is 
something, I just can’t see it.  Would it only be during a 
situation of crisis?  Would it be before the crisis occurred?  
…I do strongly believe there is a lot to do with 
interdisciplinary study, but that requires knowledge, and 
interest, and it is very difficult to do that because people 
don’t speak the same language. 
 
John, another post-doc in the Jones laboratory, also expressed that he was unsure what 
role social scientists could play, as he felt that the governance of science should be left 
to senior scientists with experience and knowledge. 
C.P. Snow’s writings on the two cultures, the divide between the humanities and 
natural sciences, although archaic and perhaps no longer completely descriptive of the 
complex and dynamic relationship between the natural and human sciences, fit 
surprisingly appropriately in the initial phases of each laboratory engagement project.  
Snow, reflecting on his personal experiences moving between the realms of the human 
and natural sciences states that he felt as if he were “moving among two groups […] 
who had almost ceased to communicate at all, who in intellectual, moral and 
psychological climate had so little in common that instead of going from Burlington 
House or south Kensington to Chelsea, one might have crossed an ocean” (1993, 2).   
The initial conversations with the senior scientists in the two laboratories 
indicated a certain cultural understanding of the relationship between the social and 
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natural sciences, that the two cultures do not come together unless there is a specific 
issue that needs to be addressed, and the relationship, if there is to be one, is one of 
utility.  In Alice’s reflections, the “soft science” of ethnographies and surveys was useful 
because she could use it as evidence and context to further buttress her scientific 
findings on young women’s perspectives on fertility.  While Alice noted that there was 
utility in her social science forays, collaboration with social scientists did not fit into her 
day-to-day laboratory life.  Edward also saw a specific utility in collaborating with a social 
scientist on the back-end of research projects, in that following publication in a scientific 
journal, the social scientist could “translate” his research for a broader public audience.  
In this regard, the social scientist would serve as an ambassador of the laboratory to the 
general public.  Alexi, too, viewed interdisciplinary collaboration as a primarily need-only 
relationship, e.g. the laboratory might call in social scientists to assist with a crisis 
situation, such as a public relations crisis or serious ethical quandaries.   
In all of these perspectives, the social scientist is viewed as having one set of 
expertise (ethics and public relations/engagement), and the natural scientist has another 
(empirical insights into the natural world).  The two only come together for short bouts of 
time to address specific issues related to specific events.  In this model, social scientist 
intervention or collaboration occurs in the downstream of scientific research, after 
research agendas have already been set, experiments are undertaken, and articles are 
authored.  The laboratory, the locus and “midstream” of research and development 
activity, has traditionally not been viewed as a place for governance of research.  Such 
activity would occur either upstream, where research mandates and policies are set, or 
downstream, when research results are published, applied commercially, or applied to 
new projects.  By this time, it is often too late to augment research and technological 
trajectories.  Fisher et al. (2006, 491) note that it is not surprising that the laboratory 
  232 
context “remains largely conceptualized as the instrument of promotion, with control 
almost by definition seen as externally orchestrated, even when scientists and engineers 
themselves initiate or devise it.”   However, engagement within the laboratory context 
itself, the midstream, potentially enables proactive engagement with issues before the 
crises that Alexi alluded to occur.   
The laboratory engagement model developed by Fisher (2007) and undertaken 
in this project seeks to engage social and natural scientists in the midstream itself, to 
explore the capacities for reflexivity, reflection, and responsiveness to societal 
considerations within the laboratory context.  In order to move beyond a punctuated 
equilibrium of collaboration, where social and natural scientists only sporadically come 
together to retroactively address an issue, the siloed social science and natural science 
actors must be able to come to some sort of grasp of each other’s languages and 
cultures.  The following sections of this paper explore this process in-depth, highlighting 
that such immersion does not only entail the learning of languages, but also comprises a 
complex tapestry of social, cultural, and political contexts that the embedded social 
scientist must navigate.  
A Journalist or a Psychologist? Initial Distrust and Hesitation 
One such complexity that I encountered was the initial hesitation and distrust that 
many of the laboratory members had regarding my presence in their space.  While each 
laboratory had its own unique dynamic, there were a number of similarities in terms of 
how my role was initially perceived by the researchers.  Members of both laboratories 
asked me if I was spending time in the laboratory in order to “dig up dirt” on them. There 
were also fears that I would give away privileged laboratory information, either 
accidentally or intentionally, therefore jeopardizing the laboratory’s ability to publish.  
Vancouver laboratory members asked me if I was secretly an embedded journalist, 
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intent on finding the wrongdoing in their daily activities.  While the “journalist” framing 
was predominant in Vancouver, one particular laboratory member in Oxford, Seamus, 
asked me if the purpose of my study was to “psychoanalyze” the laboratory members.  
Seamus’ unease would manifest most saliently when one of the Oxford laboratory 
members and I would leave for an interview.  “Have fun getting psychoanalyzed!” was a 
common comment that Seamus would call out.   
 The initial distrust exhibited by many of the laboratory members slowly subsided 
over the first few weeks, as some inquisitive individuals began to ask me basic questions 
about the social sciences.  One such example came early on in the Oxford engagement.  
My space in the Jones laboratory was close to the workspace of Lavender, one of the 
DPhil students in the Jones laboratory. Lavender turned to me.  “So what research will 
you be working on in the laboratory?” she inquired.  I responded that I was broadly 
interested in how scientific researchers grapple with and think about the social and 
ethical aspects of their research, in light of various considerations.  “So are you a 
scientist?” she asked. 
 “Not in your traditional sense,” I said.  I explained that my background was in 
political science, and that I focus on the connections between science, technology and 
policy, and that I was hoping to explore those relationships further during my time in the 
laboratory.   
 “What is political science?” she shot back.  “I don’t think that there is anything 
that my research has to do with politics or policies.  I just do science!”  I sensed that her 
questioning was born out of interest and curiosity, and her posture and body language, 
despite her lack of sleep and pending poster presentation, conveyed that she was willing 
to listen.  Rather than give her a textbook answer, I told her that just as she examines 
complex biological relationships, I unpack the relationships between the material and the 
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social.  I then pointed to various materials around the laboratory and used them to 
illustrate how they might be embedded in a complex policy discourse.  I pointed to the 
refrigerators that held various types of biological samples, both human and animal, and 
noted the system of consent that patients have to go through before providing samples, 
a practice rooted in historical rationale and concepts of human rights and dignity, after 
the abuses of Nazi scientists and incidents such as the Tuskegee syphilis experiment.  
“Interesting,” she said.  “I didn’t think we had anything in common.” 
Accounts of British and Canadian Culture  
My first chance to meet the Williamson laboratory as a whole was at the 
laboratory meeting.  Coupled with my lack of knowledge of genetics, the challenge of 
finding common ground seemed to become even more insurmountable at that meeting, 
where a conversation on the differences between Canadian and American genetics 
conferences gave way to some laboratory members discussing the perceived cultural 
divide between Canada and America.  Being the social scientist from America, the odd 
woman out in more ways than one, my outsider status was highlighted as Alice, who had 
spent a large portion of her life in America, and the other lab members highlighted the 
communal spirit of Canadians, noting that Canadians tend to care more about their 
communities and each other than Americans and making statements such as 
“Canadians are friendlier and care more about their country” and “Socialism isn’t a bad 
word here.”  I had the distinct impression that they were discussing this for my benefit, 
and perhaps did not realize the unintended impact this comparison would have on me.  
The tone of the conversation further strengthened my feelings of otherness.  I felt 
categorized with the rest of America as unfriendly, individualistic, and uncaring.  
Although I laughed it off, and joked about it at the time, I silently agonized over it.   
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The Oxford experience was different in this regard.  Throughout the engagement, 
few overt references were made by laboratory members regarding nationality or British 
versus American culture.  One of the few conversations that touched on this topic was 
with Alexi, who was an international researcher.  She noted that Oxford was a “very 
strange place,” a separate “reality” which strives to keep a certain mystique.  “There is a 
mystique about it,” she said, “but I don’t really appreciate it because I’m not British…I 
don’t really care, for me…it’s just a place to work.”  She said that the Oxford mystique 
was particularly salient for English people: “There’s an aristocracy of intellectual 
development…and that’s what Oxford does to any English person.[…]We do fabricate 
these worlds, and the value is cultural, and also personal.”  She also commented on the 
differences between European and American university experiences: 
You probably haven’t met many undergrads here, but 
there is this terrible pressure of being first at 
Oxford…students are very rarely happy here, which is very 
different from an American campus.  Why do people do 
that to themselves? Why does it have to be painful to be 
valuable?  We do this as a human species, but much less 
Americans than other people.  Loads of Americans are 
there to have a good time.  But as Europeans there is this 
idea that to have a valuable experience, it has to be tough, 
and you have got to suffer… 
 
Reflecting on the quiet and more reserved nature of the Jones laboratory, Alexi 
commented that “People respect each other’s boundaries, which is a very English thing 
to do[…]The laboratory used to be very international, but it has become very British.”  
She then highlighted her perceptions on American versus British laboratories: 
In general, it’s kind of a cliché but the American people are 
very outgoing at first, but it doesn’t go much deeper than 
that.  It tends to not go that much further…the British 
personality is hard to crack that first step, but they are 
actually very caring.  It’s not indifferent.  Once you know 
them, there is no difference.  But it’s not a naturally 
outgoing culture.  [Historically] they’ve had to put up with a 
lot of crap.  I think that Americans tend to complain too 
easily. 
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During a casual lunch conversation with Michael, a researcher from another 
laboratory, I learned that the Jones laboratory was perceived by other laboratories as 
particularly “British.” Michael, an international researcher himself, commented that I 
would likely notice the differences between his laboratory and the Jones laboratory.  
“They’re a very British laboratory,” he stated.  “You’ll notice that many of the other labs 
are much more international.  Sometimes it can be harder for a non-British person to be 
part of the group.  It takes a lot of work to break that thick British skin.”  Later in the day, 
John mentioned that I was the latest “talk of the town,” as Michael’s lab had been talking 
about me – the Jones’s laboratory’s American “social scientist.”  
Fertility and Aging: Laboratory Level Bio-Politics 
In addition to the challenges of navigating Canadian and British culture within the 
laboratories, I was also exposed to “culture shock” of a different kind.  During my 
encounters with Frank, the post-doctoral researcher, and other laboratory members in 
Vancouver, I sensed a trend regarding laboratory members’ perspectives on fertility and 
aging.  While Frank was providing me with basic overviews of molecular genetics, he 
asked me how old I was.  After I responded, he turned back to the computer screen.  
“Well take a look at this,” he said.  He pointed to a graphic representing various ages 
and corresponding fertility.  “See how egg quality and overall fertility decline more rapidly 
as you enter into your late twenties and thirties?  And how drastic the decline is as you 
approach your forties?”  I was speechless.  It took me some time before I could respond 
to him.   
 This was not the first discussion regarding age and fertility, however.  In my first 
meeting with Alice, I was advised, “Have babies before you turn thirty.”  She offered me 
this advice because of the increased issues and risks associated with trying to have a 
baby as one becomes older, a statement that was supported by her research.  Although 
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one might imagine this as a somewhat comedic situation, underneath the humor is an 
undercurrent of seriousness.   A number of laboratory projects are dedicated to 
understanding the relationship between aging and fertility.  In fact, at least one 
laboratory member has undergone in vitro fertilization (IVF) in the past and subsequently 
gave birth to a healthy baby.  When asked if her experiences with IVF influenced her 
research interests, the laboratory member responded that it was “the other way around.”  
She noted that the decision was influenced by her participation as a scientist in fertility 
research.  Given that many of her colleagues were IVF researchers and practitioners, 
her own research on genetics and fertility, and a scientific curiosity regarding IVF, the 
researcher decided to try the procedure.      
The research coordinator, Jackie, had her thirtieth birthday fast approaching.  
The laboratory community, in typical fashion, wanted to put together a card to let her 
know that she was appreciated.  The lab opted against a placenta-replica birthday cake 
for Jackie, although they excitedly showed me pictures of previous placenta-shaped 
cakes from other celebrations.  I asked one member how old the “birthday girl” would be.  
They responded “thirty,” and jokingly said that I shouldn’t mention the specific age the 
birthday girl was turning, since the turning thirty signified that her fertility was beginning 
to decline faster. “Shhh,” the researcher teasingly stated, “we don’t want to upset her.” 
Although the lab members are able to joke about their fellows’ fertility, these 
casual conversations and the unsettling effects they had on me served to illustrate the 
researchers’ perspectives on science and self.  Clearly, the ongoing scientific work that 
researchers engage in permeates and shapes laboratory culture and social life, in 
addition to interactions with outsiders.  The mantra of “have babies before you turn thirty” 
that was expressed to me multiple times continued to impact how I perceived my body 
and my fertility choices.  Typical birthday jokes might address aging or going “over the 
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hill,” but most do not reference the reproductive side of aging (for the obvious reason 
that most people would not take kindly to their reproductive health being referenced in a 
joke).  There are exceptions, however.  Discussing fertility is not taboo in the Williamson 
laboratory.  It is the exact opposite, since human fertility in this setting is literally under 
the microscope.  
Such micro-level dynamics associate with the scientists’ perspectives and 
publications on fertility and ageing impact the macro-level dynamics of how society and 
individuals view fertility and aging, in personal choices, the media, and in the policy 
realms.  In North America and Europe, the multiple births rate from IVF is twenty to thirty 
percent, whereas in “naturally conceived” pregnancies, the rate is only one percent 
(Baylis 2009).  A thirty-five year old woman might opt against the safer single-embryo 
transfer while undergoing IVF and choose to transfer multiple embryos because she 
perceives herself as being less fertile due to her age.  The popular media romances the 
notion of multiple births through reality shows such as “John and Kate Plus Eight,” and 
pays little heed to the health risks associated with multiple births, for both mother and 
children.  Most Canadian provinces do not fund IVF procedures; therefore many women 
want to save money by transferring multiple embryos at a time, in hopes that more 
embryos transferred will lead to a successful pregnancy.   
There were a number of occasions where I witnessed the powerful and 
emotionally charged nature of fertility research, such as when Alice and Rosa came 
close to tears when recalling working with samples from terminated pregnancies.  At the 
same time, I felt that Alice was trying to retain the objective and impersonality commonly 
associated with scientific research, but despite those attempts, it was evident that she 
too was strongly impacted by the experience.  Given the above considerations and 
examples, fertility research is quite different from other areas of research.  Decisions in 
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the areas of other emerging technologies are arguably and perhaps debatably much less 
personal and intimate than the decision of when and how to have a child, a decision that 
is increasingly being affected and influenced by scientific and policy realms.  
The philosophy of the Williamson laboratory, where researchers are encouraged 
to have children earlier in their careers, rather than later, was different from what Alexi 
(in the Jones laboratory) had experienced in her career.  When I approached Alexi and 
asked if she would be willing to do an interview with me on issues related to science and 
society, she started laughing and joked that her opinion would depend on what day of 
the month it is.  She segued into talking about the challenges and difficulties of being a 
woman in a scientific field.  “They don’t get it,” she stated, referring to the unanticipated 
hardships associated with having children while doing research or trying to finish school. 
A few weeks later, Alexi sat down with me for a formal interview.  She had 
studied and worked at a number of top universities before coming to the Jones 
laboratory, where she had been working as a senior post-doc for the last eight years.  
Prior to coming to the Jones laboratory, she had secured a post-doc in London.  During 
this post-doc, she became pregnant.  “People don’t tend to very much like it when you 
take maternity leave on a short term contract…it’s an issue…so basically, I got fired.” 
The Word “Masturbation”  
Unlike the Williamson laboratory, which focused on the relationship between 
maternal age and genetic disorders, much of the Jones laboratory’s recent research has 
focused on the relationship between paternal aging and resultant sperm mutations and 
certain congenital disorders.  In order to explore the relationship between paternal age 
and certain mutations, researchers engaged in “massively parallel sequencing” sperm 
DNA.  Performing research on sperm DNA requires sperm, and therefore sperm donors.  
Alexi stated that while one might think that procuring semen donations would be easier 
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than getting blood donations, since it does not include a needle, it is actually much more 
difficult: “Masturbation is one big taboo.”  She noted that men tend to be split on the 
issue, and that their willingness to donate is largely dependent on culture, with Catholic 
cultures being particularly difficult to procure samples in. 
I have found over the years that people really offer to give 
it, or they will not even consider doing it.  It’s very simple, 
you cannot convince anybody.  It’s either not a problem 
(and I think it has to do with education and culture)…I think 
some people even have a real taboo about the word 
masturbation. It’s very common, so it’s all about how you 
produce a sample.  You know, that’s for the men to decide, 
it has nothing to do with me, really.  But if you think about 
it, practically, it’s much less invasive than taking blood.  It’s 
a taboo, and a cultural taboo.  It’s very clear. 
 
Like the Williamson laboratory, the Jones laboratory also had its inside humor, 
although, the jokes tended to come as more of a shock to me, given the quieter and 
more serious nature of the Jones laboratory.  For example, when grabbing coffee with 
Sonny and Lavender, the two DPhil students in the laboratory, they began discussing 
the latest happenings at the research institute.  A random (and apparently used) pair of 
men’s underwear had been found in one of the men’s bathrooms at the institute.  The 
two laughed and immediately quipped, “It’s probably Alexi telling someone to drop their 
pants and give her a sample!” 
 I was also in for quite a surprise when Lavender opened her desk drawer and 
took out a pair of preserved testes, which she was in the process of cutting into 
extremely thin slices so she could examine them under a powerful microscope.  
Lavender’s work focused on identifying tumors in the testes, which laboratory research 
indicates produce the mutant sperm.  “Since we’ve been talking about them so much, I 
wanted to show you my testes!” Lavender exclaimed.  Later, when Lavender and I were 
talking with John, I told him what Lavender had shown me. He laughed, and informed 
me, “Lavender never showed me her testes before!”       
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 I reflected with John on the patterns of humor I was beginning to notice in the 
laboratory.  John stated “We’re a bunch of leg twitching antisocial dorks.  We never see 
the sun.”  “So, English, essentially,” I joked back.  “English to the extreme,” he noted. 
Engaging in Material Practices 
Material Practices - Vancouver 
During the first two weeks of the Vancouver laboratory engagement, I despaired 
ever coming to a real understanding of what the researchers did in their daily practices.  
I would stare, mystified, at the large machines that surrounded my workspace.  I would 
hear conversations regarding “snips.”   What is a snip?  I desperately scanned the 
Internet in an effort to find answers.  However, I was not able to find a clue to the 
mysterious “snip” entity that seemed to be so popular in laboratory discussions.   
 I decided that, despite the potential embarrassment it might cause me, I would 
broach the topic of the “snip” in my interviews with the researchers.  My weekly 
interviews with Joy and Zhi served as a primary source of information for me, particularly 
when it came to learning the language of genetics.  The primary reason that I could not 
solve the mystery of the “snip” is that although the term is pronounced as “snip” it is 
actually an acronym: “SNP,” which stands for “single nucleotide polymorphism.”  These 
SNPs occur when one “letter” (the nucleotides represented by the letters A,C,T,G) in the 
genetic code gets switched out for another letter.  Depending on where these SNPs 
occur, they can either be harmless or are considered a genetic mutation, having a vast 
impact on human development and health. 
Although conducting interviews and spending time in the laboratory was 
important in establishing rapport and trust relationships, spending time, in and of itself, 
does not necessarily translate to gaining competence or understanding.  Each day spent 
at the laboratory meant being surrounded by strange equipment that I only vaguely 
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recognized as being important for DNA analysis from forensic television programs.  
Researchers would spend hours hunched over their benches, using slender instruments 
to draw liquid from one set of tubes and deposit it into other sets of tubes.  This ritual 
was simultaneously hypnotizing and perplexing.  
During my weekly interviews with Joy and Zhi, two PhD students in the lab, terms 
such as “PCR,” “sequencing,” and “SNP” were used quite frequently, and I was coming 
to have a nebulous grasp of what the terms meant, yet the discourse, at this point, was 
far divorced from an understanding of practice.  I could engage in conversation about 
scientific practices, and could even string the words “polymerase chain reaction” 
together, yet I could not connect the concept with the practice.  Discussing SNPs and 
PCRs was akin to talking about fairytales and swords in stones.  I could attempt to 
imagine them situated in scientific practice, but had never witnessed or experienced 
them firsthand.  I could have a conversation about a PCR, but I still could not understand 
how it was actually done.  We might talk about ethedium bromide agarose gel in multiple 
conversations, yet a cognitive dissonance would remain.  I could not connect the idea of 
the gel to the actual practices of the laboratory. The researchers would patiently explain 
concepts to me in our interviews, but without an understanding of material, physical 
practices that I could anchor them to, the concepts continued to remain empty and 
meaningless to me. Understanding the concept was not enough; I needed to understand 
how the concept operated in practice (see Rabinow’s “Making PCR: A Story of 
Biotechnology” for a history of the PCR, from concept to technique). 
The opportunity to move from engaging with the concept to engaging with the 
technique came in my interactions with Frank, the post-doctoral researcher in the 
Williamson laboratory. My work area was right next to his workbench.  Frank’s hands 
were constantly busy preparing and executing experiments.  While working, he typically 
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carried on one or more conversations on a wide array of topics with me and his lab 
mates, topics ranging from music to food to science.  Approximately three weeks into the 
project, I asked Frank if I could watch him “do a PCR.” That same day, my bench-side 
friend transformed into my key informant.  My guide readily agreed to let me watch him 
“do the PCR,” but he actually did much more than just let me watch.  Having taught 
courses at his former university, he pulled up the PowerPoint slides (which were in 
Spanish) and began the process of teaching me about genetics.  He realized that we 
would have to start with the basics when he asked me if I knew what a PCR was.  
Rather than pretend to know something I did not, I admitted that I hardly understood it, 
with only a vague understanding from popular television shows such as CSI.   
Frank described to me how all genetics research depends on DNA amplification.  
For a geneticist to study a particular gene or region of DNA, the tiny fragment must be 
amplified.  The PCR, or as I came to learn, “polymerase chain reaction,” is both a 
process and an entity, which explained some of my earlier confusion.  The process 
includes putting together a complex combination of liquids to create a reaction.  The 
reaction only happens under a series of intense heat exposures, which are carried out in 
a PCR machine.  So when a researcher says that he or she “has to go do a PCR,” the 
expression encompasses both the PCR process of mixing liquids and the machine itself.  
Put simply, the purpose of the PCR is to amplify particular regions of DNA.  The regions 
to be amplified depend on what the researcher wants to study, and he or she will put 
together a specific and customized mixture of primers, enzyme, and nucleotides that will 
bind to and amplify the specific regions to be studied.  The “chain reaction,” the process 
of DNA amplification, only happens when specific temperatures are applied to the 
mixture inside of the PCR machine.  I was struck by how simple the process was – there 
was basically no difference between it and cooking: one must add the proper ingredients 
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and use the proper temperatures to achieve the desired product. A good PCR requires 
both experience and skill.  A novice can stumble through, but the old adage that 
“practice makes perfect” holds true for PCRs; the steady hand and experienced eye of a 
veteran typically results in a more consistent PCR reaction. 
By this point, about four weeks in, I was interacting with the researchers in casual 
social situations on a daily basis.  During coffee breaks and lab outings to lunch, the 
researchers would provide me with updates on their projects.  Frank and I would discuss 
when he would start and end his experiments, confirming timetables so I would be sure 
to be there when he received new information and breakthroughs.  When I arrived at the 
lab each day, he would provide me with an update of the ongoing saga of successful 
PCRs, failed PCRs, and the latest sequencing successes and challenges.  At this point, I 
was not only interviewing researchers about their work, I was becoming an invested 
participant – almost like I was part of a family. 
About nine weeks into the project, laboratory members and I were regularly 
engaging in lab social events, such as lunch, coffee, and after-work outings.  Around this 
time, Frank showed me that he had re-designed the laboratory member’s pictures and 
biographies on the door to include my own picture and blurb.  Laboratory members and I 
were also connected on the social networking website Facebook.  On Facebook, I 
signaled my intention to audit a molecular genetics course in order to deepen my 
understanding of some of the laboratory’s experiments.  I was confronted by Zhi, who 
had learned of my expressed interest.  “Why would you want to do that?” he demanded.  
After I explained my motives, Frank, also present, asked if I had “done a PCR.”  When I 
responded that I had not, my collaborators immediately suggested that I try my hand at 
one.  Within a matter of days, donning a lab coat and rubber gloves, and armed with a 
pipette, I was doing my own PCR, no longer “benchside,” but at the bench itself.  The 
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researchers found it novel, humorous, and exciting that I was rolling up my sleeves and 
engaging in the physical, material aspects of their work.  When Pearl, the technician, 
saw me working, she exclaimed, “Wow, I can’t believe my eyes!”  Pearl and some of the 
other researchers excitedly snapped pictures of me holding a tray of samples and using 
a pipette.   
The experience was a vital learning exercise, providing me with insight into 
scientific practice that I would not have had otherwise.  For example, when pipetting my 
PCR product into the ethedium bromide agarose gel wells, I realized that my blood sugar 
had dropped quite low (I had not eaten that morning), since my hands were shaking, and 
I was beginning to feel slightly lightheaded.  When I expressed how unsteady my hands 
had suddenly become, the undergraduate student, Tsai, showed me a way to hold the 
pipette with both hands that helped me steady my grip.  If I had not been performing the 
delicate pipetting task, I never would have noticed that something as seemingly trivial as 
skipping breakfast could have on the physical aspects of a scientist’s work.  Knowing 
that I would be doing more work with Frank, I changed my eating habits and began to 
eat breakfast.  Despite my shaky hands, I managed to successfully pipette the rest of the 
PCR product into the wells, and a few hours later, after the completed gel 
electrophoresis, Frank found my PCR results to be so exemplary that he ran to the copy 
machine and made a copy, to use as an example of a “good PCR result” in his future 
lectures on the topic.  Such lectures would include guest lectures, and genetics courses 
that he will teach in Vancouver and his home country.  
Material Practices - Oxford 
 
The opportunity to engage in material practices in the Oxford laboratory came 
early on, indeed, the very first day of the engagement. I accompanied John, one of the 
laboratory’s post-docs, on a brief trip to the lab to put some samples into the freezer. I 
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commented to him how familiar the laboratory seemed, despite Canada and the UK 
being separated by an ocean. I gestured to various familiar instruments, such as 
pipettes, stating how I had used them while preparing PCR product and doing 
experiments in the Vancouver laboratory.  John’s eyes lit up when I mentioned that I had 
experience, and noted that that he had hundreds of samples and PCRs to “do,” so it 
would be great to have my assistance and another pair of hands. 
 Two weeks into the Oxford engagement, I was wearing a lab coat, assisting John 
with the preparation of gels, pipetting PCR product into hundreds of little wells.  I would 
regularly assist John with his experiments, typically spending two or three days out of 
the week, either at the lab bench, working alongside John, or accompanying him to the 
“mouse house” – checking on the genetically modified mice that he used for some of his 
research. John expressed his admiration of the work that I had been doing, and even 
called me a “PCR god,” stating that “pipetting one hundred wells and making a gel is a 
good day’s work for anyone.” 
Oxford – a Mini Turing Test 
During lunchtime, the scientists at the institute would convene and talk shop. 
Early on, I spoke with Michael, a researcher at the institute about to receive his doctoral 
degree.  We discussed his work on blood disorders, and he was surprised to discover 
that I was not a natural scientist.  All of the researchers outside of the Jones laboratory 
that I met and talked with assumed that I was a scientific researcher, based on my ability 
to engage them in the more technical aspects of their work.  It was always a surprise to 
my interlocutor when the conversation would turn to my own research, and they would 
learn that I was not a scientist at all and had no formal training or scientific background. 
Oxford – Transferring Material and Knowledge Practices 
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During my time in the Oxford laboratory, I came to know a DPhil student named 
Sonny.  Sonny was having issues achieving successful PCRs.  Before I met Sonny, I 
learned about his PCR challenges in my first conversation with Edward Jones, the 
laboratory’s director.  Part of our conversation centered around trying to understand 
each others’ “cultures.” When Edward expressed to me that he understood only about 
“one tenth” of what I do, I told him that I was also still trying to understand his world, as 
well.  I explained that I had been engaging in some material practices in my last 
laboratory engagement, and had some basic understanding of genetics from a 
practitioner’s perspective, but that there was still a great deal to learn.  I showed him 
results from a PCR that I had done in the Vancouver laboratory.  “You are probably 
equal to or farther along in your understanding of genetics as Sonny is, who has been 
here for months, and still can’t manage to do a PCR,” Edward stated.   
Edward’s comment, that I was equally competent or surpassing in understanding 
material practices as one of his doctoral students, was an unanticipated 
acknowledgment of my increasing capacities for material competence and 
understanding.  The day following my conversation with Edward, Sonny and I were 
casually chatting in the lab, and he expressed his frustration with his PCRs to date.  We 
sat down at his workspace, and Sonny showed me his PCR notebook.  Most of the 
researchers in the laboratory used large red notebooks to record their experiments and 
notes.  The sturdy red covers ensured that they could withstand wear and tear, and 
could be referred to years later.  Despite spending hours at his bench preparing his 
PCRs, they always ended in failure.  The bands signifying the presence or absence of 
specific DNA mutations were non-existent, or very faint at best.  Despite Sonny’s poised 
and secure attitude, I could sense that he was becoming frustrated at his lack of 
success.  The ability to complete a PCR is a basic skill necessary for a geneticist to be 
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competent in before he or she can do anything else, and Sonny’s futile attempts, after 
four months of trying, were preventing him from going any further in his research 
endeavors.  
 Disconcerted at Sonny’s distress, I reached for my folder containing my notes 
and PCR results from the Canadian laboratory.  “Maybe we could compare PCRs,” I 
said.  I pulled out the PCR sheet and results that I had completed in my last laboratory 
engagement.   
 “Where did you get this?”  Sonny asked. 
 “It’s from my laboratory engagement this past summer,” I said.  “This is one of 
the PCRs that I did.” 
 “You did this?” Sonny asked.       
 I responded that it was my very first attempt at a PCR.  Sonny commented that 
he was very impressed that it was my first try.  “The bands look so nice!” he exclaimed.  
“Bloody good.  Goes to show that you don’t need a scientific background to do a PCR.”  
Sonny then took a closer look at the PCR “sheet,” a rubric that Frank, the post-doc in the 
Canadian lab, had designed.  The sheet listed all of the basic ingredients for a PCR, and 
allowed the researcher to fill in all of the specific amounts of the necessary materials.  It 
was a useful tool for both seasoned veterans and new researchers alike to keep track of 
exactly what was going into their PCR solution.  Sonny found the PCR sheet design to 
be both elegant and useful.  He had been writing everything down in his notebook, and 
he noted that without the PCR sheet, it makes it more likely that the researcher could 
omit something or make an error.  Sonny asked if I could provide him with a copy of the 
PCR sheet so he could use it and employ some of its characteristics in his own note-
taking and PCR practices.  I contacted Frank from the Canadian lab, and asked him if 
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Sonny could have a digital copy of his PCR sheet design.  Frank was happy to oblige, 
and was excited that someone was interested in using his PCR sheet.   
Interactional Competence – Going Beyond Linguistic Engagement to Material 
Engagement 
 How can natural scientists and social scientists create a shared space for 
collaboration?  Peter Galison (1997) grappled with this dilemma and proposed the idea 
of trading zones as a way of surmounting the barriers of different disciplinary languages, 
paradigms, and epistemic cultures: “distinct groups, with their different approaches to 
instruments and their characteristic forms of argumentation, can nonetheless coordinate 
their approaches around specific practices” (1997, 806).  In this collaborative space, the 
actors develop a shared language, or creole.  While Galison explored trading zones 
amongst different scientific disciplines, Collins, Evans, and Gorman (2010) have tested 
the idea in collaborations between natural scientists and social scientists, developing the 
notion of interactional expertise.   
Collins (2004, 125) defines interactional expertise as the “ability to converse 
expertly about a practical skill or expertise, but without being able to practice it, learned 
through linguistic socialization among the practitioners.” At a specific point along the 
way, in the Vancouver-Oxford laboratory engagements, there was a shift from 
conversing with the researchers about their experiments to actively participating in their 
material practices alongside them. Collins (2004, 128) saliently highlights this transition, 
from the “painful period” of ignorance, to being able to “join in” and even transfer 
knowledge amongst scientists, to the point where the social scientist can coherently 
engage with his or her scientist collaborators: 
the sociologist of scientific knowledge entering a new 
domain initially understands neither the banter nor the 
technical terms pertaining to some new piece of science 
being investigated.  After a painful period, the inferences in 
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others’ conversations start to become clear and eventually 
it becomes possible to begin [to] join in.[…] Eventually the 
scientists will become interested in what you know, not as 
a scientist in your own right, but as a person who is able to 
convey the scientific thought and activities of others.  If you 
have just come from visiting scientist X you may be able to 
tell scientist Y something of the science that X is doing, 
and tell it in a way that is convincing enough to enable Y to 
be sure they have learned something.   
   
While learning how to converse about the domain of research, I was also engaging in 
the practice of it.  In Vancouver, as the shift of moving away from only dialogue to 
participating in material practices while engaging in dialogue occurred, laboratory 
dynamics also shifted.  In Vancouver, my name and picture were placed on the door 
alongside the names of the other laboratory members – I was no longer perceived as the 
outsider keen on “digging up dirt,” rather, I was another member of the laboratory, an 
invested participant.   
The process of gaining interactional expertise while also participating in the 
material practices of the laboratory culture poses what some scholars might perceive as 
serious risks to the integrity of ethnographic research. The transitional experiences from 
laboratory outsider to laboratory insider highlight an important aspect of ethnographic 
research, that is, the risks associated with “going native,” of blurring the distinction 
between the observer and the observed, of participating too much in the culture that one 
is observing.  Ethnographers are warned that feeling too  “at home” is a danger: “there 
always must remain some part held back, some social and intellectual ‘distance’.  For it 
is in the space created by this distance that the analytic work of the ethnographer gets 
done” (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, 90).  While there is the risk that the 
ethnographer might lose his or her objective ethnographic gaze by actively breaking 
down the boundaries between the Self and the Other, there are also advantages to 
conscientiously going native.  In the case of the Vancouver and Oxford studies, going 
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native by engaging in material and other cultural practices of the laboratory served as a 
strategy to foster diverse modes of engagement and discourse. 
In Oxford, following the Vancouver study, I “hit the ground running,” and shortly 
after my arrival, began participating in material practices on an almost daily basis.  
Unless they already knew of me as the “Jones laboratory’s American social scientist,” 
other researchers at the Oxford research facility assumed that I was also a geneticist, 
based on my growing capacity to fluently converse with them, and also empathize with 
their day-to-day challenges.  If their PCR was not turning out, or they were feeling 
overwhelmed by the amount of pipetting they had to do, I could empathize, and even 
offer advice in some circumstances.  I was able to empathize with the struggles of the 
Oxford DPhil student, Sonny, identify a specific issue in terms of how he was recording 
his PCRs, and identify something that might help him by transferring the Vancouver PCR 
protocol over to him.  Sonny was willing to take my advice and attempt doing things 
differently because I could not only dialogue about PCRs with him, I was able to show 
him an artifact (the PCR sheet and pictures of a successful PCR) of my firsthand 
experience that served as evidence of competence in the domain.  
For the purposes of the Vancouver and Oxford projects, “going native” served as 
a strategy in establishing and building trust relationships that would make further 
dialogue, engagement, and even changes in laboratory practices tangible.  Learning 
about and engaging in the material/procedural aspects of laboratory work illustrated to 
laboratory members that I was eager to “walk in their shoes” and engage in their daily 
work activities alongside them.  Engagement is a two-way process, and as the social 
scientist demonstrates that she is willing to expand or step outside of her comfort zone, 
and as demonstrated in the following sections, her collaborators will begin to step 
outside of their comfort zones, as well. 
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Responsible Innovation: Public Engagement, Reflexive Awareness, and 
Integrating Across Scientific and Policy Domains 
Puzzling over Responsible Innovation in the Laboratory 
Throughout the laboratory engagements, I engaged in dialogues with laboratory 
researchers on their own perspectives on responsible innovation.  Joy, one of the PhD 
students in the Williamson laboratory, and I had ongoing conversations on the topic, 
starting with her very first interview, about the role of the laboratory in thinking about 
social and ethical considerations.  While Joy felt that the laboratory was taking important 
ethical issues such as patient confidentiality seriously, when prompted for her thoughts 
on areas that could be enhanced, she acknowledged that there is always room for 
improvement, particularly in the realm of patient engagement efforts.  She informed me 
that the laboratory was presently not participating in any particular engagement efforts.  
She noted that inaction on the part of researchers to engage with patients was not 
confined to her laboratory, however.  It is a condition that pervades many studies that 
incorporate patient samples:  With many human studies, the “findings or implications for 
whatever disease, disorder, or condition you’re studying is never actively reported back.”  
Unless patients proactively pursue this information, “they won’t actually know what sort 
of progress is being made.”  Rather than continuing in the vein of the status quo, in 
which the only laboratory-patient communication happens in the beginning recruitment 
stage, Joy preferred to see an iterative system where the laboratory could potentially 
contact patients throughout the research process and update them on the project’s 
progress.  “Because if they participated in the first place then obviously they have a 
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vested interest.  They would probably be curious, not necessarily about individual 
findings, but just overall how the research is going.”11   
 
Shannon: [Ideally you would want to] show [the patients] 
the whole, the big picture of what their small contribution is 
going towards. 
 
Joy: I know the Smith lab across the hall, they work with 
Huntington’s, and they have a lot of interaction with 
Huntington’s patients.  They hold conferences to give them 
updates and things like that.  I think it’s a cool way to 
engage public interest, other than just having posters and 
recruiting patients, following up with some of the important 
[information]. 
 
Shannon: Do you think in the future you’d be able to do 
something like that? 
 
Joy: “Potentially.  Someone would have to head it up and 
take responsibility for it.  I don’t really know what sort of 
ethical considerations should be taken into account when 
approaching that kind of thing.  I think you wouldn’t want to 
cross any lines with privacy. 
 
Shannon: So respecting individual confidentiality while at 
the same time conveying the big picture. 
 
Joy: Yeah. 
 
The conversation on patient-engagement, a conversation from our first interview, served 
as my primary introduction into how Joy thought about social considerations in her day-
to-day research.  Social considerations, from her perspective, revolve mainly around the 
patient.  Her response to me indicated that she had already been thinking about the 
issue of engagement and how current practices might be improved.  The interview 
format provided a venue in which we could collaboratively explore such issues further, 
and think about various ways in which those considerations could be implemented in a 
concrete fashion. 
                                                
11 Exact question asked: “ Do you think there’s any room for improvement, or do you 
think the system is already doing what it should be doing?” 
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Joy’s and my conversations on responsible innovation led to us exchanging 
articles that the other might find interesting.  In the days following a conversation 
regarding the limits and boundaries responsible scientific practice, she searched for a 
Bill Joy piece that had a particularly strong impact on her thinking about science and 
boundaries.  Once she found it, she made sure to tell me the moment I walked into the 
laboratory, and had already placed it at my workspace with a post-it note saying, 
“Shannon, I found that article!”  Due to her enthusiasm and willingness to dialogue with 
me on the topic, I provided her with a selection of articles about integration and 
anticipatory governance, and included an explanation of how the articles could help 
inform and illuminate aspects of the Bill Joy article, as well as issues that we had 
covered in our “benchside” conversations.  Little did I know that I would be given the 
opportunity to feed Joy’s insights on responsible innovation into the larger group weeks 
later.    
That opportunity occurred about eight weeks into the engagement when I was 
invited to give a lab talk.  Frank approached me and asked if I would be willing to give a 
talk on responsible innovation.   Rather than attempt to give a lecture on the topic, it 
seemed best to simply guide the conversation in the style of a seminar.  Since a main 
topic of the workshop was responsible innovation, the question “what does responsible 
innovation mean to you?” was presented to the researchers. 
Alice, the laboratory director, discussed her trouble with reviewing grants.  She 
used the example of experiments that use monkeys as animal subjects.  She noted 
while reviewing a particular grant that she had sincere difficulty grappling with the 
consequences of particular experimentation on monkeys.  “What is my role in this?” she 
asked.  “Can I reject the grant because of the ethical issues that I see, or do I have to 
make my judgment based solely on the science”?  She said that reviewers do not have a 
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specific mandate to review the ethical implications of projects.  She stated, “We can 
adhere to all of it [the guidelines] but are the benefits/cruelty really worth the risk?”  She 
used another example of an experiment in which mice are starved to death, 
paradigmatic of experiments where the pain and suffering of the animal is obvious, and 
the social benefits much less so.  These points led to more discussions about science 
and ethics, concluding with the question of “where does ethics end and science begin?” 
The conversation also touched on issues of lab safety, training, confidentiality, 
and patient consent.  Laboratory members brought up the notion that “informed consent 
is a process, not a document” – something that can be forgotten in the day-to-day grind 
of scientific research.  At the same time, there is a fine balance that must be struck – lab 
members reflected that it would probably be irresponsible to unnecessarily contact 
patients that provided miscarriage samples.  In these cases, minimal contact might be 
better than too much contact, given the sensitive and emotional nature of such a case.  
Contacting patients in such a case might cause more harm than good.  This led to more 
philosophical questions, such as the idea of doing research for the “common good.” 
Rosa, the laboratory manager, inquired into the notion of the common good – “What is 
the common good?”  “What is good for who?” “Is the majority what rules?  Is whatever is 
good for the majority good for society?” 
Over the course of the conversation, I was able to present my own contextual 
notion of responsible innovation.  I made comments about the patient-centeredness of 
the laboratory culture, making references to past conversations about lab members’ 
passion for helping patients.  I noted that when and prompted to think about responsible 
innovation in the context of the laboratory, I immediately connected responsible 
innovation with patient engagement. I referenced my first interview with Joy, who was 
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out of town for this particular lab meeting.  “Can this lab do something like the Smith lab 
is doing?” I inquired.   
“Well, I’m not sure about what the other labs are doing in terms of patient 
outreach,” said Alice, “But I have wanted to put out a newsletter to our patients for quite 
a while.”  She claimed that the major setback was that she wanted to design it herself 
(having created many of the graphics on recruitment brochures, etc.), and did not have 
the time to get the newsletter underway.  Enthusiasm had been sparked in the 
conversation, and we continued talking about the possibility of an iterative patient 
newsletter, touching on topics such as format.  This prompted Alice to jump out of her 
chair and run to her office to grab a newsletter that had been sent to her house.  She 
particularly liked the format of this newsletter, and wanted to show it to the group, since it 
was close to her vision of what a patient update newsletter might look like.       
Shortly following this interchange, the discussion came to a close, as there were 
other items on the meeting agenda to address. The discussion afforded an opportunity 
to explore laboratory members’ thoughts and concerns regarding responsible innovation 
and how they understand it.  It provided a venue for the sharing of stories and ideas that 
are not typically discussed in the everyday laboratory setting, and importantly, served as 
an opportunity for the scientists themselves to raise concerns regarding patient 
engagement, where it was lacking, and where it might be possible to make it better. 
Such concerns relate back to the notion of enhancing accountability and democratizing 
scientific expertise making it “everybody’s business” to know what goes on in the context 
of the laboratory.   
A roundtable discussion such as the above example, in which scientists’ own 
insights and perspectives are fed back into the larger group, provides an opportunity in 
which junior scientists’ own tacit knowledges or tacit expertise can play a role in 
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enhancing the reflexive awareness and capacities of laboratory leadership and the 
laboratory itself.  As the facilitator of the discussion, I tapped into my ongoing 
conversations with laboratory members and presented some general insights to the 
larger group.  The insights that were presented to the larger group all stemmed from the 
laboratory members themselves, what integration provided was an opportunity to 
discuss their ideas and insights via the interview protocol, which would not otherwise 
have been accessed and fed back.  While immediate changes in practice might not 
occur, or even need to occur, such interactive roundtable venues serve as a perturbation 
in the everyday fabric of laboratory culture, and by their very nature of “bringing up 
things that are not normally discussed [in lab meetings]” and revisiting issues that have 
“sat on the backburner” for years, change the laboratory culture itself.    
It appeared that the newsletter idea had been set on the backburner once again, 
until the very last lab meeting.  In this meeting Alice said that she was planning on 
moving forward with the newsletter, and told her researchers that she wanted each one 
to work on a lay summary of their research.  The process would become a part of 
laboratory culture: “When someone publishes a paper, they should write a lay version.”  
She went on to discuss the merits of the newsletter: “[It will be] great for people to be 
involved in the process and know the progress of it.”   
That the newsletter appeared to be in the process of implementation as a 
laboratory practice less than a month after it had been discussed as a method of patient 
engagement in the responsible innovation conversation was an unexpected and exciting 
turn of events.  Laboratory members have indicated that the responsible innovation 
conversation played a role in the various dynamics that led to the newsletter’s 
implementation.  In the final interview with Joy, we were discussing the various activities 
that the laboratory is doing in terms of actively integrating social and ethical 
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considerations into its work.  I brought up the newsletter as one way that the laboratory 
was actively pursuing integration, and she asked, “Was that your idea?”  “No,” I 
responded, “It was yours!”  I told her that I had fed her earlier thoughts regarding patient 
engagement back into the larger group while she was out of town, therefore, the 
feedback and our earlier conversation on patient engagement had provided an important 
foundation for later conversations and action on the topic.  Fisher (2007, 163), 
encountered a similar experience, where a change in material practices was not 
triggered by an external mandate or policy, but rather by the participant’s own “latent 
concerns.”  As Fisher notes, “the engagement may have influenced practice, but to do 
so required the practitioner’s desire to remedy a perceived deficiency.”  
Oxford/London – Responsible Innovation, Micro and Macro  
Most of the material work that I participated in within the Jones laboratory was for 
John’s projects.  One of his projects focused on exploring the underlying genetic factors 
related to autism, a neurological developmental disorder affecting 1/150 children 
(Zimmerman 2008, 3).  Contemporary estimates for diagnoses of autism spectrum 
disorders, which can range from mild to severe symptoms, put the numbers at 1/88 
children (Carey 2012).  While symptoms range in severity, individuals along the autism 
spectrum can have difficulties in socialization, communicating, and might also have 
issues with intellectual development.  However, children that are diagnosed and begin 
treatment can see improvement in symptoms over time.  John hoped that his research 
could assist with early diagnosis and better therapy.  As my work relationship with John 
deepened, we would dialogue about the nature of his research, and I learned that autism 
was a particularly challenging area in genetic research because of its extreme variability 
from individual to individual, and to date, no single genetic mutation or combination of 
mutations can account for the complex symptoms that comprise autism disorder. 
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During a discussion with John, I mentioned that I was in the process of learning 
about preimplantation genetic diagnosis.  Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is a 
technique that enables genetic analysis of in-vitro embryos before they are implanted 
into the womb.  In order to detect genetic abnormalities that might indicate pre-
disposition to a particular disease, a single cell is biopsied from the embryo.  The 
technique has been utilized for a number of different conditions, including the genetic 
mutations associated with particular forms of breast cancer (the BRCA 1 and 2 
mutations).  In 2009, clinicians in the United Kingdom made headlines around the world 
when they performed PGD for a couple in which the father’s family line had a 
predisposition to breast cancer.  The clinicians created a number of embryos in-vitro, 
and selected the embryos that did not have the BRCA 1 and 2 mutations, therefore 
enabling the couple to have a baby without the genetic predisposition to breast cancer. It 
has been lauded by supporters as a miracle technique, because it can enable couples 
who might be carriers for certain devastating genetic conditions to have healthy babies.  
It has also been criticized as a harbinger of a new eugenics, of scientists “playing God” 
as other genetic predispositions unrelated to disease, such as sex, eye color, height, 
and other characteristics could be tested for.  The practice has been critiqued by some 
religious groups as well, because any unused embryos, or embryos with undesired 
genetic predispositions are discarded.  Additionally, having certain genetic mutations 
such as BRCA does not guarantee that an individual will get the disease, rather, in the 
case of BRCA, they have a higher chance (50 to 80 percent) of getting breast cancer at 
some point.  Some states, such as Italy and Germany, ban the practice.  The double-
edged sword of PGD is a highly regulated practice in the United Kingdom by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA).  
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 Early on, I made a mental connection between John’s autism research and the 
potential implications in embryo screening.  I asked John for his thoughts on PGD and 
autism.  “What if your research on autism genetics was applied to diagnosis of 
embryos?” I inquired.  “If your project is successful and the research published, there 
exists the potential that the genetic markers that you identify could be used to screen 
embryos for this condition.  Are you comfortable with the results of your research being 
used in such a way?” 
 “I have honestly never thought about this issue before,” responded John.  “I 
would hope that the research results would not get used in that way.  I want my research 
to go towards helping people.  Autism isn’t a death sentence – individuals with autism 
can lead fulfilling lives, and can benefit greatly from therapeutic measures.  I hope that 
the research can be applied to helping diagnose individuals earlier so they can get better 
treatment.”   
During the Oxford study, I would also travel to London every few weeks in an 
effort to understand the broader ongoing policy dynamics underpinning genetics and 
new reproductive technologies.  During one such visit to London, I participated in a 
stakeholder workshop on British PGD licensing policy, hosted by the HFEA.  The vast 
majority of the participants at the workshop were primarily scientists, stakeholders, or 
policymakers.   
Clinics must be licensed by the HFEA to carry out PGD, and once licensed they 
can carry out PGD for any condition previously approved by the HFEA.  Two conditions 
do not follow this licensing category, however, and the HFEA licensing committee 
considered the approval of testing on a case-by-case basis.  The two conditions are 
“lower penetrance,” where not everyone who has the mutation will get the disease, and 
“later age of onset” conditions, which carry with them the possibility for preventative 
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surgery.  BRCA is considered a later age of onset condition, and therefore would fall into 
the second category. A number of the clinicians at the workshop noted that the licensing 
application and case-by-case approval process was so lengthy (sometimes over the 
course of multiple years), that many couples would give up, especially couples 
experiencing a potentially short reproductive lifespan, either because they are older 
couples, or would have to undergo treatment, such as chemotherapy, mastectomy, etc. 
that could affect reproductive health.     
For part of the workshop, participants were divided into breakout groups.  The 
participants at the table, with the exception of myself, were well-established scientists 
and clinicians in the area of reproductive technologies.  The table was grappling with the 
question of whether lower penetrance and later age of onset conditions PGD should 
continue to be licensed on a case-by-case basis, or whether a blanket licensing scheme 
would be appropriate in some circumstances (i.e. once a clinic was approved to test for 
a certain condition, they would not need to reapply for a new license for that condition 
each time).  One clinician mentioned that she had been approached by a couple who 
wanted to carry out PGD for autism.  The couple had two sons already, and both were 
affected by the condition.  They hoped that the same mutations that were detected in 
both sons could be detected via PGD.  She implied that the couple gave up due to the 
lengthy licensing and approval process.   
While the couple ultimately did not end up moving forward with PGD, the 
clinician’s brief comment reminded me of John’s work, and the highly variable nature of 
autism, and his comment that autism is not a “death sentence” – some individuals with 
autism can benefit greatly from therapy.  I relayed these thoughts back to the larger 
table, noting my experience working with John on the autism project.  While the 
clinicians had been complaining about the hindrance of lengthy case-by-case review 
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process for low penetrance conditions, I noted that certain conditions, such as autism 
and other genetic disorders might merit closer scrutiny because they are so variable.  I 
also noted autism, unlike BRCA, for example, has a number of genes that could 
potentially be implicated in the condition, therefore making a blanket licensing policy 
difficult and laden with ethical ramifications.  The clinician who had originally raised the 
autism example commented that the points I raised about the unique and variable nature 
of autism were important issues, and while she had brought up the example to show why 
the current case-by-case licensing policy was unwieldy and unnecessary, the additional 
insights I shared provided a space for her to further reflect on the issue, and she in turn 
adjusted her viewpoint.  She and the rest of the scientists at the table agreed that some 
conditions might still merit a case-by-case licensing approach (they felt that BRCA 
should be blanket licensed, because the mother might have a short reproductive 
lifespan), but other cases that might fall along a spectrum, such as autism, should 
remain case-by-case.  The group relayed this feedback and the autism example back to 
the HFEA Head of Policy.  The Head of Policy stated that the feedback would be taken 
into consideration, as it illustrated that the HFEA should not take an all or nothing 
approach to licensing and making all conditions blanket licensed.  
Integration Agents: Engaging Inside and Outside the Lab 
The two above vignettes illustrate two ways that an embedded social scientist 
can critically interface with scientists both inside and outside the laboratory.  Te Kulve 
and Rip (2011, 704) call for “engagement agents” – individuals who can traverse the 
multiple “streams” and “work at more than one level” of innovation processes.  Such 
actors can serve as “linking pins” amongst the multiple levels that comprise a particular 
scientific and policy domain (Te Kulve and Rip 2011, 704).  Integration work presents 
one way of developing interactionally competent engagement agents.  The trading zones 
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that embedded social scientists develop with their scientist collaborators within the 
context of the laboratory are not necessarily confined to the four walls of the laboratory.  
Rather, as the collaboration strengthens over time, and the social scientist becomes 
more familiar with the technical aspects of the scientists’ work, and also becomes more 
comfortable asking questions at the confluence of the socio-technical, they consequently 
can take their newfound perspectives, knowledge, and critical insight to other levels, or 
streams, within the innovation system.   
Tennyson (2005), recounting the journeys of Odysseus, writes, “I am a part of all 
that I have met.” Similarly, the embedded social scientist carries his or her experiences 
both inside and outside of the laboratory with them, moving between the laboratory and 
other domains of scientific, policy, and socio-cultural practices.  The embedded social 
scientist becomes a mobile trading zone, in a sense, capable of directly engaging with 
laboratory cultural and material practices, while also being able to dialogue and provide 
critical insight into those same practices that she is actively participating in.  In the 
Vancouver case, this dialogue and feedback provided the laboratory a venue in which 
the laboratory director decided to change laboratory practices around patient 
engagement.  In Oxford, my experiences assisting John with his project, and our 
resulting dialogues, enabled me to “render […] visible” to him the “unperceived contexts” 
of embryo analysis that his work might influence (Fisher and Miller 2009, 371). These 
laboratory-level interactions further equipped me with the tools necessary to engage 
outside of the laboratory, and when the topic of licensing PGD for autism entered the 
conversation, I was able to provide modest insight from both the laboratory and the 
policy realms, and raise issues related to PGD licensing that neither the scientists nor 
the policymakers had discussed.     
Discussion: Engaging Responsive Capacities 
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 The cases explored in the three themes of the price of integration, participating in 
material practices, and responsible innovation suggest that laboratories are not isolated 
silos, as a traditional understanding of the two cultures might imply.  Rather, laboratories 
are nested within broader socio-technical dynamics and specific cultural contexts.  
These multiple layers of culture intersect at the level of the laboratory, giving shape to 
both the formalized and “tacit knowledge-ways” (Jasanoff 2007) that inform decision-
making within the midstream.  The ongoing engagement in socio-technical contracts (as 
opposed to sporadic interdisciplinary collaboration) that integration affords enables 
social and natural scientists to reflect on the broader dynamics of scientific research, 
establishing collaborative trading zones in which “latent concerns” of the researchers 
themselves can be unearthed (Fisher 2007, 163; Gorman 2002).   
As the work of Fisher (2007) and the examples explored in this chapter indicate, 
engaging the reflexive capacities of scientific researchers through consistent structured 
and unstructured interactions can in turn catalyze their own responsive capacities, in 
which the researchers themselves initiate laboratory-level change in response to broader 
social contexts and issues related to their research.  Furthermore, with new modes of 
engagement come new ways of understanding, and just as integration equips natural 
scientists with new tools for thinking about the broader context of their research, 
integration also furnishes the embedded social scientist with new perspectives and 
understandings cultivated through bench-side dialogue, and even, in some cases, 
participating first-hand in material practices.  Such experiences enable social scientists 
to become mobile trading zones, effective integration agents capable of engaging across 
the multiple levels of both practice and policy within a particular scientific domain, 
rendering socio-technical contracts more visible, and reflecting upon how they might be 
productively renegotiated with practitioners.  This collaborative configuration does not 
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happen automatically, though.  Integration is the study of what is possible when 
scientists and social scientists take the time to listen to each other, step outside of their 
comfort zones in order to establish trading zones, and learn each other’s “languages” by 
stepping into the shoes (or in this case the lab coat) of the other.  Therefore, while the 
“price” of integration might be a high one, it is well worth the cost. 
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CONCLUSION 
TECHNOLOGICAL SOMNAMBULISM IS NOT INEVITABLE: REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES, ANTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE, AND SOCIO-TECHNICAL 
CONTRACTS 
The anticipatory governance literature advocates for the creation of tools to 
assist in developing “distributed capacities” for various stakeholders to engage in the 
governance of technologies.  This project has explored the anticipatory capacities that 
exist within governance arrangements for thinking through and bringing about significant 
changes in what I describe as “socio technical contracts” – or the kinds of socio-
technological assumptions and arrangements that characterize a particular domain of 
policy or practice. This work has focused on the question of anticipation, and the modes 
by which societies engage in the proactive governance of emerging technologies. The 
project explored the concept in tandem with the rapid scientific and technological 
evolution of the last century, where it often seems as if technological development and 
scientific breakthroughs outpace societal attempts to govern them.   
As argued earlier, however, this is not always the case – it is possible for society 
to “get ahead” of the curve and proactively grapple with the implications of new and 
emerging technologies – before it is “too late.”  And when it does seem to be “too late,” 
and that the socio-technical contract has already been “written,” that is possible to 
renegotiate, rethink, and rewrite the terms of the contract (see, for example in chapter 
four, which focuses on donor conception technology).  While there exists a rich literature 
in Science and Technology Studies, Feminist Studies, and Policy Studies on 
reproductive technologies (such as the work of Jasanoff, Thompson, Mulkay, Franklin 
and Roberts, and others) I sought to bring a new perspective to this literature by bringing 
reproductive technologies together in conversation with existing literature on anticipatory 
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governance, and utilize the case studies as a way of putting anticipatory governance in 
conversation with the socio-technical contract framework.  Drawing from Guston’s (2007) 
work on the social contract for science, the empirical material in this project also helped 
illuminate another aspect of social contracts as they relate to the governance of 
emerging technologies, that is, socio-technical contracts diverge from the traditional 
social contracts of thinkers such as Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls in the sense that rather 
than being tacit agreements, they are dynamic negotiations that are actively being 
renegotiated and deliberated upon.  
The case studies in the governance of assisted reproductive technologies 
explored within this project illustrate the process of active negotiations of socio-technical 
contracts. Society does not sleepwalk through every technological configuration.  
Citizens and stakeholders, in these case studies, were not necessarily being blindsided 
by advances in reproductive technologies, rather, as the case studies illustrate, 
questions were being raised about the implications of reproductive technologies far 
before the technologies themselves actually existed.  One aspect of the empirical work 
that comprises this project that I sought to illuminate was the critical role that individual 
citizens, various government entities, and other informal entities can play in combatting 
the “lag” that is commonly attributed to the relationship between technology and 
ethics/policy by taking an active role in negotiating and renegotiating socio-technical 
contracts.  The remainder of this conclusion situates the capacities described within the 
project within the foresight, engagement, and integration spheres of anticipatory 
governance, and provides thoughts and questions regarding future areas for research.    
The Governance of Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Foresight, Engagement, 
and Integration 
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The foresight, engagement, and integration spheres are foundational to the 
concept of anticipatory governance.  As Barben et al. (2008) emphasize, anticipatory 
governance comprises distributed and societally embedded capacities for shaping things 
to come, and these shaping mechanisms are framed within Barben et al. 2008 as 
foresight, engagement, and integration.  Therefore, how do the capacities explored in 
this project fit into these three key spheres?  In the following section, I discuss the 
distributed capacities illuminated in this project as they relate to the foresight, 
engagement, and integration concepts, illustrating how the anticipatory governance 
framework overlays with large-scale, governance dynamics and capacities for 
proactively shaping things to come.  
The imaginative capacities explored in the second chapter align with the foresight 
and engagement spheres of anticipatory governance.  Within this chapter I drew from 
Miller and Bennett’s work on science fiction in constructing socio-technical futures, and 
Jasanoff and Kim’s work on sociotechnical imaginaries in order to reflect on and 
contribute new ideas regarding the imaginative capacities of society, and the role of 
story, metaphor, and motif in shaping and catalyzing debates around the future 
implications of new and emerging technologies.  I illustrated that there were ongoing 
debates and dialogues about the responsible practice of science reaching to before the 
time of Shelley’s Frankenstein, when concerns about the responsible use of galvanism 
were being deliberated and the importance of citizen participation in the scientific 
enterprise was being discussed in the public sphere.  Frankenstein, widely considered to 
be the first modern work of science fiction, served as a reflection on the practices of 
galvanism taken to the extreme limits of the imagination.  Shelley’s motif of the monster, 
born from a scientist’s desire to “play god” by controlling the powers of life itself, 
continued to be an important framing device for stimulating dialogue about responsible 
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innovation all the way to the birth of Louise Brown and beyond.  Huxley’s Brave New 
World similarly captured the societal imagination during the time that it was published, 
serving as a reflection on the role of government in society and, taking the idea of 
government control to its extremes, reflecting on government control of all aspects of 
human activity, including reproduction.  In the third part of the chapter, I drew from 
archival sources to illustrate how (sometimes in subtle ways, and sometimes in quite 
blatant ways) the two works of science fiction served as ongoing motifs in conversations 
around reproductive technologies.  Before Louise Brown was born, and before PGD 
technology was a possibility, the chapter reflected that citizens, stakeholder groups, and 
independent and government advisory bodies were actively deliberating upon the future 
trajectories of these technologies and engaging in societally embedded foresight 
activities. 
In the third chapter, I chronicled the governance dynamics in the UK from the 
birth of Louise Brown to the establishment of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority.  This chapter explored capacities for judgment, chronicling the “out of control” 
atmosphere following the 1978 birth of Louise Brown, and delving into the role of 
Britain’s trustworthy experts, the “great and good,” in reigning in those perceived out of 
control forces and giving shape to the new socio-technical contract that would provide 
the foundations (embodied within the Warnock Report and the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act of 1990) for how the British would engage with reproductive 
technologies from that point onward.  One significant capacity for judgment was 
embedded within the expertise-laden Warnock Committee, who was tasked with 
negotiating the perceived chaos into order and “Stopping [a] ‘Brave New World’.”  This 
chapter aligns with both the foresight and integration spheres of anticipatory 
governance.  It aligns with the foresight sphere in the sense that the Warnock 
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Committee, though the report it generated, engaged in an anticipatory exercise in 
providing recommendations that could not only encompass the nascent, current state of 
reproductive technologies, but that could also evolve with the technology as it 
transitioned from an experimental technique to a widely distributed medical treatment.  It 
aligns with the integration sphere in the sense that the Warnock Committee was not only 
integrated in terms of bringing together an array of experts from the social, humanistic, 
and natural sciences, but it also brought together the social and technical elements of 
new reproductive technologies and packaged them together, creating new types of 
socio-technical hybrids as a result, such as the “pre-embryo” or the “legitimate” donor-
conceived child (as discussed in chapter four).         
Chapter four focused on capacities for renegotiating socio-technical contracts, 
and specifically delved into the role of individual stakeholders and traditional legal 
institutions, such as the courts, in reimagining the rights of citizens.  The dynamics 
explored within this chapter align with the engagement sphere of anticipatory 
governance in the sense that the courts provided a new space for donor conceived 
individuals to engage with existing policy and shape future policy dynamics.  Chronicling 
the experiences of Canadian Olivia Pratten and British Joanna Rose, both donor-
conceived individuals seeking information about their biological sperm donor fathers, this 
chapter contrasted with Winner’s notion that once a social contract has been written, it 
cannot be rewritten.  It explored the experiences of donor-conceived individuals in 
Canada and the United Kingdom as they attempted to rewrite the terms of the socio-
technical contract in light of new societal considerations regarding the “right to an 
identity.”  The chapter also falls into the integration sphere in terms of the work of the 
Warnock Committee in renegotiating the donor-conceived child from what might be 
considered an unruly social kind, the “DI child” back into the traditional, “legitimate” 
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British family.  The foresight sphere appears again here, as reading of the Warnock 
Report, with particular attention to the sections on donor-conceived children illustrates 
the parallels between Brave New World, and the world Warnock was seeking to avoid 
(e.g. babies being born outside of a family context, avoiding the commodification of 
babies, and avoiding the design of children).  The Warnock Committee was clear that it 
wanted children embedded in families, not wards of the state.  Brave New World was a 
future it wanted to avoid.    
Chapter five also falls into the engagement sphere, as it explored the deliberative 
capacities within the United Kingdom for actively negotiating socio-technical contracts 
around PGD policy.  The chapter recounted societal debates around whether allowing 
PGD for limited medical uses would open the door to giving couples the opportunity to 
select for “designer babies.”  The HFEA was tasked with navigating and simultaneously 
providing a space for public discourse around the controversial topic, with vocal 
stakeholders from the disability community arguing that allowing PGD would be akin to 
new era of eugenics.  On the other hand, patient advocates argued that they simply 
wanted a “normal” baby, free of severe inherited disease.  Although the HFEA started 
developing a framework for PGD regulation in 1993, it has been unable to stabilize a 
framework for PGD, as the question of what medical conditions are severe enough to 
allow PGD continues to be an ongoing debate.  As I argued in the chapter, rather than 
viewing the lack of a stable framework as a negative, it could be seen as a positive, due 
to the strength of the “talk centric” public sphere in the United Kingdom, and the HFEA’s 
efforts to continually rethink and revisit the socio-technical contract around PGD. 
Chapter six ties into the foresight sphere of anticipatory governance.  
Specifically, the chapter focused on the capacity of existing HFEA policy for addressing 
new and controversial issues.  This chapter explores how the foresight exercises (and 
  272 
resulting policy language) of the past shape present-day policy decisions.  Specifically, 
the chapter attends to the “welfare of the child language” within the HFE Act, and the 
ways in which it acted as a boundary-negotiating tool in helping the HFEA determine 
what would be appropriate versus inappropriate use of PGD and HLA tissue-typing 
technology.  Using the case studies of the Hashmi and Whitaker families, the chapter 
further addressed the societal debates and dialogues around PGD, in light of the new 
technological capacity of HLA tissue typing, which, when coupled with PGD, enables for 
the creation of a “savior sibling” – a perfectly matched donor whose umbilical cord stem 
cells could provide relief and even a cure to an ill older sibling or other family member.  
The line between right and wrong becomes even murkier, however, since the donor 
sibling would also be a perfect match for other biological materials, such as kidneys.  
The chapter also explored the negotiation of the meanings of love and of perfection, as 
families struggled with a severely ill child – seeking to create a perfect younger sibling to 
cure an imperfect older sibling. 
And finally, chapter seven approached the negotiation of socio-technical 
contracts at a different level of analysis, at the level of the laboratory.  Chapter seven 
falls into the integration sphere of anticipatory governance, and comprised two case 
studies of genetics laboratories in Canada and the United Kingdom, and explored the 
responsive capacity of laboratories to integrate societal considerations into daily 
decisionmaking processes.  Drawing from Fisher’s (2007) work, the integration sphere of 
anticipatory governance argues that the laboratory, or the “midstream” of the R&D 
process, is an overlooked but important sight for governance, and as I argue within the 
chapter, a key arena for the negotiation and renegotiation of socio-technical contracts.  
This chapter is distinct from the others in one other key way: while the previous chapters 
explored existing capacities for anticipatory governance and the negotiation of socio-
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technical contracts, chapter seven illustrated another key aspect of anticipatory 
governance – that capacities for anticipatory governance can be actively and 
intentionally built.  
While I began this study with the intention of primarily focusing on the HFEA as 
an agent of anticipatory governance, my time spent both in the field and immersed in 
archives led to an augmentation of the scope of analysis.  As Barben et al. (2008) note, 
anticipatory governance should not be limited to any one entity, rather, anticipatory 
governance can be thought of as a “society-wide distributed capacity for shaping things 
to come.”  Indeed, this project was not solely a study of government, but instead tackles 
the topic from the perspective of governance.  The case studies discussed above reflect 
the broader notion of governance – there is no one specific entity engaging in the 
negotiation of socio-technical contracts.  Instead, the capacity resides in many different 
parts of society, from formal institutions such as the HFEA, to plaintiffs in court cases, to 
dialogues at the laboratory bench, to conversations about these issues in coffee shops 
and pubs.  The foresight, engagement, and integration tools in the societal tool belt for 
anticipatory governance are broad and diverse in nature.  Thus, technological 
somnambulism is not the inevitable trap that Winner had originally posited. 
Questions for Future Research and Proposed Next Steps 
This project sought to lay groundwork for new directions for research in 
anticipatory governance.  It argues that the policy process is broader than legislation 
alone, that there are capacities being cultivated within society for anticipatory 
governance, and therefore presents a different way of looking at the world from what 
Winner lays out.  A number of questions for future research then arise.  For example, 
what does anticipatory governance look like in different national contexts?  One key 
question and new direction for research relates to what anticipatory capacities look like 
  274 
in different socio-cultural contexts.  In what ways are capacities distributed in similar and 
dissimilar arrangements?  What is the process for cultivating capacities in the British and 
other contexts?  How does one measure and evaluate capacities?  What are the means 
for determining whether they are effective or ineffective?  In what ways do these 
anticipatory capacities help British society construct a better future?  What sorts of 
capacities for anticipatory governance need to be pursued and cultivated moving 
forward?  These questions cannot be answered here, but I raise them because in order 
to have a more robust understanding of how anticipatory governance operates within 
different contexts, they need to be answered.        
While this work focused primarily on British capacities for negotiating socio-
technical contracts, the next phase of my research plan includes integrating a 
comparative Canadian component. I propose to utilize the comparative method, 
comparative institutional histories, and archival work to examine historical anticipatory 
capacities in the British and Canadian governance of reproductive technologies.  
Comparative case studies enable the researcher to parse out activities that are context-
specific, and those that are not.  There are a number of similarities between British and 
Canadian societies which make governance activity within these contexts solid 
comparisons, including a parliamentary system of government, shared legal traditions, a 
similar language, shared histories, and additionally, they are two of the only countries 
that have created national licensing agencies to govern assisted reproductive 
technologies.  Despite their similarities, however, my initial research into British and 
Canadian approaches to the governance of anonymous sperm donation indicates that 
there are also significant distinctions in British and Canadian approaches to governing 
assisted reproductive technologies.  A comparison between the UK and Canada 
provides the opportunity to focus on a study of historically embedded anticipatory 
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capacities that emerge in both cases, as well as those capacities that might be specific 
to each context.   
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